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Abstract 
This work examines the role of private elites in addition to public actors in West German-
American relations in the post-World War II era and thus joins the ranks of the “new 
diplomatic history” field. It studies the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on 
Germany (ACG) from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s – a history that has hitherto been 
neglected. The focus on private elites and their contributions to fledgling public-private 
networks within each country and across the Atlantic helps to shed light on the ways 
hostilities between West Germany and the US were addressed.  
Based on original archival research and applying tools of Social Network Analysis 
(SNA), this thesis starts from the assumption that international relations are conducted by 
elites. These elites are not only composed of democratically legitimized politicians and 
diplomats. Private actors representing business, industry, media, and academia are also 
involved, albeit hidden from public scrutiny. Private actors are enabled to do so because they 
are integral parts of dense state-private networks. The state-private network concept is 
innovatively transferred to the transnational level. The network term emphasises the fact that 
those connections are neither limited in quantitative terms nor are they confined to national 
boundaries.  
The analysis illuminates three sustainable achievements of the ACG and Atlantik-
Brücke.  Firstly, they contributed to forging a bipartisan foreign policy consensus at whose 
core has been a strong West-German-American relationship. Key in achieving this was the 
redirection of West German Social Democracy away from anti-militarism, neutralism, and 
socialism.  Secondly, in fulfilling an elite coordination function, the organisations helped to 
secure the transatlantic partnership consensus by conveying it into business, trade and 
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industry circles in the US as well as in West Germany. Thirdly, by utilizing their manifold 
links to media and academia they assisted in manifesting this consensus in public discourse.  
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Introduction 
 What are the connections between the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the German media 
coverage, and transatlantic elite networks? These connections are not necessarily visible at 
first sight. Yet viewers of the German political satire TV show Die Anstalt, comparable to The 
Daily Show in the US, got a glimpse of these links in spring 2014. The show revealed a dense 
network of transatlantic elite organisations – associations, think tanks, and councils, among 
them the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany (ACG)  which all have in 
common that they bring together journalists, academics, politicians, and business people. In 
the episode of Die Anstalt, these organisations were dubbed “local branches of NATO’s press 
office” and “transatlantic lobby organisations”, which, accordingly, helped to portray the 
crisis in Cold War terms. The portrayal showcases, on the one side, Ukraine desperately 
longing to be associated with the European Union and thus becoming a partner of the US, and 
on the other side, Russia playing an aggressive and anti-Western role. Journalists of leading 
German media outlets feature prominently within these transatlantic networks.
1
 Kai 
Diekmann, for example, was editor-in-chief of Germany’s highest-circulation tabloid Bild at 
the time and still is a board member of the Atlantik-Brücke.
2
 
 For most viewers, this was probably the first time they had heard about these 
organisations. The Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG have rarely been subject to media coverage 
in the course of their more than 60-year-history. Seldom did they actively seek public or 
media attention. Therefore, little is known about these organisations – among the broader 
                                                 
1 
The close interconnectedness of leading media representatives in Germany with transatlantic elite networks is 
the main focus in Uwe Krüger, Meinungsmacht: Der Einfluss von Eliten auf Leitmedien und Alpha-
Journalisten - Eine Kritische Netzwerkanalyse (Cologne: Herber von Halem Verlag, 2013). 
2 
Die Anstalt broadcasted by German public-service broadcaster, ZDF, on Apr. 29, 2014; access online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3M6Vu6XjUsc (Oct. 14, 2015). Committees of the Atlantik-Brücke 
https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/eng/about-us/committees/ (Jan. 17, 2017). 
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public as well as in academia. In the higher echelons of US and German politics, however, the 
two organisations are well known. In December 2011, Minister of State Werner Hoyer, for 
example, praised the ACG as having “always been a strong actor in [Germany’s] relations 
with the United States”.3 Former president George H. W. Bush lauded the Atlantik-Brücke in 
turn for having “stood the test of hard times and rough weather”, standing “fast during the 
difficult years of the Cold War”, and being instrumental in bringing about “the peaceful 
unification of Germany”.4 
The intertwined history of these two organisations, going back to the early 1950s, has 
hitherto remained untold. Yet, both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke promote a strong 
transatlantic partnership to this very day, albeit in a changed global setting. This dissertation 
argues that the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG evolved to become central civil society pillars, 
essential in underpinning German-American rapprochement, and have become important 
actors helping to build and maintain an unlikely partnership between the US and West 
Germany as an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance. In doing so, this thesis examines whether 
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke have indeed functioned as “local branches of NATO’s press 
office”, and “transatlantic lobby organisations” as Die Anstalt claimed. 
The beginnings of an unlikely alliance 
In the early years after World War II, the life of most people in war-ridden Europe was 
dominated by hardship and distress. More than 32 million people had been killed in Europe 
alone, military and civilian alike. Tens of thousands were still held as prisoners of war, most 
                                                 
3 
Speech given by minister of state Werner Hoyer at a dinner sponsored by the ACG in Berlin, Dec. 7, 2011 
(http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/111207-
StM_H_American_Council.html accessed Nov.5, 2015). 
4 
Introduction by George H. W. Bush in Ludger Kühnhardt, Atlantik-Brücke. Fünfzig Jahre deutsch-
amerikanische Partnerschaft, 1952-2002 (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2002), 7.  
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of whom were Germans imprisoned in the Soviet Union.
5
 In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, until September 1945, there were approximately six to seven million displaced persons.
6
 
Urgent needs such as hunger and finding a place to live had to be met. Widespread 
bombardments of German cities by the Allied Air Forces left an equal number of people 
homeless with approximately 20 percent of the total housing stock nationwide destroyed or 
damaged. In Hamburg, for example, the extent of destruction reached 75 percent.
7
 For those 
who had lived through the war, paralysing memories of flight, persecution, and imprisonment 
often conflicted with the necessity to manage everyday life. Germany’s reputation was 
damaged greatly as more and more transpired about war crimes committed by Germans.  
Thus, looking back at the impact of World War II two central aspects come into view: first, 
the exceedingly high numbers of human losses coupled with the catastrophic degree of 
physical destruction, and “the division of the world into victors and defeated”.8 With regard to 
both aspects, Germans and Americans belonged in opposite camps. German military losses 
had amounted to approximately 5.3 million dead soldiers – “almost three times … than in 
World War I”; by contrast, the US army had suffered the considerably smaller number of 
405,000 military deaths during the Second World War.
9
 While Germany surrendered to the 
Allies in 1945 and was divided into four zones of occupation, the US emerged as the 
mightiest Western power establishing an “empire by invitation”.10 
                                                 
5 For table of “European World War II Casualties”, see Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic 
Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947 (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1998), 304. 
6 
Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, ‘Displaced Persons, 1945-1950: The social and cultural 
perspective’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exile and Resettlement, 1945-1950, Cengage Learning EMEA 
Ltd, Reading 2007, see http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope/essay5.asp (accessed Nov. 20, 2013). 
7 
Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War : The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 11-12. 
8 Gerhard L. Weinberg, “The Place of World War II in Global History”, in A Companion to World War Two, 
ed. with Daniel M. Dubois Thomas W. Zeiler (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 999. 
9 
ibid. Rüdiger Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 
294. 
10
 Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952”, Journal of 
Peace Research vol. 23, no. 3: 263-277. 
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Against this background, as early as in 1949, four people – unlikely friends at the time – 
Americans and Germans, began developing a plan to found the American Council on 
Germany (ACG) in New York and a sister organization, the Atlantik-Brücke, in Hamburg. 
One of the founders was Eric M. Warburg, a Jewish banker originally from Hamburg where 
his ancestors had founded the family’s banking house in 1798. Due to Nazi Aryanisation and 
expropriation policies, the Warburg family had lost its banking house in 1938 and emigrated 
to the United States, settling in New York. Eric Warburg, who was very attached to Hamburg 
despite the terror of the Nazi regime, became a transatlantic commuter after World War II, 
living both in Hamburg and in New York. In the early 1940s, Warburg met Christopher 
Emmet, a wealthy publicist and political activist who shared Warburg’s strong anti-
communist stance and an attachment to pre-Nazi Germany. On the German side of this 
transatlantic relationship, Marion Countess Dönhoff, a journalist at the liberal West German 
weekly Die ZEIT, and Erik Blumenfeld, a Christian Democratic politician and businessperson 
joined Warburg and Emmet. Their plan was to use the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG as 
vehicles to foster amicable relations between the newly founded Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States. Yet, what role did these private organisations play in West 
German-American relations during the first half of the Cold War (1950s to mid-1970s)? In 
answering this, this thesis will examine the role of private elite networks on the stage of 
international relations.  
Friendly relations between the US and West Germany, a victorious superpower and the 
disgraced nation, are too easily taken for granted.
11
 In the late 1940s and 1950s, Americans 
were still shocked by the horrors of Nazi rule and the Holocaust. Americans also still suffered 
                                                 
11 Thomas A. Schwartz, for example, characterised “U.S. relationship with postwar Germany” ... as “a case 
study of success...”. Thomas A. Schwartz, “The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, 
Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History vol. 19, no. 4 (1995): 549. 
Hans Wilhelm Gatzke, Germany and the United States, a “Special Relationship?”, The American Foreign 
Policy Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). Detlef Junker, “Introduction: Politics, 
Security, Economics, Culture, and Society - Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations”, in The United States 
and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990, ed. Detlef Junker (Washington, D.C.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 1-28. 
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from the losses sustained in carrying a major burden together with their allies to end Hitler’s 
planning for German rule beyond Europe. West Germany was confronted with a deeply 
divided population suffering from economic, military and moral devastation. Many Germans 
blamed capitalism along with the Nazis for their ordeal. Certainly, Social Democrats, 
Communists, and trade unionists were not immediately convinced of economic liberalism and 
re-armament under the umbrella of NATO. Germany’s propertied class suffered from 
dispossession of overseas properties, from the disruption of former trade routes, and not least 
from a negative image tainted by the nation’s Nazi past. These obstacles on the way to a 
reliable West German-American partnership were serious. 
 How did West German and American leaders overcome objections to rapprochement and 
how did they achieve reconciliation? Hostile sentiments and prejudices held on both sides 
should not be underestimated. Most Germans, and in particular the industrial elite, had 
persistent anti-American sentiments. The American public and a considerable part of the 
political elite were deeply sceptical as to whether the Germans were ready for democracy. 
Furthermore, the political battle between the isolationist and the internationalist camp in US 
politics was still ongoing. Beyond public and private opinion, West Germany and the US had 
conflicting interests: German and American companies were competitors in major markets; 
and any war between the US and the Soviet Union would have been likely to play out on 
German soil. Keeping all this in mind, friendly relations between the victorious US and the 
defeated Germany do not appear predestined.
12
  
                                                 
12 
 Dan Diner sketches superbly the development of anti-Americanism as an ideology from the 18th century to 
the present stressing that such sentiments were particularly widespread among the German  middle classes 
and intelligentsia; in: America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism, English language 
ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996). On the nexus of anti-American sentiments and anti-
modernism see Rob Kroes, “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Modernism in Europe. Old and Recent Versions”, 
in Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945, ed. 
Alexander Stephan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 202-220. On the West German industrial elite see 
Volker Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 
72-73. 
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General geopolitical explanations for German-American reconciliation are well known: the 
US needed a strong West Germany in the face of post-war Soviet expansion and consolidation 
of the Eastern bloc. West Germany sought military protection and security guarantees from 
the US as well as the restoration of its economic prospects. Post-war history might have to be 
written quite differently if the Western allies, along with West German chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, had not dismissed the Stalin notes of March and April 1952  a proposal for the 
reunification and neutralisation of Germany as well as for free elections   as bluff.13 The 
Germans’ desire for unification along with a neutral status for the country was as strong as the 
opposition to the rearmament of West Germany. In March 1950, 52 percent of West Germans 
were neither in favour of being invited to the Atlantic Treaty nor of belonging to a framework 
for a European Army. In July 1952, 23 percent saw the issue of reunification as most 
important and more significant than economic questions. In May 1955, 45 percent were 
opposed to a West German army. From August 1957 until January 1965, more than 60 
percent of West Germans ranked the wish for unification as the top priority of the country’s 
foreign policy.
14
 
This thesis examines the role and relevance of private elites in addition to public actors and 
their contributions to enable fledgling public-private networks within each country and across 
the Atlantic. Along with other studies committed to new diplomatic history, this dissertation 
argues that it is necessary to unveil the anonymous structures of diplomacy within the nation 
state and beyond.
15
 Thus, it helps to shed light on the ways hostilities between the US and 
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Rolf Steininger and Mark Cioc, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of 
Reunification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
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Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966 
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reunification pp. 59-64. 
15 
The broadest definition of the field or subject in a traditional sense specifies diplomatic history as the study 
of international relations with a strong focus on power and the state combined with a methodological 
conservatism and the primacy of political history. The cultural turn in diplomatic history opened the field to 
cultural studies and the social sciences and is manifested in works focusing on the role of ideas, ideologies, 
knowledge and cultural goods at large as well as a focus on private actors and transnational entanglements 
transcending national borders and thus opening up to larger geographical spaces. See among others Akira 
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West Germany were addressed and how the diverse obstacles to German-American 
reconciliation have been tackled. Considering the activities and achievements of organizations 
like the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke hence contributes to a fuller understanding of how and 
why West Germany recovered so swiftly, economically and politically, and how and why 
Americans came to see West Germany as a friendly nation again rather than a barbarian 
enemy.  
A closer look at the group of people who helped steer the decisive shift on the American 
side helps to solve the puzzle. This group consisted of staunch anti-communist political 
realists, mainly comprised of internationalist-minded members of the US East Coast 
establishment. This included New York lawyers and bankers, who, by using the revolving 
door, held high state or military posts exerted much influence on US foreign policy, especially 
with regard to Germany. Therefore, US policies aimed at Germany came to reflect the 
specific ideological and economic interests of these circles.
16
 A number of these men were to 
play a significant role in the story of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Among them were 
John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner to Germany (1949-1952); Shepard Stone, director of 
the Ford Foundation’s international programme (1954-1968); Lucius D. Clay, Military 
Governor of the US Occupation Zone in Germany (1947-49); and Eric M. Warburg and 
Christopher Emmet, co-founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.
17
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In Chapter 1 Christopher Emmet and Eric M. Warburg are introduced as two of the four original founders of 
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay were members of the ACG both 
holding official positions in the organisation and thus are introduced in Chapter 2. Shepard Stone’s 
relationship to the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG as well as personal relationships to a number of the original 
founders is attended to in Chapter 3. 
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The role of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in the quest for Atlanticism 
This thesis focuses on the early years of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, tracing their 
history up to 1974. Both bodies were founded in 1952. Christopher Emmet, one of the four 
core founding members of both organisations, died in 1974. This marked the end of an era in 
more than one respect. Emmet’s death coincided with an overhaul in terms of the leadership 
and membership of the West German and the American groups, reflecting their attempt to 
rejuvenate the transatlantic elite network. Only one year prior to Emmet’s death, the ACG and 
the Atlantik-Brücke had introduced their Young Leaders’ programme. The latter sought to 
ensure that the younger generation would help to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, 
the year 1974 not only marked the start of a new era in the history of both organisations; it 
was also characterised by major political changes in both countries. In terms of domestic 
politics, it was marked by the resignations of both Willy Brandt and Richard Nixon. And, at a 
more general level, the mid-1970s constitute the end of the “Golden Age”, the crisis of 
industrial society and the breakdown of consensus liberalism of the Cold War period. The 
sum of these developments means that 1974 is a fitting end point for the timeframe of this 
thesis.  
The analysis of the intertwined history of the two bodies starts from the assumption that 
elites shape international politics and bilateral relations. These elites, however, are not only 
composed of democratically legitimized politicians and diplomats. Private actors representing 
business, industry, media, and academia are also involved in this process, albeit hidden from 
public scrutiny. They are able to do so because they are integral parts of dense state-private 
networks. Inderjeet Parmar deserves credit for shaping our understanding of state-private 
networks and their conceptual underpinnings.
18
 According to this concept, actors of both the 
public and private realm interact in a cooperative and “state-spirited” mode, personally 
                                                 
18 Inderjeet Parmar, “Conceptualising the State-Private Network in American Foreign Policy”, in The US 
Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War. The State-Private Network., eds. Hugh Wilford and Helen 
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identifying with the problems of the state. In using the concept of “state spirit”, I follow 
Inderjeet Parmar, who defines the latter as a central aspect of private elites’ motivation as they 
“take personally the concerns” of the nation-state. In his defining of the term, Parmar refers to 
two texts in Antonio Gramsci’s Prisonbooks, “The Different Position of Urban and Rural-
Type Intellectuals” and “Elements of Politics”. As Parmar points out, “state spirit” allows 
leaders to “subordinate narrow economic and political interests to the broader, long-term 
interests of the state/nation as a whole. According to Gramsci, such leaders may even come to 
believe “that they are the State”.19  
By studying the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this thesis makes an original contribution to 
the study of state-private networks as it transfers the study of the latter the transnational level. 
The “network” term is important in this context: it emphasises the fact that those connections 
are neither limited in quantitative terms nor are they confined to national boundaries. On the 
contrary, networks are highly flexible structures that easily transcend national boundaries and 
allow for multidirectional transfers and exchanges of resources, ideas and values.
20
 
In this thesis, the founders and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG are shown as 
key agents in initiating and facilitating state-private networks. At the same time, this study 
seeks to illustrate to what ends founders and officers have used these networks. It argues that 
the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were essential actors in the process of developing and 
maintaining an unlikely partnership between the US and West Germany. Key in achieving 
this aim was to convince both West German and American elites to embrace liberal 
internationalism – “the other great postwar ideology”, which was the antagonist of 
                                                 
19 Quoted from Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller 
Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 23-24. Antonio 
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Communism.
21
 Concepts and theories of liberalism are highly controversial and contested, not 
least the transferral of liberalism into the international sphere.
22
 Liberal internationalism was a 
political project that aimed to establish individual freedom through private property 
internationally following the American model. Realising this project, however, required a 
willingness and ability to protect and extend this freedom through government by consent, 
hence consensus liberalism. Yet, in doing so, liberal internationalism produced and 
reproduced unequal power relations. According to Beate Jahn, this political project ultimately 
provided a justification for American hegemony.
23
 
Historiography 
Historical assessment of the intertwined histories of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke is 
overdue. A number of scholars have pointed to the relevance of both organisations, most 
prominently the contributors to Detlef Junker’s handbook The United States and Germany in 
the era of the Cold War, 1945-1990.
24
 These cite the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as 
examples of private organisations taking over tasks from US government agencies in the 
1950s, particularly programmes, implemented during the first post-war decade focusing on 
the de-nazification, re-education, and democratisation of the German people. In the process of 
rebuilding Western Europe and Germany, US government institutions played a major role at 
least in the first decade after the end of World War II. This explains the longevity of 
historians’ concentration on the governmental level of relations and hitherto neglect of private 
actors.
25
 A number of historians, however, suggest studying precisely and comprehensively 
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organisations such as the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, emphasising the relevance of 
informal contacts in international relations. These scholars stress the role of private groups in 
enhancing West-German-American relations by bringing together elites from both countries 
and thus promoting dialogue and a better mutual understanding of both societies.
 26
 According 
to Konrad Jarausch, the Atlantik-Brücke’s assumed task was to reduce the “still widely held 
reservations toward the Federal Republic” in the United States and to cultivate “sympathy for 
the ‘American way of life’ in Germany”.27 However, aside from two in-house histories, both 
published on the occasion of their fiftieth anniversary in 2002, a comprehensive scholarly 
study on the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke is still missing.
28
  
While this doctoral dissertation seeks to fill a scholarly gap with regard to these two 
organisations, it is very much inspired by Kees van der Pijl’s work on the formation processes 
of the transatlantic bourgeoisie in the 20
th
 century.
29
 The thesis can draw on scholarship 
analysing elite groups and networks active in a transnational sphere.
 30
 During the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, historians became increasingly interested in the cultural dimensions of the 
Cold War confrontation and hence probed deeper into private and informal connections 
transcending national borders. The well-studied Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a 
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transnational elite network of anti-Stalinist left intellectuals and artists in Western Europe, 
features overlaps in personnel with the network of the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke; among 
them, for example, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Shepard Stone.
31
 The CCF 
attracted particular controversy when it was revealed, in the late 1960s, that it had received 
covert CIA funding. Shepard Stone, the networker par-excellence, is at the centre of Volker 
Berghahn’s path-breaking book on the sociology of West German-American post-war 
relations.
32
 Stone also played an influential role in the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s 
history as director of the international programme of the Ford Foundation, the main external 
source of funding in the US.
33
 
 While Berghahn used the biography of an individual to analyse transatlantic 
entanglements in the cultural realm of the Cold War, other scholars have helped to narrow the 
research gap with regard to crucial transatlantic elite networks and institutions. Valerie 
Aubourg’s research contributes to making visible the manifold interconnections between 
different elite coordinating efforts such as the Bilderberg conferences and the Atlantic 
Institute in Paris.
34
 Aubourg attends to the transnational character by pointing to a number of 
individual West Germans integrated in these West European-American networks; she 
neglects, however, the role of the Atlantik-Brücke, and the ACG in furthering the Atlantic 
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Community project.
 35
 The Bilderberg conferences organised by group of the same from 1954 
onwards, served as models for the German-American conferences established by the ACG 
and the Atlantik-Brücke in 1959.  
Another highly influential template for the conference scheme initiated by the Atlantik-
Brücke and the ACG were the annual English-German Königswinter Conferences. Christian 
Haase’s extensive work on British-German relations sheds light on this initiative. His research 
is tremendously helpful for research on West-German-American elite networks as Haase 
depicts the conference scheme as a catalyst for the reestablishment of a transnational civil 
society network.
36
 Furthermore, his work helps to prove the more comprehensive character of 
these informal elite contexts as members and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke belonged to the 
core of the Königswinter network.
37
 While all of the aforementioned elite networks may be 
subsumed under the label “liberal internationalist” or “consensus liberal” in the political 
spectrum, others have expanded the transnational approach to neoliberal elite networks, 
namely the Mont Pèlerin Society.
 38
 Johannes Großmann deserves credit for eventually 
illuminating transnational conservative elite networks partly overlapping with the neoliberal 
ones.
39
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Primary sources and methodology 
Research on the history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke poses challenges with regard to 
primary source material. Both groups’ officers claim that no archives exist of the two 
organisations. Therefore a number of different archives have been visited to obtain necessary 
primary source material. Abridged versions of minutes of the Atlantik-Brücke were available 
at the official registry of associations in Berlin. In addition, the thesis utilizes official 
documents of the German Foreign Office and Federal Press Office and the Chancellery, of the 
US Department of State and of the Ford Foundation.
40
 However, given the absence of official 
institutional archives for the ACG or the Atlantik-Brücke, the thesis particularly draws upon 
the personal papers of founders and members.
41
 Compared to well-maintained organisational 
archives, working with personal papers raises issues of its own. At the same time, the use of 
personal papers is particularly important as this thesis stresses the significance of private 
contacts that sustained (and were sustained) by the involvement in these organisations. 
Certainly, none of the personal papers offer a comprehensive record of the Atlantik-Brücke or 
the AGC. However, in several instances, they did contain detailed minutes of membership and 
board meetings. The papers of Marcia Kahn, Carl Joachim Friedrich, and Eric Warburg 
proved particularly rewarding in this context.  
 I have complemented my use of archival material by conducting interviews with a 
number of eyewitnesses. The meeting with Sara Ann Fagin, former secretary of Christopher 
Emmet, proved particularly instructive.
42
 She provided invaluable insight into Emmet’s 
personality and his family background. Given the significant time that has lapsed since the 
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developments covered in this thesis, I have been careful not to rely solely on oral testimony 
when seeking to verify specific facts. In this respect, most interviewees primarily helped me 
to consider the wider context of the activities covered in this thesis.  
 While the overall methodological focus is on historical source analysis, the thesis also 
employs prosopographical approaches.
43
 Chapter One provides biographical sketches of the 
four core founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. These individuals bore 
characteristics that applied to the larger group of members in both bodies. The latter point is 
demonstrated by the subsequent chapter, which features substantial material on the profile and 
background of the two organisations’ membership. By studying collective biographies – using 
auto- and biographies of the major players – it has been possible to gain insights about 
relationships and activities within the larger historical group. 
As has been noted earlier on, the term “network” features prominently in this study. 
Conceiving of the relationships between individuals, organisations, and institutions as a 
network structure helps to further move away from a state and nation-centred approach to 
diplomatic history by overcoming the simple dichotomy between the public and the private 
sector. If nodes in a network illustrate people in different functions, both public and private, 
and edges depict relations between them, the term describes social structures. In Chapter Five, 
the thesis therefore uses the methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to complement its 
historical and biographical approaches. In that chapter, SNA tools serve to visualise the 
transatlantic network by drawing on the key activities of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke – 
the German-American conferences from 1959 to 1974. Visualisation helps to reveal hidden 
patterns and structures: “Who attended the conferences with whom and how many times?”44 
More specifically, these tools serve to verify the central location of the founders in the 
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developing elite network and help to underscore functions of central figures in the network. In 
this respect, the analysis of the core group and membership in the first two chapters provide 
the framework for the application of SNA in Chapter Five.  
Outline of thesis 
“The Quest for Atlanticism” begins by exploring the history of the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
ACG on the micro level. Chapter One, “Unlikely Friends: the founders of an unfolding 
transatlantic elite network”, introduces the four founding figures: two Germans, Marion 
Dönhoff and Erik Blumenfeld; one American citizen, Christopher Emmet; and the Jewish 
German-American, Eric Warburg. The chapter traces the stories of their lives to the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Their biographies offer four perspectives of the first half of the 20
th
 
century: one of a German Jew émigré returning, one of a Germanophile American, one of an 
East-Prussian aristocratic woman, and one of a Hamburg merchant with Jewish roots. Their 
depiction is driven by the question why so shortly after the end of World War II, these four 
personalities came together to found the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as vehicles to foster 
amicable relations between the US and Germany. While their differences are stressed, the 
chapter examines their common elite character. It argues that they formed the nucleus of the 
transatlantic elite network that survived a tumultuous half-century continuing to grow to this 
very day.  
Chapter Two, “The ‘good’ Germans and their American friends”, moves on to the 
organisational level and investigates the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke in Hamburg and the 
ACG in New York in the early 1950s. The focus is on the membership profile of both 
organisations; hence, it questions whether the members in the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke 
constituted the “power elite” of West German-American relations. Furthermore, the chapter 
seeks to draw conclusions about the specific function of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in 
 31 
 
their respective home countries, but also their contribution to West-German-American 
relations. 
Chapter Three, “Mastering a tainted past: The funders of German-American public 
diplomacy efforts”, illustrates the multifaceted links to public agencies, private institutions, 
and corporate money that funded the activities of the two groups. It argues that the ACG and 
the Atlantik-Brücke were drivers of a transatlantically coordinated public diplomacy effort 
seeking to improve both countries’ images. 
Chapter Four, “Off the record: the informal diplomacy of the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke” showcases the state-private network in action. It follows the officers of the two 
groups behind the scenes of West German-American relations illuminating their private 
diplomacy activities. It illustrates, for example, how the groups’ contributed to Social 
Democrats changing their mind with regard to neutrality and instead welcoming rearmament 
of West Germany in the 1950s. Furthermore, the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s role in 
implementing the preamble to the German-French friendship treaty of 1963 is illuminated.  
Chapter Five, “Promoting transatlantic identity formation: the German-American 
conferences, 1959-1974 – a public-private project” is dedicated to the groups’ key activity. 
By studying this series of transatlantic elite meetings, the central role and function of such 
private endeavours in the realm of international politics is carved out. Hence, the chapter 
explores the complex selection process of the delegates, the resulting transatlantic elite 
network featuring diplomats, parliamentarians, business-people, media representatives and 
scholars from the US and West Germany as well as the cultural setting and the debates taking 
place at these informal meetings. The chapter demonstrates how this conference scheme has 
contributed to the socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community 
under US-American leadership over approximately 25 years. 
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As a whole, this thesis studies for the first time the entangled history of two transatlantic 
elite organisations, namely the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. It thus contributes to 
scholarship on German-American post-war relations and transnational elite research. 
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Chapter 1: 
Unlikely friends: the founders of an unfolding transatlantic elite network 
Four unique people  Eric M. Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik 
Blumenfeld  are the focus of this chapter. They formed the nucleus of the Atlantik-Brücke 
and the ACG. They differed in important ways yet they all were born into a social milieu 
entrenched with the spirit and values of the “(western) civilization of the 19th century”  a 
civilization that Eric Hobsbawm associated with a capitalist economic system, with liberalism 
regarding “its legal and constitutional structure”; with the bourgeoisie as the “characteristic 
hegemonic class”; with “glorying in the advance of science, knowledge and education, 
material and moral progress”; and the conviction “of the centrality of Europe...”. Maybe even 
more importantly, this was a civilization that broke down in 1914. The societies of Europe, in 
particular, then entered the “Age of Catastrophe” reaching well into the aftermath of World 
War II.
1
 
Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld witnessed, to different degrees, and first-hand, 
the unfolding catastrophes of the first half of the 20
th
 century and the restructuring of the 
world after 1945. Yet they did so from considerably different perspectives. They were, at least 
partly, citizens of the opposing warring countries of World War II – Germany and the United 
States. However, against all odds, not least the fact that one of them was Jewish, a group that 
undoubtedly had suffered most under Nazi rule, by as early as 1949 these four began to make 
plans for the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany – two 
central pillars of the German-American relationship during the second half of the twentieth 
century. In doing so, they carried at least a hint of the spirit and values of the lost western 
civilisation of the 19
th
 century into the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
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Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1995), 6-
7. 
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The biographies of the founders serve as point of departure for the larger story to be told 
here. Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld lend their faces to the history of the two 
organisations against the background of the post-war relationship of West Germany and the 
United States of America. These four have been identified as the nucleus of the unfolding 
transnational elite network transcending the artificial boundaries of the public and the private. 
Following their life paths, thus, illustrates the idiom “the private is political and the political is 
private” with regard to a transatlantic elite milieu.  
The biographical approach chosen for this chapter is also based on the premise that the 
personal networks and professional connections, which in turn derive from the individual’s 
elite position, provided the basis for establishing the two private organisations in question. 
The founders’ position in Germany and the United States and their numerous connections 
across the Atlantic allowed the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke to firstly, attract an elite 
membership, and, secondly, for their activities to transcend national borders crossing the 
Atlantic. 
Hence, this chapter pursues goals on two levels; the first being the individual biographical 
one and the second a more analytical conceptual one. On the biographical level, the chapter 
addresses questions regarding the founders’ social and familial backgrounds. Here it is of 
particular interest to highlight parallels and commonalities. Striking, for example, are the 
shared strong anti-communist sentiments amongst the four founders. Moreover, all four have 
ties to Hamburg or New York, in the case of Warburg even to both, Hamburg and New York. 
These two cities have a lot in common. By being harbour cities of global importance they also 
stand for a cosmopolitan and internationalist minded bourgeoisie.
2
 Ultimately, the goal is to 
answer the question about their motivation to embark on a long-term project to promote 
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See, for example, Werner Jochmann and Hans-Dieter Loose, ed. Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt und ihrer 
Bewohner. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 2 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1986). Sven 
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transatlantic unity. What nurtured their “state spirit”, their feeling of being called upon to 
serve the rapprochement of Germans and Americans after World War II?
3
 Furthermore, by 
looking at the biographies of Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff and Blumenfeld special attention is 
paid to their personal networks pinpointing central nodes relevant for the later evolution of the 
ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke and their joint transatlantic network in formation. The goal pursued 
on the conceptual level is to trace the elite character of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG back 
to their founders. Therefore, the chapter aims at carving out how the different functions of 
each founder representing a distinct elite segment complemented each other especially with 
regard to the evolving organisations and their connected networks.  
The elite concept 
According to Vilfredo Pareto, members of elites generally occupy leading positions in a given 
society and are clearly in a minority vis-à-vis the masses.
4
 Each of the four founders belonged 
to one functional segment of society  political, economic, scholarly-intellectual, media  or 
even more than one simultaneously. C. Wright Mills, however, qualifies this distinction by 
stressing that neither functional areas nor the respective elites can be set apart from one 
another in a clear cut way. Rather, he points to a concentration of influences on elites through 
frequent interaction between them.
5
 Organising frequent interaction and exchange between 
different elites was central to the activities of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke during the 
period in question here. However, segmentation represents only one focus of scholarly inquiry 
into the nature of elites. Another is the social composition of elites.  
Different schools of elite theory see different principles at work in selecting or recruiting 
elites. The mainstream functional elite school argues that selection processes are driven by a 
merits system. Others see the social background as having the greatest influence on whether 
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For definition of term, see Introduction pp. 22, 23. 
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York,: Dover, 1963). 
5 
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
  36 
someone can access elite positions or not.
6
 When looking at German elites, Michael 
Hartmann notes that they are disproportionately recruited from among the bourgeoisie. 
Further, he explains the latter’s disproportionate representation with different patterns of 
participation in education depending on which social strata one is looking at; with the upper 
and middle classes having privileged access to higher education.
7
 Hartmann’s contentions can 
be sustained with regard to the four personalities studied here. 
When examining the Americans, however, another concept comes to the fore. It is broadly 
agreed that “the foreign policy establishment” of the United States is a twentieth-century 
phenomenon. The term describes a body of individuals committed to “internationalist” 
policies, a body that was most decisive in driving out isolationism within the first four 
decades of the 20
th
 century.
8
 The establishment was comprised almost exclusively of men 
from leading financial and business institutions, law firms, Ivy League universities, major 
philanthropic foundations, and communications media of the East coast. These men shared a 
particular interest in, and substantial impact upon, the direction American foreign policy 
affairs took from at least the 1920s until the mid-1970s. Furthermore, most scholars of the US 
establishment agree that the members and staff of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
embody the purest form of the establishment.
9
 The CFR was founded in the aftermath of 
World War I by “a group of wealthy and influential Americans ... designed to equip the 
United States of America for an imperial role on the world scene.”10 The CFR contributed to 
this grand aim by bringing together people representing the official sphere, politicians and 
diplomats with representatives of the private sphere, businessmen and academics. In study 
                                                 
6 Michael Hartmann, “Eliten in Deutschland. Rekrutierungswege und Karrierepfade”, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, no. 10 (2004): 17-24.  
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Ibid.  
8 Priscilla Roberts, “‘All the Right People’: The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy 
Establishment”, Journal of American Studies vol. 26, no. 3 (1992): 409-34. 
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groups members of the CFR analysed the role of the United States in the world and the nature 
of its relations with foreign countries. Results of the different study group projects were made 
available to the public and government agencies with the ultimate goal of influencing the 
foreign policy making.
11
 Given this task and in particular given the special composition of 
CFR membership, it is hardly surprising to find numerous connections between founders of 
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke to the CFR. 
A transatlantic commuter: Eric Moritz Warburg, 1900–1990 
 
Image 1: Eric Warburg 
“Eric Warburg personifies the bridge over the Atlantic.”12 This is how Richard von 
Weizsäcker, former federal president of Germany (1984-1994), praised Warburg at the 
occasion of the first Eric M. Warburg award ceremony in 1988.
13
 For the enterprise that 
Warburg embarked on together with Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld he resumed the role of 
a cultural mediator and conciliator being both German and American as well as being Jewish. 
An additional role, equally if not at times more important than the former, was the one as 
successful fundraiser on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Formally, however, Eric M. 
Warburg only served the ACG as treasurer for several decades.
14
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The Warburg dynasty 
Eric Warburg was a German-born Jew; a descendant of an old Jewish banking dynasty 
originating in the German town of Warburg located in eastern North Rhine-Westphalia. Born 
in April 1900 in Hamburg, Warburg was the first son of his parents Max and Alice Warburg, 
to be followed by four sisters. He was born in the middle of the Wilhelmine era, when 
Germany was still a monarchy. Warburg grew up witnessing the astounding success of his 
father, Max Warburg, and the family’s long-established bank, M. M. Warburg & Co.. 
Besides being a successful banker, Max Warburg was also politically active as member of 
the Hamburger Bürgerschaft (the city’s parliament).15 The Warburgs counted among their 
business partners and friends illustrious figures such as Albert Ballin, father of modern cruise 
ship travel and general director of the famous Hamburg-America Line, and Prince von Bülow, 
former Reich Chancellor of the German empire. Moreover, Max Warburg advised the 
German emperor, Wilhelm II. This earned him the label “Kaiser-Jude [Kaiser Jew]” ascribed 
by Chaim Weizmann, Zionist leader and Israeli politician, “more German than the Germans, 
obsequious, superpatriotic, eagerly anticipating the wishes and plans of the masters of 
Germany”.16  
The Warburgs’ continuing ascendance prior to the Nazi era was also reflected in the 
steadily rising number of corporate board seats that Max Warburg held until the 1930s. By the 
mid-1920s, he served on 27 boards, at Blohm & Voss, Germany’s biggest shipyard at the time 
and I.G. Farben, a German chemical industry conglomerate, for example.
17
 Most beneficial, 
however, was Max Warburg’s membership of the general council of the German Reichsbank. 
At least during the early years of the Nazi era, this position provided some protection to the 
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Warburg bank.
18
 While Warburg was forced to forfeit those seats after the Nazi seizure of 
power, they were nevertheless an expression of M.M. Warburg & Co.’s excellent standing in 
business and industry. This provided a foundation for his son Eric’s successful 
reestablishment of business networks after World War II.  
Furthermore, Max Warburg also devoted time and money to fostering international 
understanding. In an attempt to smooth Anglo-German relations in the period leading up to 
World War I, Max Warburg together with Albert Ballin had founded the “King Edward VII 
Anglo-German Foundation”. After the war, in 1922, Max initiated the establishment of the 
Hamburg Übersee Club. Modelled after English Gentlemen’s Clubs, the Übersee Club served 
as a meeting place for business and scientific communities in support of the recovery of the 
German economy.
19
 As is shown later, Eric Warburg would not only follow into his father’s 
footsteps with regard to the banking business but also with regard to enhancing international 
relations in an unofficial manner. 
Furthermore, the Warburg family had established a significant branch of the family in the 
US around the turn of the century, through the marriages of two of Eric’s uncles, Paul and 
Felix Warburg. Both married into the Wall Street banking house Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the 
second biggest private investment bank in the United States prior to World War I. Kuhn, Loeb 
had earned this status by financing America’s expanding railway and other companies in fast 
growing industries.
20
 Eventually, Paul and Felix Warburg joined as partners in the Wall Street 
bank.
21
 Yet, the Warburg brothers’ ascendance into the highest echelons of the New York 
establishment was not only illustrated by professional success. Social advancement and 
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growing acceptance of the Warburgs within influential circles was manifested, for example, in 
the membership in the CFR and seats in numerous supervisory boards of universities and 
museums and by the numerous ties of the Warburgs to the Roosevelts.
22
 By the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 century the name Warburg became associated with international banking having 
established important branches in Hamburg and in New York. Thus, the Warburgs were 
surely members of the haute bourgeoisie and a transatlantic cosmopolitan elite. 
New York apprenticeship in the 1920s 
Since Eric Warburg was the only son, his career was predestined. He had to take over the 
family’s bank, eventually. Yet before he entered the banking business, Warburg volunteered 
for military service in 1918. After the war, he apprenticed with banks in Frankfurt and Berlin 
and subsequently with N.M. Rothschild & Son in the City of London and with his uncle Paul 
Kohn-Speyer’s company Brandeis, Goldschmidt & Co, the largest non-ferrous metals dealer 
in England. His training as an international banker then got its finishing touches when he 
spent three years, from 1923 to 1926, in the US. For the most part Warburg lived with his 
New York relatives, Felix and Frieda Schiff Warburg, in Woodlands near White Plains, NY 
and worked at the International Acceptance Bank (IAB). Paul Warburg had established IAB 
after his service at the Federal Reserve Board. The bank’s main business was selling 
commercial papers to finance reconstruction of European countries after World War I.
23
  
Since Eric was close to his cousin Frederick M. Warburg, his uncle Felix Warburg’s oldest 
son, Frederick’s circle of friends soon became Eric’s too as he reminisced in Times and Tides: 
“among them were the McCloys, the Garrisons, the Parkers, Frank Hatch, George Brownell”, 
a crowd of young ambitious Wall Street lawyers and bankers; and this despite the “upper-
class anti-Semitism” that certain milieus of US society were imbued with in the period prior 
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to World War II.
24
 While working on Wall Street, Eric Warburg also did business with 
Sullivan & Cromwell, which was, according to Warburg “one of the most prestigious 
international law firms in New York”. At the time, both Dulles brothers, Allen – later head of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  and John Foster – later Secretary of State  worked 
at Sullivan & Cromwell and “taught [Warburg] a thing or two about the value of the contracts 
we were about to sign”.25 
Brief return to Germany, a country in upheaval 
Upon his return from the US, Warburg was reintegrated into the Warburg Bank in Hamburg. 
Ultimately, in 1929, he was made a partner in his family’s banking firm – not for a long time 
though. For, political developments in the Weimar Republic made conducting business 
increasingly difficult. With the Nazi rise to power, the Warburg’s success story came to a 
dramatic halt as the number of clients decreased considerably from 5,241 in 1930 to 1,875 by 
the end of 1933.
26
 The process of organised “de-Jewing” of German society had already set in 
during the early months of 1933. Jewish personalities such as Max Warburg, who held 
particularly exposed positions, were ousted from supervisory boards as early as 1933.
27
 Step 
by step the imposition of anti-Jewish measures took effect. The Nazi regime excluded Jews 
from the cultural sphere, from educational institutions, from bureaucracy and the state 
apparatus, as well as from businesses. Eventually they were deprived of their citizenship 
rights. In early 1938 the concerted economic expropriation of Jewish businesses began and 
thus like thousands of other Jewish-owned businesses, the Warburg bank fell prey to 
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“Aryanisation”. After the November pogrom of the same year, “the legalised robbery” of all 
Jewish property escalated even further.
28
 The Warburg family, however, was still well-
connected enough to be able to determine who would take over the bank. Hence, a group of 
limited partners, friendly shareholders, among them Siemens, the Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft and the Gutehoffnungshütte took over M.M. Warburg & Co. In 1938, Max 
Warburg officially handed the bank over to the new management. For years to come the bank 
would operate under the name Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co.
29
  
Starting anew in the US 
When life in Germany became unbearable for the Warburgs, they departed for the United 
States. All the measures taken by the Nazi leadership before January 1939 had crushed any 
hope of Jewish life in Germany.
30
 Until the final prohibition of emigration in 1941, roughly 
250,000 Jews managed to leave Germany, that is about half of the Jewish population that 
lived in Germany in 1933. During the first emigration wave, most people had left for 
neighbouring European countries and Palestine. Later, the United States was the preferred 
destination.
31
 In 1938 there were 300,000 German citizens waiting to immigrate to the US. 
The entry quota, however, was as low as 27,000 per annum. Fortunately, Eric already held the 
status of permanent resident which allowed him to quickly become naturalized. As an 
American citizen he could then in turn obtain permission for his parents, Max and Alice 
Warburg, to stay as well.
32
  
The Warburg’s wealth and existing family ties to the United States allowed for a relatively 
smooth transition compared to the experience of many other exiles. Unlike many émigrés, 
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Eric Warburg felt very much at home in the United States. Even before his actual departure 
from Nazi Germany, Warburg had chosen the US as his preferred country of resettlement. He 
later said that since he “had spent three of the happiest years of my youth there” that he 
“would probably feel far more at home there than in, say, England, Holland or Sweden.”33 
Thus, socially well-connected in New York and accustomed to American ways, Warburg 
quickly established a new life. He started his own banking business, E. M. Warburg & Co. 
Among its clients “were the fortunate few who had managed to take some capital out of 
Europe, especially Germany”.34 Besides conducting business, Warburg joined several 
assistance committees trying “to help refugees stranded in New York to find homes and some 
sort of work else-where in the country”.35  
Warburg’s military service was the ultimate proof of his loyalty to his new home country. 
At the age of 42, he enlisted with the U.S. Army Air Force to fight his native country. Like 
many other German-Jewish émigrés, Warburg was assigned to intelligence work.
36
 As an 
international banker Eric Warburg possessed the necessary language skills, intimate 
knowledge of foreign countries, and the ability to think strategically and exercise discretion.
37
 
Hence, Warburg became chief interrogator and liaison officer between American and British 
military intelligence.
38
 According to Ron Chernow, Eric Warburg’s wartime service secured 
him “entrée in both Washington and Whitehall, where he collected powerful friends who 
would help to advance his post-war career.”39  
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A transatlantic commuter’s li e 
Warburg successfully reactivated and expanded his pre-war and wartime networks after the 
end of World War II. However, Warburg did not intend to join the US military government 
and refused to officially participate in the Nuremberg trials beginning in November 1945. 
Instead, he resigned from active duty and returned to New York.
40
  
In the immediate post-war years, Warburg’s priority was to revive his New York firm, E. 
M. Warburg & Co. Although he had re-established contact with the family’s old banking firm 
in Hamburg, it took several years to create the basis for limited participation of the Warburgs 
in the bank. Nonetheless, E. M. Warburg & Co. became the New York representative of 
Brinckmann, Wirtz. The latter, was the first West German bank, able to re-establish a 
business connection with the United States. As a result, Volkswagen became the bank’s most 
important client by the late 1940s.
41
 Besides Volkswagen, Warburg also assisted, among 
others, Ferrostaal Overseas Corporation, belonging to the Gutehoffnungshütte to get a 
foothold on the American market.
42
  
Although Eric Warburg returned to his civilian live as a banker, he remained loyal to the 
Air Force Intelligence community. Throughout the 1950s, Warburg, as a reserve officer, gave 
lectures training future CIA interrogators. And since he was very much interested in 
international relations, particularly in German-American relations, he joined the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) - proving his credentials among the New York establishment as the 
CFR expanded membership by-invitation-only. At a CFR meeting in the late 1940s, Warburg 
met Christopher Emmet, with whom he shared an almost romantic nostalgia for Germany.
43
 
“... [W]e both considered the hard course vis-à-vis Germany after 1945 and later on the so 
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called ‘Morgenthau Plan’... We telephoned with one another on these matters for weeks 
before actually meeting, and then we became the closest of friends”, wrote Warburg in his 
condolence card to Emmet’s brother in February 1974.44 
In 1946, Warburg married Dorothea Thorsch, daughter of a prominent Viennese banking 
family. In quick succession, the couple then had three children. For the time being they lived 
on the Warburgs’ estate in Woodlands, New York where Eric had already spent much time 
during his apprentice years.
45
 In 1949, however, Warburg finally achieved limited 
participation in Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co. Hence, he had good reason to travel on a regular 
basis to West Germany and Hamburg, thus becoming a transatlantic commuter.
46
  
From 1952 onwards, Eric and Dorothea would spend the summers together with the 
children on Kösterberg, the family’s old estate on the banks of the river Elbe just outside 
Hamburg. It was also during the 1950s, when Marion Dönhoff, with whom Warburg 
maintained a “lifelong friendship”, lived in a guesthouse on the Warburg estate.47 When a few 
years later, Warburg again became personally liable partner in Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co. he 
moved the entire family to Hamburg for good and the children attended German schools. 
Though surely not an easy decision to make, Warburg could do so as he perceived of the Nazi 
regime and the atrocities committed as an aberration in German history.
48
 Beyond emotional 
attachment to Hamburg and legitimate business interests that motivated Warburg’s move, the 
encouragement of John J. McCloy’s, US High Commissioner at the time and Warburg’s 
friend since the 1920s, was an important factor.
49
 McCloy perceived Warburg as an important 
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figure in bringing about German-American rapprochement and, to a certain degree, 
reconciliation between the Jewish community and Germany.
50
  
Yet, the return of a prominent emigrant German-Jewish family from either the United 
Kingdom or the United States to post-war Germany was an exceptional case. Of all those who 
had managed to emigrate before the deportations began, less than two percent returned to 
Germany after the war.
51
 Shortly after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), the High Commission of Occupied Germany (HICOG) concluded that anti-Semitism 
“as a social problem was of minor significance”. At the same time, authors of the survey had 
to acknowledge that anti-Semitism pervaded German life particularly in the middle and upper 
classes. After the Shoah, Jews all over the world, and in particular those living in Israel, 
boycotted all things German. Jews returning to Germany after 1945 felt the consequences 
thereof.
52
 After World War II, it was inconceivable to revive any meaningful Jewish 
communal life in Europe. Jewish communities in countries across Europe previously occupied 
by the Nazis suffered more than 80 percent losses; in Germany an astounding 81 percent of 
the former Jewish population was gone either through emigration or extinction.
53
 
 “Well, we don’t descend from Herman the Cherusker”, Eric Warburg used to say when his 
Jewishness came up.
54
 Consistent with this kind of attitude, Warburg explicitly wished to be 
buried on the non-Jewish part of the cemetery in Hamburg. In fact his grave is near the 
baptized members of the Warburg family, who perished in the Holocaust. Not living an active 
Jewish religious life, however, did not mean that Warburg shied away from commitments to 
the Jewish community. He helped to establish the Israelitische Krankenhaus (Israelite 
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hospital) in Hamburg and served as its chairman.
55
 Furthermore, he rendered services as 
negotiator to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany (or Jewish Claims 
Conference, JCC).
56
  
 A German-born Jew with an American passport reviving West German industry  
Eric Warburg’s multiple identities coupled with loyalties to different communities and nations 
often put him in situations in which he was caught between stools.  
In August 1949, Eric had a meeting with his old friend John J. McCloy, who had just 
started his term as US High Commissioner for Occupied Germany. Warburg was a fierce 
opponent of the Morgenthau Plan and observed in horror the dismantling of industrial plants 
and facilities in Germany. Warburg was convinced that a de-industrialized Germany would be 
extremely vulnerable to a communist take-over. Moreover, he was witness to how resentment 
against the Allies grew while business and industrial leaders had to watch the destruction of 
the basis for any kind of economic recovery. Thus, Warburg argued heatedly with McCloy 
about the Allied dismantling programme, which Warburg wanted to be stopped immediately. 
He was convinced that “[w]ithout a solid economy the German people … would fall prey to 
Communism”.57 Although they had a difference of opinion on the issue, McCloy eventually 
gave in and asked Warburg to produce a list of plants to be saved from dismantling. Among 
the names listed were the steel works of August Thyssen – representatives of which would 
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later become members of the Atlantik-Brücke - and the Krupp synthetic gas works.
58
 
Warburg’s conviction that only a revived and strong West German industry would sufficiently 
equip the country against Communism also prompted him to put in a good word for such 
highly controversial figures as Alfried Krupp, who was tried at Nuremberg for using slave 
labour.
59
  
Knowing of Warburg’s extensive networks, the Claims Conference asked him to act as 
honest broker, when they entered negotiations with German companies to compensate former 
concentration camp inmates for forced labour. Claims conference officials sought Warburg’s 
intervention since he was acquainted with a number of the negotiators representing the 
successor firms to I.G. Farben, Krupp, Siemens and Flick.
60
 Among these representatives was 
Fabian von Schlabrendorff, whom Warburg had known since the armistice in 1945 and had 
developed a friendship with. Warburg’s “old friend Allen Dulles”, after the war in charge of 
the American intelligence service for Germany as head of the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) in Switzerland and later in occupied Germany, had introduced Warburg to von 
Schlabrendorff, a survivor of the German resistance plot of 20 July 1944.
61
 In the 1960s then, 
the two friends found each other on opposite sides of the bargaining table – Warburg 
representing the Claims Conference and von Schlabrendorff the Dynamite Nobel AG, a 
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munitions producer of which Friedrich Flick held 82% of the shares.
 62
 Irrespective of von 
Schlabrendorff’s role in these negotiations, Warburg referred to him as “one of the most 
heroic and courageous resisters against National Socialism”.63  
Unofficial service to the cause of German-American relations 
Christopher Emmet praised Warburg as “a successful business man, a good pater familias, 
and a constructive philanthropist, both in the sense of giving and organizing the raising of 
funds.”64 Emmet, moreover, considered him as “so much more politically intelligent and 
knowledgeable than most other business men”, acknowledging Warburg’s influence on 
“important individuals in key positions, like Jack McCloy”.65 Despite his diplomatic and 
political talents Warburg never pursued a political post or a career in politics. Yet, he kept 
close to the influential and powerful.
66
 Following Emmet’s advice of cultivating “[Helmut 
Schmidt’s] acquaintance ... as I think he might be a future social Democratic Chancellor, or 
he might become Defense Minister in a Social Democratic or coalition cabinet”, Schmidt and 
Warburg became close friends sailing many times on Warburg’s ship “Atalanta”. Later on, 
Schmidt not only became board member of the Atlantik-Brücke but Warburg also his 
unofficial adviser on foreign affairs and German-American relations in particular.
67
  
However, Warburg did not single out West German-American relations in his unofficial 
efforts of fostering bilateral relations of the FRG. Owing to the Warburg family links and 
Hamburg’s traditional orientation and cultural affinity to England, Warburg also committed 
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time to Anglo-German reconciliation after World War II by participating in the British-
German Königswinter Conferences.
68
 Eric Warburg’s most tangible commitment in this 
regard was, however, realised in the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and his 
continuing dedication to them. For, he was not only co-founder of the organisations but also 
served as the ACG’s treasurer for many years. Atlantik-Brücke and ACG became the vehicle 
for realizing his hope to be able to “take part in building a bridge between the old world and 
the new, in particular Germany and the United States, since I had spent so many years on both 
sides of the Atlantic.”69  
Warburg’s extensive contacts in political, business and intelligence circles in the United 
States as well as in West Germany (and elsewhere for that matter), coupled with the social 
and cultural capital that he accumulated during his youth, enabled him to assume a role as 
transatlantic translator and mediator in the post-1945 period. This role in turn was a 
prerequisite for the development of a transnational elite network across the Atlantic Ocean 
facilitated by the two private organisations, the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Warburg’s 
post-war involvement in transatlantic elite networking was underpinned by his conviction that 
reconciliation and cooperation between the US and Germany after the war was of vital 
importance for international understanding – the key prerequisite to determinedly counter 
Communism. This conviction had been facilitated by his elite upbringing and his intimate 
knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon world and the US in particular.  
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Germanophile Cold Warrior: Christopher Temple Emmet, 1900–1974 
 
Image 2: Christopher Emmet 
While Warburg took care of financial issues, Christopher Emmet was “the heart” of the ACG, 
“the American pillar of a strong connection crossing the Atlantic Ocean”.70 Christopher 
Emmet, however, considered himself and Eric Warburg to “have basically precisely the same 
political attitude and point of view. We even have, in different ways, the same personal 
involvement with America and Germany”, the same lifetime experience and involvement in 
world crises. They were both concurrently anti-Nazi and anti-Communist for the same basic 
reasons and at the same time they were “pro-German” even while fighting Nazi Germany. 
Moreover, Warburg and Emmet had both “inherited a degree of financial security” and family 
traditions of which “we can be proud”. Yet, neither of them had “personal political ambition” 
nor held “narrow political ideologies”, according to Emmet.71 Just the same, Emmet acted as 
the political mind of the joint enterprise  the Atlantik-Brücke and ACG  and as political 
adviser in the interest of strong West German-American relations. 
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 he “bourgeoisie“ of the United States: Emmet’s  amily background  
Born in March 1900 in Port Chester, New York into a Protestant family, Christopher Emmet 
established a lifelong relationship with Germany for the most curious of reasons. The Emmet 
family was an upper-class family of German origin settled on the East Coast of the US.
72
 
Christopher’s mother, Alida Chanler Emmet, was once even portrayed as one of America’s 
last “Grande Dames” by Life magazine, being a grandniece of Mrs William B. Astor; Caroline 
Astor being the socialite of “New York’s old-guard mercantile elite” that still dominated the 
city’s social life during the last third of the 19th century.73 Accordingly, the family could 
afford to travel frequently to Europe. And thus, when Mrs Alida Chanler Emmet heard of 
something called “twilight sleep” being used by German doctors to minimise women’s pain 
giving birth, she decided to temporarily move to Germany. “She packed up all her servants 
and her family ... to travel on boat” to Europe and farther on to “some college town” in 
Imperial Germany. Sara Fagin, Emmet’s secretary for many years explained that Emmet’s 
mother crossed the Atlantic “three months before she had a child and stayed for two months 
after.”74 According to Fagin, thus, five of Emmet’s siblings were born in Germany. As a 
result Emmet spent much of his childhood in Germany being taught by private tutors and 
attending private schools there.
 75
  
In the US, Emmet attended St. Paul’s School in Concord, New Hampshire, a private 
college preparatory boarding school, before going on to Harvard. Yet after only one year, he 
dropped out and returned to Europe instead.
76
 In Germany, Emmet attended the University in 
Freiburg/Breisgau.
77
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Emmet’ political activism  
The years spent in Europe, during the 1920s and early 1930s, were decisive ones in forming 
young Emmet’s world view. During those years, Emmet watched Hitler’s and National 
Socialism’s rise to power. He witnessed first-hand the brutal clashes of Brownshirts of the 
Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary branch of the NSDAP, with the Communists of the Red 
Front Fighter’s League. However, Emmet also remembered “good and exciting times in 
Berlin during the 1920s – exciting political events, wonderful theatres and night clubs...”78 
In 1933, however, Emmet returned to the US being equally opposed to Soviet Communism 
and Nazism. Only a few years later, Emmet turned intellectual opposition into action by co-
founding the Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany.
79
 This was, however, only the 
beginning of Emmet’s committee activism that would determine the rest of his life.  
With the beginning of World War II, Emmet became involved in a plethora of causes. He 
was chairman of the Committee to Aid Britain by Reciprocal Trade, vice-president of France 
Forever, executive committee member of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the 
Allies, and treasurer of the Committee for American Irish Defense. According to Thomas A. 
Mahl, a number of these organisations were British intelligence front groups active in fighting 
isolationism in the US.
80
 In addition to his committee activism, Emmet was a vocal foreign 
policy expert on air. For decades, Emmet anchored the bi-weekly Foreign Affairs Round 
Table on WEVD, New York.
81
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Emmet and the CFR 
Christopher Emmet’s daily routine was that of an independent scholar – packed with reading 
and writing. He wrote articles and letters to the editors of newspapers, in the US and West 
Germany alike, and not least important he wrote numerous confidential reports and 
memoranda on international relations issues.
82
  
The perfect place to obtain latest analysis of international events and US foreign policy 
was, therefore, the CFR, only a block and a half away from Emmet’s apartment. 83 There he 
tested and discussed his ideas. Yet, most importantly, this was the venue for networking in US 
foreign policy establishment circles. As a matter of fact, a number of people who were to play 
a role in the ACG participated in CFR study groups or served as CFR directors; among them 
were George N. Shuster, ACG president from 1954 onwards; John J. McCloy, ACG chairman 
from 1972 onwards; and Shepard Stone, director of the Ford Foundation’s international 
programme, the ACG’s key funding institution.84 The CFR’s study and discussion groups 
drew participants and members from public agencies, first and foremost the US Department 
of State, private organisations, foundations, universities, and corporations. Considering the 
Council’s membership policy of predominantly inviting individuals after they had 
distinguished themselves as business leaders, in the executive branch of government, or as 
scholars, Emmet’s membership stands out.85 Emmet never even pursued a career in any of 
these fields. He said about himself, however, that he had the “peculiar combination of talents 
[and] experience”, which have “produced an exceptional political judgment.” Furthermore, he 
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identified not only “a total arrogant independence but the ability to change [his] own mind in 
response to the course of events” as part of his talent.86 This self-assessment underlines his 
social background and upbringing as a child of a privileged class.  
The CFR’s overriding objective of promoting internationalism definitely fitted Emmet’s 
political convictions. Moreover, the CFR’s central function – brokering a consensus among 
the different groups represented and thus shaping US foreign policy certainly served as 
template for the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke and the later German-American conferences.
87
  
 he “Committee” Cold Warrior  
Emmet’s privileged background allowed him to shift, very shortly after the end of World War 
II, from fighting Nazism and isolationism to fighting Communism and promoting pro-German 
policies, again in a private capacity. During his entire life Emmet never needed to pursue a 
paid job. Instead he lived off his family’s allowance from the time he dropped out of Harvard 
in 1920. The most valuable asset was his huge apartment on Lexington Avenue in New 
York’s Upper East Side. There he sat in the midst of his “open filing system”, smoking “big 
cigars”, reading a wide range of newspapers, “revis[ing ] his ideas” on foreign policy, and 
“refin[ing] his letters”. Emmet corresponded with a truly astonishing number of political 
decision-makers, intellectuals, activists, and industrialists in the US, Germany, and 
elsewhere.
88
  
After World War II, and as during the war years, Emmet became active in a myriad of 
committees. He served as chairman of the non-profit organisation Common Cause, Inc., an 
organisation founded by the socialite widow Natalie Wales Paine in January 1947 to combat 
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the influence of Communism. On the board of the organisation Emmet was joined by State 
Department officials, diplomats as well as academics.
89
 One of the earliest successes of 
Common Cause was its role in the Oksana Kasenkina case of 1948. Kasenkina, a Russian 
citizen, worked as schoolteacher for children of Russian delegates to the United Nations in 
New York. In 1948 she tried to evade repatriation seeking refuge in the US. The quarrels 
pertaining to her case caused a consular breach between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.
90
  
Moreover, Emmet served as trustee for Freedom House, an organisation that acted 
primarily as a clearing house for information on human rights. On the board of Freedom 
House Emmet rubbed shoulders with a number of prominent personalities. The first honorary 
co-chairpersons were Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential nominee in 1940 and 
Eleanor Roosevelt.
91
 Furthermore, Emmet was an active organiser of the Committee for a Just 
Peace with Italy, director of International Rescue Committee (IRC), the American Council on 
NATO, the American Friends of Vietnam (AFVN), and chief-spokesperson of the American 
Friends of the Captive Nations (AFCN). A number of these organisations, particularly the 
IRC, the AFVN and AFCN, linked Emmet to a covert network of organisations which at 
times helped the US intelligence community “to implement a variety of clandestine 
operations” in the Soviet Union itself and in countries belonging to the Soviet bloc during the 
Cold War. It also seems that in 1951, Emmet attended meetings of the Congress for Cultural 
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Freedom.
92
 These activities provided him, like Warburg, with “solid connections within the 
intelligence community”.93 
Fighting Communism by opposing US foreign policy in occupied Germany 
Saving post-war Germany from Communism was a matter of deep concern to Emmet. His 
commitment to this cause led him to criticise US foreign policy toward Germany in the early 
post-war years. Emmet was “violently against the Morgenthau Plan” accordingly his first 
comprehensive campaign after 1945 focused on the allied dismantling programme in 
occupied Germany.
94
 According to Eric Warburg, this shared concern about dismantling 
incidentally marked the beginning of Emmet’s and Warburg’s friendship.95 
In November 1947, Emmet released an “Appeal Against Dismantling German Factories 
Now” which was undersigned by trade union representatives, journalists, and educators.96 In 
response to the new level-of-industry directive which called for the removal of 682 plants 
Emmet’s appeal to British and American military authorities in Germany, pursued two main 
lines of reasoning. The first was directed at US financial interests, that is the American 
taxpayer who was “called upon to appropriate another fifteen to twenty billion dollars to 
restore Western Europe to economic health and political stability.” The second line of 
argument pointed to the dangers of Communism into whose arms “Germany’s starving 
workers” were pushed by destroying factories. With reference to the Soviet zone of 
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occupation, the appeal points out that “with glee” the Russians had already announced the end 
of dismantling in their zone. Emmet concluded the appeal by making the gloomy prediction 
that no policy would be “better designed to make converts to Communism in the industrial 
heart of Europe and thus to defeat the objectives of our entire foreign policy than the policy of 
dismantling”.97  
Emmet continued refining his argument against dismantling and subsequently published a 
pamphlet with the title Destruction at Our Expense: How Dismantling Factories in Germany 
Helps Inflation in the United States and Sabotages the Marshall Plan.
98
 The facts 
underpinning Emmet’s analysis were gathered by Karl Brandt. Brandt was a German-born 
and educated agronomist who had immigrated to the US in 1933. Before Brandt was 
appointed Professor of Agricultural Economics at Stanford University, California in 1938, he 
had been a researcher at New School for Social Research in New York. In the late 1940s, 
however, Brandt was drafted as food adviser for the US occupation forces in Germany.
99
 
During this service, Brandt collected material documenting the implementation of US 
occupation policies as well as the operations in the French and British zones. Brandt was 
motivated to help bringing about “the correction and reshaping of our foreign policy under the 
program of foreign aid” by his fear that “Communism is just around the corner 
everywhere.”100 
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Fear of and opposition to Communism united Brandt and Emmet in this campaign and later 
on. For, Brandt joined the ACG as early as 1954. Christopher Emmet and like-minded friends, 
Warburg, Blumenfeld, and Dönhoff among them, were deeply convinced that only an 
economically and politically strong West German state could withstand Communism.  
Despite his status of independent scholar, Emmet was enthused with “state spirit”. He had 
a respected and influential voice when it came to US foreign relations, particularly German-
American relations.
101
 He was an extremely well-connected figure in establishment circles 
both in the US and in West Germany, before and after the war; moreover he was a very 
prolific author of political articles and books. Although he never held a paid position, he was 
a professional in the non-profit political activist scene. Emmet continued much of his 
correspondence and travelled until the early 1970s despite his deteriorating health. In 1974, he 
died in New York and thus the first major epoch of the ACG came to an end. 
The East Prussian countess: Marion Dönhoff, 1909–2002 
 
Image 3: Marion Dönhoff  
Marion Dönhoff had an upper-class upbringing and came to share attitudes and convictions 
with Eric Warburg and Christopher Emmet. According to Emmet, she only differed with 
regard to her sex and “ancient aristocratic lineage”.102 The fact that Dönhoff was a woman 
deserves special attention particularly against the background of the membership of the 
Atlantik-Brücke. Until 1974, she was the only female member. Regardless, Emmet continued 
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in his appraisal of Dönhoff by stating that she had a “vital handicap of not knowing America.” 
Moreover, “she cannot ... see the essential similarities between the Communist and Nazi evils 
as well as we can” because she was younger than Emmet and Warburg.103 Here Emmet 
alluded to Dönhoff’s early promotion of Ostpolitik.104 Yet despite this claim, she nevertheless 
promoted the West integration of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance 
under American hegemony by joining forces with Warburg, Emmet and Blumenfeld in 
founding the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Dönhoff contributed to their joined cause in two 
respects. Firstly, she was an instrumental link to the reawakened media landscape in West 
Germany and in her capacity as a leading journalist a crucial voice and multiplier.
105
 
Moreover, she played a crucial role in the larger process of reintegrating West German elites, 
for she was well-connected within aristocratic circle in Germany and beyond. One of her 
greatest merits thus was to help to improve German aristocracy’s image. This in turn helped 
boosting West German elites’ reputation amongst American elites. 
“Ancient aristocratic lineage”: Dönho  ’s  amily background 
Marion Dönhoff was born in December 1909 on Schloss Friedrichstein near Königsberg, East 
Prussia (nowadays Kaliningrad, Russia), the Dönhoff family’s home for centuries. Her mother 
used to be in the service of Empress Auguste Viktoria and her father was a widely-travelled 
diplomat, descendent to the counts von Dönhoff who belonged to one of the most important 
families among the landed Prussian aristocracy.
106
 Marion Dönhoff grew up amongst her 
many siblings in a rural semi-feudal world with horse riding and hunting as common 
pastimes. She received little formal education until the age of 13 or 14.  
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The first proper school Dönhoff attended was a secondary school in Königsberg. She 
continued secondary education at a boy’s school in Potsdam to earn a qualification allowing 
entry into university. Dönhoff started travelling widely early in her life. After finishing 
school, her first journey brought her to the United States. For two months she toured from the 
East Coast to the West Coast together with her friend Beatrice von Riedemann, whose father 
was a director of Standard Oil & Co.
107
 This was quite an unusual journey at the time, 
particularly for a young Prussian Countess, given the anti-American sentiments pervasive 
among German aristocracy at least since the late 19
th
 century driven by feelings of cultural 
superiority, dismissal of mass society and democracy as well as imperialist rivalry.
108
 
 he countess’ educational career 
In 1932, Dönhoff began her studies of economics at Frankfurt University. In 1933, the Nazis 
came to power. Initially Dönhoff showed her strong opposition to the Nazis by attempting to 
remove their flag from the university building, tearing down Nazi posters, and handing out 
anti-Nazi flyers on campus not least because many of her professors had been expelled.
109
 Her 
opposition, however, was not directed at her family; albeit two of her brothers joined the Nazi 
party, NSDAP.
110
 Despite her hostile attitude to the Nazis she continued her studies and 
graduated from Frankfurt University in 1934. Afterwards she continued postgraduate studies 
outside of Germany, enrolling at the University Basel. There she began her doctorate 
supervised by Edgar Salin, a distinguished economist descending from a Jewish 
manufacturing and banking family. After she had been awarded the doctorate Dönhoff 
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returned to East Prussia. The better part of the later 1930s, however, Dönhoff spent travelling 
in Europe, to places in England, France, Southeast Europe, and Africa.  
In September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland marking the beginning of World War 
Two, Dönhoff’s oldest brother was drafted. Thus, she had to resume the responsibility to 
administer the family’s estates in East Prussia. Yet despite the war in the east and the estate 
related duties, Marion Dönhoff still found time to travel widely in the early war years, among 
other places to Russia and Persia.
111
 
 he countess’ 20 July connection 
On 20 July in 1944, a group of aristocrats attempted to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Dönhoff 
knew a number of members of the Kreisauer Kreis and the Goerdeler-Gruppe, which were 
two separate groups with overlapping membership forming the civilian branches of the anti-
Hitler group; her friends were Axel von dem Bussche, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Heini Graf 
Lehndorff, and Counts von Moltke and Yorck.
112
 However, Dönhoff’s actual role in the plot 
to kill Hitler remains controversial.
113
 While she was not directly involved in developing the 
plan for the assassination, according to Eckart Conze, Dönhoff did act as conduit to keep the 
various members in Berlin and East Prussia in contact. Occasionally, Dönhoff travelled to 
Switzerland to meet with Carl Jacob Burckhardt, a Swiss diplomat and former high 
commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig/Gdansk. There she passed on information 
from the anti-Hitler conspirators for Burckhardt to transfer to other foreign diplomats.
114
  
After the war, Dönhoff contributed to presenting a positive image of the aristocratic 
opposition to Hitler, seeking to shape the Federal Republic of Germany’s historical memory. 
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As journalist and author, Dönhoff tirelessly worked towards a broader acknowledgement of 
the deeds of the conspirators.
115
 According to her biographer and fellow journalist Klaus 
Harpprecht, she was quite successful in anchoring the memory of German resistance into the 
founding myth of the Federal Republic of Germany and thus considerably contributed to a 
shift in the Germans’ historical awareness.116 This in turn helped to rehabilitate German 
aristocracy at large after its involvement in the National Socialist dictatorship.  
During the early post-war years, 20 July resistance was by many associated with an 
alliance between National Socialism and traditional elites, with the reactionary efforts of the 
“generals” and especially with a very negative view on the East Prussian Junkers in the US as 
well as in the UK. Resistance and opposition to Hitler within Germany was a taboo. Only 
when the Cold War confrontation intensified in the late 1940s, the 20
 July conspirators’ 
staunch anti-Bolshevist attitudes were discussed. Now it seemed opportune to exploit the 
resistance by evaluating it more positively and thus stabilising the Germans’ collective 
psyche; a necessity since Germany should join the Western alliance.
117
 Acknowledging the 
fact that there had been opposition to Hitler allowed for a differentiation between Nazis and 
anti-Nazis, which in turn weakened the idea of collective guild. Christopher Emmet later 
applied the criterion of affiliation with the resistance movement of 20 July to distinguish 
“good” and “bad” Germans and thus selected from amongst the “good” individuals to be 
invited to join a Committee of German-American understanding.
118
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Starting anew: the countess turned journalist 
In January 1945, with the Soviet army approaching from the East, Marion Dönhoff departed 
from Friedrichstein on horseback. Seven weeks later, she arrived in Schloss Vinsebeck, a 
small place in Westphalia more than 1,000 kilometres west of Königsberg.
119
 The first part of 
Dönhoff’s life ended with a double loss; the loss of her friends in the resistance, who were 
executed after the failed assassination and the loss of home and native land. After World War 
II, East Prussia was no longer part of Germany. Instead it was divided; the southern part 
became Polish and the north eastern part an official province of the Soviet Union. 
When Germany surrendered to the Allies in May she was reunited with family members 
and friends such as Axel von dem Bussche and Richard von Weizsäcker in Brunkensen. 
There she drafted two memoranda addressed to the British occupation forces. In one of them 
she explained to the British “how the Nazis came about, why the Germans venerated the 
Führer the way they did, and what was to be done now”.120 The other memorandum was a 
first tribute to the “20th of July” group of conspirators in which Dönhoff set forth the 
members’ motivations and their post-war plans.121 The memoranda got into the hands of 
officers of the British occupation forces and through them they eventually reached Gerd 
Bucerius who was about to launch a new weekly newspaper in Hamburg. The memoranda 
written by a woman with apparent strong opinions and a sense of mission impressed Bucerius 
deeply.
122
 Hence he invited Marion Dönhoff to Hamburg. Soon afterwards she began working 
for Die Zeit. Thus, the Countess from East Prussia started a new life as citoyen.
123
 She had a 
job, if quite an unusual one considering her professional and social background. Soon she also 
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had a place to stay, which Erik Blumenfeld offered since he lived just around the corner of the 
offices of Die Zeit.  
The founders of Die Zeit had initially intended to place Dönhoff in the economics section 
of the paper which would have been much closer to her actual academic background. Soon, 
however, it turned out that she was much more interested in politics. In 1950 she officially 
took over responsibility for the politics section. In 1968 she became editor in chief and in 
1973 even publisher of Die Zeit. Thus, according to Klaus Harpprecht, within 20 years after 
the end of World War II, Marion Dönhoff managed to become West Germany’s “most 
famous female journalist”.124  
Dönhoff demonstrated in her op-eds that she meant to have an impact on domestic as well 
as foreign politics. As early as in March 1947, when the allied dismantling policy was still in 
full swing, she opined: “In the long run Germany will, without a doubt, only survive and be 
able to contribute significantly to world economy as a capital intensive and highly 
industrialised state”.125 Therefore, dismantling German industrial assets had to be stopped. In 
this she was in full agreement with her friend Eric Warburg, whom she knew through Erik 
Blumenfeld. While rhetorically attacking the British for being “insensitive” with regard to 
their attitudes towards Germany which were, in Dönhoff’s opinion, still driven by a punitive 
mode, Dönhoff praised the Americans for their role in ending dismantling.
126
 John J. McCloy, 
US high commissioner at the time, whom she knew personally through Eric Warburg, was a 
real hero of German-American relations to Dönhoff.
127
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Crossing the Atlantic again 
In 1951, Dönhoff travelled to the US for the second time. In the meantime the Federal 
Republic had been founded and the US Department of State spent millions of dollars on 
cultural diplomacy through numerous exchange programmes. The US government invited 
more than 12,000 Germans to visit the United States for stays, lasting from one month to two 
years, between 1948 and 1955. Though these exchange programmes targeted varied groups, 
the focus was on the “future democratic elites”. By 1955, 25 percent of the Bundestag 
members had been guests of the Foreign Leader Program (FLP), among them many future 
leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.
128
 
Under the auspices of such a programme, Dönhoff visited the United States. This first post-
war trip was, however, overshadowed by a certain alienation between the American 
government and its European counterparts. The relationship then was marked by a general 
feeling of disappointment on the part of the Americans with a view on the Europeans’ 
standing on the issue of war in Korea. This at least was how Marion Dönhoff sensed the 
atmosphere when she arrived in New York in mid-January.
129
 While politicians across Europe 
and particularly in West Germany had entered a heated debate concerning the question of re-
arming the Germans in the face of the communist threat now so tangible, Marion Dönhoff had 
already taken a stance in late 1950, a half year after the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean 
peninsula: “Shall we resign to fate without putting up a fight in the face of this impending 
threat of war ... or are we prepared, if need be, to fight for our freedom with arms in hand?”130  
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Irrespective of the discord between the US and the Federal Republic over the war in Korea, 
Dönhoff used this trip to the US to establish important contacts benefitting from relationships 
dating back to her pre-war life. Christa von Tippelskirch, for example, had first met Marion at 
the Dönhoff family’s estate where the young Tippelskirch had been instructed in aristocratic 
housekeeping. Tippelskirch, who was a translator and photographer by profession, had 
immigrated to the US and had married Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the influential 
journal Foreign Affairs. Subsequently, the Armstrongs’ residence in New York City became 
the first contact point for Dönhoff whenever she was in town. Beyond providing a place to 
stay Hamilton Fish Armstrong was an ideal contact for Dönhoff. He knew the right people to 
talk to for Marion to get an idea about American planning for Europe and particularly for the 
Federal Republic. Among them was Henry Kissinger, who at the time was still a graduate 
student at Harvard University but would later enter the Nixon administration as National 
Security Adviser and Secretary of State. Eric Warburg also offered a hand in getting her in 
touch with influential people from US business and banking circles as well as politicians. 
Another meeting, among the most significant, had been arranged by Ernst Kantorowicz, 
Dönhoff’s professorial friend whom she knew from Frankfurt University. The German 
medievalist Kantorowicz had immigrated to the United States in 1938. In 1951, he was 
professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton University where George F. 
Kennan was among his colleagues. Thus he introduced Marion Dönhoff to Kennan. They 
developed a life-long friendship.
131
 When travelling onward to Washington, DC, Dönhoff 
even managed to attend the weekly press conference of the US secretary of state, Dean 
Acheson at the time.
132
  
Dönhoff’s close exchange with the US establishment, however, did not turn her into a mere 
mouthpiece for US policies. Quite to the contrary, she spoke her mind and took a stance on 
controversial issues. In July 1952, for example, she commented rather bitingly on the opening 
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of the West German embassy in a “brand-new” building provided by the US Senate as a 
“symbol of friendship” after the “dubious liquidation of the old embassy”. She interpreted this 
as a hopeful sign for a potential shift in attitude of the US administration regarding 
confiscated German property in the United States, an issue that the Atlantik-Brücke would be 
concerned with in the late 1950s.
133
 
Her next trip to the US was sponsored by the Atlantik-Brücke.
134
 In 1955, she spent two 
months in the United States travelling through the southern states as well as the Midwest 
meeting with people in Washington, New York, and Chicago. She wrote a number of 
reportages about her encounters and experiences which then were published in West German 
newspapers.
135
 Though foreign affairs were her passion, three of the four pieces written 
during her 1955 US trip dealt with American domestic issues. With a mix of enthusiasm and 
critical distance she reported and educated her German readership about, for example, the 
migration movement within the United States into the South and West of the country 
alongside a progressing industrialisation of rural regions and American attitudes to world 
affairs ranging from isolationism to “Sabre-Rattling”.136  
While Dönhoff was definitely fascinated by certain technological achievements, for 
example by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), she simultaneously reinvigorated 
stereotypes of American characteristics held by Germans.
 137
 One was the American as a 
parochial, disinterested and shallow being. Dönhoff borrowed this cliché when referring to a 
local newspaper in Knoxville. This paper had 88 pages and “started with 24 pages of comics 
in gay colours” followed by “a few articles about local politics... a lot of sports news as well 
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as a very thick supplement for women with beauty tips... Not a word about Formosa...” And 
Adlai Stevenson, whom Dönhoff met in Chicago, she described as the “sophisticated, 
sensitive, intellectual, kind” which in her mind was “unlike many Americans”.138  
Dönho  ’s networks 
While reiterating anti-American stereotypes in the pieces about her US experience in the mid-
1950s, Dönhoff was nevertheless a strong proponent of the Atlantic Alliance as well as strong 
German-American relations. This she proved first and foremost in her role as co-founder of 
the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and in regularly attending the German-American 
conferences from 1959 onwards. Moreover, Dönhoff was active in a number of informal elite 
networks and served on boards of the German Council on Foreign Relations, and the Steuben-
Schurz society.
139
 The transatlantic, multinational approach of the Bilderberg group to forging 
and maintaining a strong Atlantic Alliance was neither alien to her, although she was not a 
regular there. Dönhoff attended the 1972 Bilderberg conference in Knokke, Belgium. From 
then on, however, another representative of Die Zeit became a constant at Bilderberg 
meetings.
140
  
Despite Emmet accusing her of not seeing the similarities between Communism and 
Nazism and despite her leading role in promoting Ostpolitik, Dönhoff was not a communist 
fellow-traveller. Her association with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) proved her 
liberal anti-communist credentials.
141
 When Shepard Stone took over the CCF’s successor 
organisation International Association of Cultural Freedom (IACF) in the late 1960s, Dönhoff 
                                                 
138 “…Adlai Stevenson – ein ausgesprochen geistiger Typ – anders als viele Amerikaner: weltgewandt, sensibel, 
intellektuell, liebenswürdig.”; “… und begann mit 24 Seiten Comics in bunten Farben. Es folgten einige 
Aufsätze über Lokalpolitik … viele Sportberichte sowie eine dicke Frauenbeilage mit Ratschlägen für die 
Schönheitspflege … Kein Wort über Formosa…” in Dönhoff, Amerikanische Wechselbäder: Beobachtungen 
und Kommentare aus vier Jahrzehnten, 47, 56-57. 
139 
Harpprecht, Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff, 518. 
140 Theo Sommer, Dönhoff’s journalistic foster son at Die Zeit, was member of the Bilderberg conference’s 
steering committee for many years. http://www.bilderberg.name/index.php?lang=en&content=participants 
(accessed Jan. 31, 2014). 
141 
Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive: Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, 528, 
75. 
  70 
even became board member together with Richard von Weizsäcker, another friend of hers.
142
 
At this point, Shepard Stone and Marion Dönhoff had already known each other for more than 
twenty years. Back then Stone had worked for the US High Commissioner in West Germany 
and had helped to re-establish the West German press.
 143
 From the mid-1950s onwards, Stone 
had directed the Ford Foundation’s International Division. In 1974, Stone established the 
Aspen Institute Berlin serving as founding director.
144
 Marion Dönhoff was member of the 
board of Aspen Berlin together with Willy Brandt, Richard von Weizsäcker, and Lord Allan 
Bullock. It was the time of West Germany’s controversial Ostpolitik, which was carefully 
watched abroad particularly in the United States. The government of the city of Berlin 
supported the founding process since Aspen Berlin was hoped to be “one way of keeping 
German-American relations on an even keel” in the face of Brandt’ ambitious outreach to the 
Eastern bloc.
145
 
Dönhoff did not only focus on German-American relations. She was also a regular member 
of the German-English Königswinter conferences from the late 1950s onwards.
146
 When in 
1952/53 a regional section of the German-English society was founded in Hamburg, Marion 
Dönhoff, Helmut Schmidt and Ralf Dahrendorf served as honorary presidents of this 
section.
147
 Schmidt and Dönhoff, however, shared deeper bonds beyond a purely professional 
relationship between a supportive journalist and a politician. Schmidt joined the Atlantik-
Brücke in the 1960s. Dönhoff and Schmidt had a number of mutual friends, among them Eric 
Warburg. Last but not least, they both enjoyed informal and open debates about current issues 
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of concern. Thus, from the mid-1960s onward, Dönhoff regularly invited the “Blankeneser 
Kreis” for meetings at her home in Hamburg Blankenese. Apart from Schmidt, regular 
participants included the Weizsäcker brothers, Carl Friedrich and Richard (the future federal 
president); the industrialist Otto A. Friedrich, and the bankers Karl Klasen (later president of 
the Federal Bank of Germany) and Alwin Münchmeyer; and Professor Karl Schiller (senator 
in Hamburg and later federal minister).
148
 Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Otto A. Friedrich, 
and Karl Schiller were also members of the Atlantik-Brücke.
149
 
 
Woman in a men’s world: arion Dönho   together with Henry Kissinger (to her right) and Shepard Stone (to 
her left). Undated photograph, Shepard Stone Papers, Dartmouth. 
Image 4: Woman in a men’s world: Marion Dönhoff together with Henry  Kissinger (to her right) and Shepard Stone (to her left). Undated pho tograph, Shepard Stone Papers, Dartmouth. 
The most unlikely Atlanticist 
Marion Dönhoff might have been the most unlikely of the four founders to embark on the 
endeavour to foster German-American relations in the early 1950s, given her aristocratic 
background and the noble class’s entanglements with the Nazi state. The East Prussian 
Countess not only left but lost her native land fleeing the approaching Soviets. In her opinion, 
however, history could have taken a different turn had the allies, the Americans and the 
British, been willing to cooperate with the resistance movement. Instead they demanded 
unconditional surrender and vilified the resistance or even denied its existence: “The allies 
                                                 
148 
Karl-Heinz Janßen, Haug von Kuenheim and Theo Sommer, Die Zeit. Geschichte einer Wochenzeitung 1946 
bis heute (Munich: Siedler, 2006), 139. 
149 
See chapter 2. 
  72 
weren’t concerned about right or wrong. All they sought was power! They wanted Germany’s 
total humiliation and subjugation and therefore there could not be a German resistance 
movement.”150 Yet, despite this negative and almost hostile attitude towards the allies, 
Dönhoff did reinvent herself as a citoyen living a bourgeois life, from 1949 onwards. 
Moreover, she advanced to become one of West Germany’s most influential female 
journalists. Her career was closely connected with the ascendance of the Hamburg weekly Die 
Zeit. This liberal West German weekly newspaper was, according to Philipp Gassert, itself 
part of a transatlantic elite network. Its journalists were transatlantic actors and agents of 
Germany’s western integration rather than mere observers of US life and politics.151 This 
definitely includes Dönhoff. As a citizen of the FRG she endorsed the state’s political 
integration into the Western Alliance under American hegemony. It was worth to contribute 
to shaping the Federal Republic of Germany, according to Dönhoff, as it offered an “open 
society in which it was possible to live humanly and fairly free”.152  
Thus, apart from being a woman, Dönhoff had a lot in common with the male co-founders. 
Like Warburg and Emmet, she had a privileged background with regard to education as much 
as in terms of financial security. Furthermore she was well and widely connected with the 
main actors in politics, journalism, academia, the business community and the cultural scene, 
inside and outside West Germany as Klaus Harpprecht confirms.
153
 Yet, for the transatlantic 
project of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, Dönhoff’s standing in West German journalism 
was most beneficial determining her role and influence within these circles. 
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Moreover, Dönhoff shared with them a strong anti-Communism. To her, Communism 
definitely ranked high among potential threats to liberal, democratic societies, on this side of 
the Atlantic as well as on the other side. However, Dönhoff did not align with hawkish Cold 
Warriors. She vehemently opposed Adenauer’s stance towards the East following the 
Americans’ doctrine that “the Russians could only brought to their knees, if the West was 
stronger.” Adenauer was firmly convinced “that the West should be shut off and should not 
have any relations with the East.”154 Dönhoff, on the other hand, felt that entering dialogue 
with the people in the Eastern bloc countries was a much more promising way to pursue.
155
 
Hence she was an outspoken proponent of an active Ostpolitik from 1956 onwards.
156
 While 
this stance was a source of conflict in her relationship with Warburg and Emmet, her 
neighbour in Hamburg, Blankenese, Erik Blumenfeld, was rather susceptible to an opening to 
the East. 
Hanseatic merchant and politician: Erik Blumenfeld, 1915–1997 
 
Image 5: Christopher Emmet 
In 1950, Christopher Emmet told Erik Blumenfeld “you are one of the comparatively few 
influential people in Germany who have a full and sympathetic understanding of the problems 
both of American and British relations with Germany”.157 Blumenfeld’s political biography 
by Frank Bajohr sees him as a dignitary politician, who did not define himself as a 
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professional political decision-maker. Rather, Blumenfeld derived from his business success 
the natural right to participate in shaping the “res publica” and thus personified the classic 
Hanseat.
158
 In Christopher Emmet’s eyes, Blumenfeld was thus well-equipped to join in with 
him, Warburg and Dönhoff on this transatlantic endeavour. With regard to Bajohr’s 
assessment of Blumenfeld, it should be added that not only Blumenfeld’s successful business 
enterprises qualified him for politics. His involvement in private elite circles and 
organizations also provided him with fruitful contacts, both at home and abroad. 
Like his fellow founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, Blumenfeld was driven by a 
strong sense of mission. Although Blumenfeld was apolitical as a young man, he decided 
“[d]uring the darkest hours of my young life, on the parade-grounds of the concentration 
camps enduring the blows of the Nazi thugs [that] … [I]f I was to escape this hell, I wanted to 
play a part in making sure that never again should so much shame, disgrace and crime be 
committed in Germany or on the hands of Germans.”159 Hence, Blumenfeld not only entered 
politics as early as 1945 but also joined forces with Warburg, Emmet, and Dönhoff to “foster 
relationships and friendship between individuals in the United States and Germany as well as 
to defuse enemy stereotypes and to thwart misunderstandings”. 160 Blumenfeld served this 
course for more than a quarter of a century as treasurer of the Atlantik-Brücke. Moreover, due 
to his standing in the West German business community and being an insider of West German 
party politics with access to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and later Ludwig Erhard, 
Blumenfeld functioned as central go-between among the different spheres. 
Hamburg merchants and Danish gentry 
Erik Blumenfeld was born in March 1915 as first son of Ernst Blumenfeld, a converted Jew, 
and Ebba Möller, a Protestant daughter of a Danish landed gentry family, followed by a sister, 
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Sonja Blumenfeld.
 161
 Erik’s grandfather, Bernhard Blumenfeld laid the foundations for his 
grandson’s carefree childhood and youth in terms of financial security. Bernhard Blumenfeld 
had moved to Hamburg in the early 1870s and established himself as commercial agent for 
mining products, iron, steel, and coke. Steadily he expanded his business opening branches in 
Amsterdam, Paris and London. Around the turn of the century Blumenfeld got a small 
steamer fleet and hence was able to provide the Russian, British and German merchant marine 
and navy alike with bunker coal. By the mid-1910s, Blumenfeld’s company had developed 
into a regionally significant player on the market with several hundred employees. 
Blumenfeld had worked his way up into the Hamburg bourgeoisie, also documented in the 
castle-like mansion that Blumenfeld had acquired on Elbchaussee. Representatives of the 
leading German-Jewish mercantile classes got together regularly at the Blumenfelds; among 
them Albert Ballin, authors like Gerhard Hauptmann, and painters like Max Liebermann.
162
 
Though 15 years apart, Erik Blumenfeld and Eric Warburg grew up in a similar social milieu 
in Hamburg. 
Born in the midst of the First World War, Erik soon had to part from his father. Ernst 
Blumenfeld was drafted and his mother moved with the two children to her parents’ in 
Denmark. While British, French, and German soldiers died on the battle fields of World War 
I, Erik spent a carefree childhood in the bosom of his family in neutral Denmark. He grew up 
with his first language being Danish and, thanks to a British nanny with English as his second 
language. He only really learned German after his family had moved back to Hamburg. Early 
the seeds were sown for a cosmopolitan spirit that marked Blumenfeld’s life in the second 
half of the twentieth century. 
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From bourgeois dandy li e to the “parade grounds o  concentration camps” 
During his Hamburg school days in the 1920s, however, Blumenfeld was mainly interested in 
sports, including horseback riding (Erik’s uncle owned a racing stable), cycle polo, soccer, 
hockey and athletics. To forestall a total educational failure of her son, Ebba Blumenfeld sent 
him off to the prestigious private boarding school Salem at the shore of Lake Constance. The 
School of Salem Castle in 1920 founded by Kurt Hahn, Eric Warburg’s brother-in-law, is still 
considered one of the most elite schools Europe. In Hamburg Blumenfeld had been exposed 
to the local bourgeois circles making friends for life among the ruling class offspring, for 
instance with the future publisher Axel Springer and Karl Klasen, the future president of the 
Federal Bank. His years at Salem provided many opportunities for sustainable networking 
among future leaders on a national and international scale. Many of the Salem alumni 
advanced, after World War II, to leading positions in politics, diplomacy, and academia.  
After graduating from Salem, Blumenfeld went abroad for professional training in banking 
and ship trading. The Hamburg ruling class traditionally had a cultural affinity to England 
nurtured by dense business contacts with the kingdom across the North Sea. Sons of merchant 
families were professionally trained in England as was Erik Blumenfeld in the first half of the 
1930s. Integrated in upper class circles, Blumenfeld absorbed both the English language and 
English culture. In addition he was trained in France and Scandinavia. In 1935, Blumenfeld 
enrolled at the Technical University in Berlin-Charlottenburg to study geology and 
metallurgy.  
Blumenfeld enjoyed his student years in Berlin to the fullest. He maintained “an elegant 
and affluent lifestyle”.163 He drove a BMW sports car and immersed into the artist scene of 
1930s Berlin socialising with actors and actresses. Yet he was also familiar with diplomatic 
circles of the Reich’s capital, most importantly he was acquainted with the US diplomatic 
representative. In June 1939 at a party of the US chargé d’affaires in Berlin, Blumenfeld met 
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the Kennedy brothers, Joseph Patrick (1915-1944) and John Fitzgerald (1917-1963). Born in 
the same year, Joe Kennedy and Erik Blumenfeld spent some time together both in Berlin and 
in Hamburg.
164
 This connection to the Kennedys was to endure and would prove very 
beneficial for Blumenfeld’s post-war career in politics, particularly as special emissary to the 
United States.  
Despite the notorious Nuremberg Laws effective from 1935 onward, according to which 
Erik Blumenfeld was a “first-degree half breed”, Blumenfeld entered the board of the family’s 
business Norddeutsche Kohle & Cokes Werke (NKCW), coal and cokes works in 1938. Only 
one year later, his studies at the Technical University in Berlin were disrupted by the draft 
into the Wehrmacht, the German army. In December 1940, however, he was dismissed. 
Blumenfeld himself claimed “for racial political reasons”.165 Blumenfeld’s wording described 
precisely the intentions of the fanatics at the NSDAP party political offices. “Half breeds” by 
Nazi standards hoped that in return for military service they would receive equal civil rights 
and could end professional and private discrimination. In April 1940, the Nazis issued a 
decree to remove all “half breeds” from the armed forces to prevent a potential softening of 
the Nuremberg laws.
166
 After his dismissal, Blumenfeld initially was allowed to return to 
business. In December 1942, he was arrested by the Gestapo, however. According to 
Blumenfeld, he had been charged with “subversion of national defence”. Travelling on 
business, Blumenfeld later conceded he had “conspired with Englishmen, Swedes, Danes and 
Germans against Hitler”.167 In January 1943, Blumenfeld was deported to Auschwitz and 
from there in October 1943 to Buchenwald. Thanks to his mother, Erik survived the horrors 
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of the concentration camps and was set free just a few weeks prior to armistice.
168
 In her fight 
to save Erik, Ebba Möller Blumenfeld was supported by the young lawyer Gerd Bucerius 
from Hamburg. This provided the basis for a lifelong friendship between Blumenfeld and 
Bucerius, who was among the founders and later publisher of the newly established weekly 
Die Zeit. Hence Erik witnessed the end of World War II and the arrival of the allies as a free 
man in Hamburg.
169
 
Reviving business in Hamburg 
In the immediate post-war period until the summer of 1946, Erik Blumenfeld focused on his 
family’s businesses. One of the first important business meetings took place in Essen, central 
part of the Ruhr area in June 1945. The Krupp family had invited Blumenfeld. Prior to World 
War II, Krupp had acquired the company Bd. Blumenfeld in the context of the general 
aryanization of Jewish businesses in 1938. Now that Alfried Krupp had been arrested by 
American forces facing charges of crimes against humanity and the Krupp’s industrial empire 
was threatened by total dismantling, Krupp sought to re-establish a joint company. Yet, this 
offer should not be mistaken as genuine act of generous voluntary restitution. The Krupps 
were eager to win potential advocates for the coming war crime trials in Nuremberg. And 
indeed after Alfried Krupp had been sentenced to 12 years in prison in 1948, Blumenfeld 
contacted US High Commissioner John J. McCloy petitioning him alongside Eric Warburg to 
release Krupp.
170
 The arrangement was, however, to the benefit of Blumenfeld as well. The 
Bd. Blumenfeld GmbH under Erik Blumenfeld’s leadership emerged as the biggest coal 
importer in West Germany during the 1950s. Reviving the Blumenfeld businesses included, 
besides re-establishing old business contacts in the United Kingdom, to make new ones across 
the Atlantic. On his first trips to the US in the late 1940s, Blumenfeld was quite successful in 
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pursuing business partners and soon Bd. Blumenfeld could import large amounts of coal from 
the US.
171
 The possibility to exploit new business opportunities secured Blumenfeld’s 
financial independence after the war. Unlike his friends Warburg and Emmet, he did, 
however, pursue a political career. 
Entering politics speaking out on economic issues 
Soon Erik Blumenfeld added official posts to his private business responsibilities. In 1946, he 
became vice president of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and assumed leadership of 
Hamburg’s traffic and transport authority, joined the city’s industry committee, and chaired 
the traffic and transport committee. Thus Blumenfeld held key positions for the economic 
reconstruction of Hamburg only twelve months after the end of war. At this point Erik could 
no longer avoid joining a political party. The SPD and the Communist party, however, were 
out of question for Blumenfeld, although in Buchenwald he had met and come to appreciate a 
number of Social Democrats and Communists. Blumenfeld was a much too “status-conscious 
entrepreneur”, however, to become member of one of the left parties.172 Another reason was 
his total disagreement regarding questions of foreign policy in which the Communists in the 
Western and the Eastern zone of occupation uncritically followed the Soviet leadership. The 
SPD scared him off with its leader’s nationalistic overtones. Konrad Adenauer’s ideas of 
opening up to the West and to Europe, however, were more in accordance with Blumenfeld’s 
own convictions. Yet, the decision to eventually join the Christian Democratic Union in June 
1946 was not an easy one for Blumenfeld as ‘the Christian’ in CDU did not appeal to him. In 
the end however, it was Konrad Adenauer’s personality that tipped the scale in favour of the 
Christian Democrats. In 1946, Hamburger politicians, among them the young Blumenfeld 
warmly welcomed Konrad Adenauer, Governing Mayor of the city of Cologne and CDU 
chairman of the British zone of occupation at the time. Blumenfeld reminisced the first times 
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he saw Adenauer. “He [Konrad Adenauer] talks for a long time very forcefully, without any 
pathos, drawing a picture of the foreign policy forces and Germany’s future position. Straight 
as a die, just like when he arrived, does the then 71 years old man leave after several hours of 
talk and debate...”173 Two months later, Blumenfeld was a member of the Hamburg CDU’s 
executive committee. In October, he was nominated candidate for the Hamburg parliamentary 
elections and designated for the post of Senator for trade, crafts and shipping. Traditionally, 
Hamburg was a stronghold of Social Democracy. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
founded in 1945, was a newcomer in Hamburg. Membership of the Hamburg CDU reflected 
this as well. In 1946, the CDU had only 3,500 members, the SPD twenty times more. 
Together this explains the rapid rise of the young Blumenfeld in politics of post-war 
Hamburg.
174
 In 1946, Blumenfeld was elected to Hamburg’s city parliament, joining the 
opposition benches in the Hamburg Bürgerschaft.
175
  
At this time, Germany was still under allied control. Therefore a central issue during 
debates in the Bürgerschaft were allied plans for dismantling German industry. Most 
members opposed this vehemently. Whilst contributing to parliamentary debates on the issue, 
Blumenfeld preferred behind-the-scenes, quiet and steady negotiations with the Allies over 
loud and aggressive voices expressing dismay in view of progressing dismantling in public. 
This attitude and approach were in complete accordance with Emmet’s and Warburg’s. 
Blumenfeld proposed to develop trustful relationships with the occupying forces by 
demonstrating willingness to European cooperation.
176
  
Unsurprisingly, Blumenfeld as a Hamburg merchant and ship-owner distinguished himself, 
at least in the early years of his parliamentary career, as a frequent speaker on economic 
issues. Early on, prior to the founding of the Federal Republic, when it was still uncertain 
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which path the German economic system would take, Erik Blumenfeld took a clear stance on 
the issue. He explicitly preferred “the private initiative of entrepreneurs” since this was “the 
best functioning engine of economic life”.177 Blumenfeld’s thinking on the preferred 
relationship between state and economy was influenced by Wilhelm Röpke’s and other 
Freiburg School intellectuals.
178
  
Calling upon his fellow entrepreneurs in West Germany, Blumenfeld reminded them that 
they could not fulfil their responsibility as promoter and supporter of social change when 
staying aloof of politics. In his opinion entrepreneurs had a political responsibility and had to 
assume a leading role in West German society.
179
 Blumenfeld’s biographer rightly 
characterised him as an ordoliberal.
180
 In the late 1940s, Blumenfeld was, hence, among those 
in Hamburg who enthusiastically supported Ludwig Erhard, then Director of Economics of 
the Bizonal Economics Council, from 1949 first economics minister of the newly founded 
Federal Republic of Germany and future chancellor (1963-1966).
 181
  
Adenauer’s uno  icial  oreign policy adviser 
If Erhard was to Blumenfeld the icon of Germany’s post-war economic order, Adenauer 
represented bourgeois civil society in the German post-war society and thus was a role model 
he could look up to. As early as in the late 1940s, Blumenfeld had risen to unofficial emissary 
to Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war chancellor. He reported back to 
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Adenauer after his frequent trips to England where he renewed pre-war contacts.
182
 Adenauer 
relied on Blumenfeld as well with regard to the US due to his well-established contacts there. 
Thus, Blumenfeld was significantly involved in the organisation of the West German 
chancellor’s first visit to the US in 1953.183 In 1960, Adenauer engaged Blumenfeld to 
officially observe the US presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 
1960; an appointment for which Blumenfeld’s personal relationship with the Kennedy family 
dating back to the late 1930s certainly played a decisive role. Blumenfeld clearly sympathised 
with the young Kennedy due to “his self-confidence, his persuasive power, and his 
enormously sure instinct”. In November 1960, he was more than enthused when JFK won the 
presidential election as he was convinced he would: “be a strong president” and felt “new 
dynamic forces and refreshing initiatives” would “be visible in Washington”.184 In the 
following year, Blumenfeld officially entered the federal stage of West German politics when 
he was elected to the Bundestag. Though a novice to federal parliament he immediately 
joined the prestigious Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committees of International 
Trade and Development Aid. These choices illustrated precisely where his political interests 
lay.
185
  
The Atlanticist looking East 
When Blumenfeld entered the federal arena of politics, he and Adenauer increasingly grew 
apart. Blumenfeld disagreed with the Chancellor’s foreign policy course steering ever closer 
to de Gaulle’s France, fearing the negative repercussions this could imply for German-
American relations. As a Hamburg merchant, Blumenfeld belonged to the Anglophile and 
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Atlanticist faction within the CDU/CSU in which economics minister Ludwig Erhard and 
foreign affairs minister Gerhard Schröder were central figures.
186
  
With Hamburg’s preference for free trade and worldwide business, entrepreneurs and 
politicians alike trusted exclusively the US to protect those interests. Blumenfeld advocated a 
close alliance with the Anglo-Saxon powers over the German-French alliance, which would 
focus almost exclusively on Western Europe. In addition, US efforts for détente suited 
Hamburg interests in trading with the East much better. Thus Blumenfeld also advocated a 
more flexible Ostpolitik, which found an early expression in the Politik der Elbe, Hamburg’s 
independent foreign trade policy towards the East centring on the economic interests of the 
city’s port in place since the mid-1950s.187 Blumenfeld was affiliated with the Committee on 
Eastern European Economic Relations, a joint organisation of the leading associations 
representing West German business founded in 1952. He cooperated particularly close with 
two members, Ernst-Wolff Mommsen and Otto Wolff von Amerongen, who were members of 
the Atlantik-Brücke as well.
188
 
Due to his staunch Atlanticism, Blumenfeld welcomed Ludwig Erhard succeeding 
Adenauer as chancellor at the end of 1963. Long before Adenauer finally resigned, 
Blumenfeld, Marion Dönhoff and Gerd Bucerius of Die Zeit had promoted Erhard’s claim to 
leadership. When Erhard finally did become West Germany’s second chancellor he and 
Blumenfeld had long been bound by a personal trust-based relationship. Thus again 
Blumenfeld advised the West German chancellor on foreign policy issues, and acted as 
interpreter of German politics and representative of the Federal Republic abroad. During the 
1960s, Blumenfeld travelled extensively to the United States. At least once a year he visited 
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the US either in consultation with the German foreign office or on behalf of Erhard. In 
December of 1964, for example, Blumenfeld met with vice president Hubert Humphrey, 
Lyndon B Johnson’s foreign policy advisor and a number of senators to discuss the 
multilateral force (MLF) and West Germany’s involvement therein.189 After Erhard’s 
downfall and with the incoming Great Coalition under Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Blumenfeld was 
pushed to the margins of Bonn’s political establishment.190 Subsequently Blumenfeld 
reoriented towards European politics. He was a member of the European Parliament for 16 
years and joined the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe as well as the 
parliamentary assembly of NATO.
191
 
Born into a Hamburg merchant family active in shipping and trade, and politically 
socialized in the city’s parliament, Blumenfeld was also a typical representative of the port 
city, Hamburg. Since at least the early 20
th
 century, this city has been associated with 
internationalism and liberal trade capitalism.
192
 Unsurprisingly, Hamburg politicians like 
Blumenfeld perceived of the US as the only power capable of guarantying global free trade 
and hence the economic recovery of Europe after the devastation of World War II. 
Blumenfeld had not only a similar outlook upon the world situation after 1945 as his three co-
founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG: he had also shared with them a privileged 
upbringing symbolized among other things in his multilingual education and schooling at 
Salem. Blumenfeld’s transatlantic leanings and his “state spirit” found expression in his 
activities in the Übersee-Club, the Atlantik-Brücke, and his regular participation in the 
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Königswinter conferences of the German-English Society from 1950 onwards and Anglo-
German Club in Hamburg.
193
 
Conclusion 
The four individuals forming the nucleus of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG had a lot in 
common. They shared a privileged background, bourgeois or aristocratic, that translated into 
privileged access to education as well as into a cosmopolitan upbringing. This facilitated their 
post-war devotion to liberal internationalism and staunch opposition to Communism. 
Moreover, Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld were imbued with “state spirit”. They 
all felt called to do good for their nation and their countries’ relationship after 1945.  In doing 
so, they all were well-equipped with transatlantic links predating World War II. The ensuing 
activities in this regard were, however, not formally legitimated. Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, 
and Blumenfeld acted as private diplomats instead. 
They also differed, however. It was, obviously crucial that the four founders had different 
nationalities, German and American. Eric Warburg was citizen of both, the United States and 
West Germany. What is more, he was Jewish and thus assumed the role of cultural mediator 
and conciliator. Status and reputation of the Warburg name in international banking and 
business in Germany as well as in the US perfectly facilitated Eric Warburg’s role as 
fundraiser for the joint transatlantic endeavour. Christopher Emmet was the intellectual and 
political mind in the group of founders. His far-reaching connections into the US foreign 
policy establishment as well as into West German politics served the cause of the Atlantik-
Brücke and the ACG for 20 years. Marion Dönhoff, the only woman among the founders as 
among the members of the Atlantik-Brücke for many years contributed to the cause in two 
ways. As East Prussian countess, she linked the transatlantic network to the old European 
aristocratic elite. As journalist and editor of Die Zeit, Dönhoff facilitated access to the West 
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German media landscape and acted as crucial multiplier reaching out to a broader public. Erik 
Blumenfeld, the youngest among the founders, was portrayed as go-between of business and 
politics. Blumenfeld as a rising star in the young Christian Democratic Union was 
instrumental for to the aims of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as he had access to 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successor Ludwig Erhard. Furthermore, as successful 
businessman he linked the growing transatlantic elite network to West German industry and 
business circles. These differences were not antagonistic but rather complementary and thus 
beneficial for establishing the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and the developing transnational 
elite network. While Emmet and Warburg were opposed to Ostpolitik, Dönhoff and 
Blumenfeld welcomed the rapprochement, illustrating particular interests of parts of the West 
German bourgeoisie. Differences among the founders in this regard foreshadowed some of 
the conflicts and controversies the transatlantic network had to deal with.
194
 Furthermore, the 
lives of Dönhoff and Blumenfeld provide us with insight into the debates surrounding the 
orientation of the FRG in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Chapter 2:  
The “good” Germans and their American friends: 
the Atlantik-Brücke’s and the ACG’s membership 
The four founders Eric Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld 
were at the centre of the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on the organisations that they 
founded, the Atlantik-Brücke in Hamburg and the ACG in New York and on the members of 
these organisations. According to Christopher Emmet, the members were “the best German 
survivors” and the best example for American “liberals in the good old-fashioned sense”.1 
While Chapter One established the elite status of the founders and their complementary 
function with regard to establishing two transatlantic organisations, chapter two analyses if 
and how the functional pattern of the founders was reproduced with regard to the membership 
of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Hence, this chapter discusses the special composition of 
both organisations in order to draw conclusions about the specific function of the ACG and 
the Atlantik-Brücke in the context of West German-American post-war relations and the Cold 
War.  
Ultimately, the chapter aims at characterising the membership of both the Atlantik-Brücke 
and the ACG, thus demonstrating how the founders were able to reproduce and maintain the 
elite character of their core group. They were particularly successful in expanding and 
fostering their numerous links to state institutions over the course of twenty odd years. This, 
in turn, enabled both groups to play an important role in the bilateral relations of the US and 
West Germany during the Cold War as is discussed below.
2
 Following this assumption, the 
chapter examines if the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG represented the 
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“power elite” of West Germany and United States or rather a “foreign policy establishment”.3 
According to C. Wright Mills, key features of the “power elite” concept include an overlap 
and exchange within the “triangle of power” of politics, economy, and military facilitated by a 
“considerable traffic of personnel” within and between politics, economy, and military and by 
“specialized go-betweens”. In explaining the unity of this power elite, Mills attends to the 
social background of the members of this elite establishing a similarity of “origin and 
education ... career and style of life”. 4 The term “foreign policy establishment” is first and 
foremost associated with the United States and furthermore intimately linked to the 20
th
 
century. It refers to individuals drawn from the corporate world, banking and law firms, Ivy 
League universities, leading philanthropic foundations, and media with privileged access to 
politics. Members of this establishment take a particular interest in American foreign affairs 
propagating active and interventionist role for the United States in world politics.
5
 
 The chapter is divided into three main sections following up on the above raised questions. 
The first considers the prelude to the actual founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in 
1954 with a special focus on Christopher Emmet’s initial plans for an Ausschuss fuer deutsch-
amerikanische Verstaendigung against the background of the Western world facing the 
challenges and repercussions of the Korean War starting in 1950. The following two sections 
concentrate on the development of the composition of membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and 
the ACG with a sociological view on the groups’ profile.  
                                                 
3 C. Wright Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society”, The British Journal of Sociology vol. 9, no. 
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5 Roberts, “‘All the Right People’”, 409. 
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Prelude: 1950–1954 
Christopher Emmet resumed his visits to Germany in 1949, the year of the founding of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
6
 A year later, in the spring of 1950, Erik Blumenfeld and 
Marion Dönhoff together with the office of Max Brauer, mayor of Hamburg, organised a 
lecture tour targeting a mixed audience of businessmen and Social Democrats in Hamburg. 
Among the key issues identified by the organisers to be addressed by Emmet in his lectures 
were “American Public Opinion Toward Germany” and “Rearmament of Germany”.7 
By the early 1950s, the Cold War was already in full swing. Tensions between the Soviet 
Union and the Western bloc had flared up a few times; in 1948 the Soviets blockaded all 
access routes to West Berlin initiating the Berlin airlift. In 1949 the so called “fall of China”  
the creation of the People’s Republic of China marking the victory of the Communists over 
the nationalists in China  seemed to prove to the West the aggressive expansionist nature of 
Communism. In the summer of 1950, this perception was further fuelled by the conflict 
between North Korea and South Korea and the ensuing intervention of the United States. In 
sum, according to Volker Berghahn, these events reaffirmed the conviction of leading US 
decision-makers that the circumstances made it necessary for West Germany to share the 
burden of fighting Soviet Communism – financially and militarily. Furthermore, from an 
American perspective it was difficult to perceive why West Germany should use its economic 
growth exclusively to enhance the standard of living and further strengthen export instead of 
investing into defence.
8
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Yet serious hurdles on both sides of the Atlantic challenged West German involvement.
9
 
US public opinion was more than sceptical towards Germans and West Germany so shortly 
after the victory over the Nazi regime. Doubts about theGermans’ renunciation of Nazism 
were widespread.
10
 Even HICOG staff worried about a “trend toward nationalism and a 
yearning for authoritarian rule” in West Germany coinciding with an increasing impatience 
with US occupation.
11
 West German public opinion and that of the political elites posed 
further problems.
12
 An opinion poll conducted in March 1950, showed that 52 percent of 
West Germans were opposed to establishing an army in the Federal Republic. In 1955, still 45 
percent said they would disapprove of an army.
13
 From an American perspective, the 
oppositional Social Democrats aggravated this situation by complaining that rearmament of 
West Germany would threaten prospects for a peaceful reunification of Germany. In the early 
1950s, industrial elites in particular still held strong resentments against Allied de-nazification 
and de-militarising policies. At the time, when the US began voicing demands for West, 
Germans to share the burden of defending the West former officers and arms industrialists 
still served sentences as convicted war criminals.
14
 Moreover, in terms of public opinion, both 
West Germany and the US faced image problems. The former suffered from the prejudice that 
all Germans were incorrigible Nazis. The latter faced, according to Volker Berghahn, a deep-
seated cultural anti-Americanism nurtured by the Europeans’ superiority complex.15 This was 
prevalent not only among people leaning towards Socialism and Communism but was as 
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strong among the Christian conservative right and applied in particular to the economic and 
intellectual elite.
16
 It was, therefore, a strategically smart move by Christopher Emmet to 
especially target the business community during his early trips to West Germany. The next 
section of this chapter examines the particular role of businessmen within the Atlantik-Brücke 
in greater depth.  
The rebuttal of mutual prejudices, German anti-Americanism and American prejudices 
against Germans, thus fuelled Emmet’s, Warburg’s, Blumenfeld’s and Dönhoff’s motivation 
to promote better bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and the United States by 
founding two cooperating private organisations. According to Christopher Emmet, the 
“Korean defeat, the revival of American isolationism and continued difficulties of a German 
participation in the defense of Europe” made it necessary to establish a German committee, 
which would have to cooperate with American groups determined to support the building of 
“a democratic, anti-Communist Germany”. At this point, Emmet had already drafted an 
elaborate plan for an Ausschuss fuer deutsch-amerikanische Verstaendigung (Committee for 
German-American understanding), which he laid out in a letter to Colonel Byraode of the 
State Department’s German Desk in early 1951. In this letter, Emmet also set forth which 
criteria German members would have to meet in order to join this committee. They would 
have to prove a positive anti-Nazi record and they would have to be anti-Communist and pro-
American.
 
Emmet supplemented his letter with a list of over sixty people who he considered 
suitable to join the Ausschuss. Emmet’s selection featured Christian and Social Democrats 
(CDU and SPD) as well as Free Democrats (FDP), trade unionists, journalists, politicians, 
academicians and a good number of members of the so called July 20 resistance movement, a 
group of predominantly noble officers in the Wehrmacht unsuccessfully plotting against 
Hitler in 1944
17
 – thus foreshadowing the composition of membership of the German 
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organisation to be founded only a few months later that year. In fact, a number of those 
mentioned on Emmet’s list later would have a decisive part in the story of the Atlantik-
Brücke. Among them were Erik Blumenfeld, Ernst Friedlaender, and Marion Countess 
Dönhoff, Max Brauer, Ernst Reuter, Otto A. Friedrich, Hellmut Becker, and Fabian von 
Schlabrendorff
18
 – a mix of journalists, businessmen, Social Democratic politicians, 
academics and former members of the resistance movement, an assembly that was to become 
characteristic of Atlantik-Brücke’s membership. 
In March 1951, following their initial meetings, the West Germans proceeded quickly with 
the plan to establish an organisation by forming first of all a committee by the name 
Transatlantik-Brücke. The committee set up office in Hamburg, not Bonn – the seat of West 
Germany’s government – and hired an executive director. The trained lawyer, Dr Walter 
Stahl, had already gathered considerable experience in the political committee sector as 
deputy secretary of the German Council of the European Movement prior to his employment 
with the Atlantik-Brücke.
19
 He was to remain with the Atlantik-Brücke for the coming 
decades being mainly responsible for the organisation’s correspondence and publication 
work. 
In the early 1950s, American public opinion toward Germany remained controversial to 
say the least. “Dangerous belligerence in the political attitude in large sections of German 
opinion” was seen by the New York Times correspondent Jack Raymond as well as a failure of 
the Germans “to accept the lessons of the Nuremberg trials”.20 In another New York Times 
article, author Friedrich T. H. Tetens went even further claiming that seven years of 
occupation and re-education on the side of the occupying forces had been a total failure and 
was convinced that “German militarists ... will make a deal again with their Red counterparts 
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whenever an opportune moment will arise.”21 Therefore, the ACG set up by Emmet in the 
spring of 1952 initially focused on providing American newspapers with information 
pertaining to developments in West Germany in order to balance media reports. Emmet and 
his assistant Marcia Kahn sent around reports written by Walter Stahl commenting, for 
example, on the reparation negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
new state of Israel, and the debt relief negotiations in London taking place during 1952.
22
 
However, unlike the Transatlantik-Brücke, the ACG could not afford to set up an office. 
Instead Christopher Emmet provided space in his family’s apartment in New York’s Upper 
West Side.
23
  
The composition of both groups reflected characteristic features that the Atlantik-Brücke 
and the ACG would further develop during the 1950s and 1960s. As table 1 indicates, the 
group of founders of the Transatlantik-Brücke featured a mix of representatives of business 
and industry, media, and politics with the first category clearly in the majority. With a view to 
the composition of the ACG’s first executive committee in table 2 one feature is particularly 
noteworthy – the fact that half of the committee’s members were émigrés born in Germany. 
The other half also had significant links to Germany. Emmet, for instance, had spent much of 
his childhood, youth and young adulthood in Germany.
24
 George N. Shuster and Theodore 
Knauth had served HICOG and the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) 
respectively. In terms of committee members’ professions we see a mix of bankers, lawyers, 
academics, and authors. However, it is noteworthy that the category representing business 
was in quantitative terms small, especially in comparison with the German counterpart 
organisation. Hence, the fact that the German group included so many business 
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representatives whereas the ACG lacked them points to a characteristic feature in the 
relationship of these two formally independent organisations.  
  95 
Table 1: Founders of the Transatlantik-Brücke, 1951
25
 
Name  Function/ Profession 
Erik Blumenfeld Member of the Hamburg Bürgerschaft (CDU); 
businessman 
Hans Karl von Borries President Ruhr Stickstoff AG 
(Ruhr nitrogen corporation) 
Marion Dönhoff Journalist Die Zeit 
Ernst Friedlaender Journalist and activist for European unity 
Gotthart von Falkenhausen Banker 
Günter Henle Chairman Klöckner concern 
Albert Schäfer President Association of German 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce; 
chairman Phoenix Gummiwerke 
Friedrich Spennrath Chairman of AEG 
Advisory board 
Max Brauer 1
st
 Mayor of Hamburg (SPD), 1946-1953 and 
1957-1960 
Karl Arnold 2
nd
 minister president of the federal state of 
North Rhine-Westphalia (CDU), 1947-1956 
Ernst Reuter 1
st
 Mayor of West Berlin (SPD), 1946-1953 
 
During the 1950s, 1960s, and well into the 1970s, their relationship involved a certain 
financial dependence on the part of the ACG. This, however, seemed to have been intended, 
as Emmet saw the Atlantik-Brücke as being responsible for raising the necessary funds 
through “American friends of our German friends”. He believed such an arrangement to be 
ideal as it prevented funders trying “to change or hamper” their “present discreet plan of 
operation”. Moreover, it would spare Emmet and the ACG from going “out and risk selling 
ourselves to American business men” who had, according to Emmet, “much less political 
understanding than the German counterparts.”26 
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Table 2: First executive committee of the American Council on Germany 
Name Function/Profession 
Christopher Emmet Activist/ publicist 
George N. Shuster Former Land Commissioner for Bavaria (1950/51); 
president Hunter College, NYC 
Eric M. Warburg* Banker 
Joseph Kaskell* Lawyer 
Norbert Muhlen* Journalist and author 
Theodor M. Knauth Former member of Religious Division of Military 
Government in Germany 
Fritz Oppenheimer* Lawyer 
Arnold Wolfers* Prof. of International Relations, Yale University 
*German-born and emigrated, except for Wolfers who was born in Switzerland; 
The Atlantik-Brücke 
The 1950s: Establishing a white-washing agency for West German industry 
The next step in strengthening the Atlantik-Brücke’s position as a transatlantic public 
relations agency came in September 1954, when the group registered as a non-profit 
association with the Municipal Court in Hamburg. The members were fully aware that in the 
mid-1950s, there existed “a number of organisations and institutes in Germany that are 
concerned with political, economic, social and cultural conditions in the U.S.A. and thus 
contribute to a better understanding of U.S. positions in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
contrast, however, there was no notable organisation that attempts to work into the other 
direction.” They intended to fill that void. 27 
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Table 3: Signatories of articles of association of Transatlantik-Brücke 
signed Sept. 25, 1954 in Hamburg
28
 
Name Function/ Position Sector/ Industry 
Hans Karl von Borries President Ruhr Stickstoff AG Chemical industry 
Marion Dönhoff Journalist Die Zeit Media 
Gotthard von 
Falkenhausen 
Personally liable partner Burkhardt & 
Co., Essen 
Private banking 
Ernst Friedlaender Publicist and activist for European unity Media, politics 
Gerhard Geyer CEO Esso AG, Hamburg Petroleum industry 
Hans Christoph von 
Tucher 
Board member 
Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich 
Banking 
Friedrich Wilhelm 
Ziervogel 
CEO, Ruhrgas, AG Gas trading 
The young organisation’s prime field of activity was directed towards US public opinion 
intending to explain West German policies to Americans. Bonn might, therefore, have been 
the more appropriate place for the planned enterprise. Yet, the geographical remoteness to the 
seat of government in Bonn may also be interpreted as an expression of symbolic distance to 
official politics. In view of Hamburg’s image as home of Germany’s cosmopolitan liberal 
merchant elite the choice appears, however, less surprising. At the end of the 19
th
 century, 
Hamburg had emerged as commercial metropolis only second to London and New York. 
Early in the 20
th
 century the Hamburg America Line (Hapag) ascended to become the world’s 
largest shipping company and thus established the international reputation for Hamburg’s 
shipbuilding industry. Merchants definitely contributed further to the city’s rapid economic 
growth. Banks and insurance companies naturally concentrated in a centre of trade and world 
traffic, industrial and technical growth. The bourgeois elite of Hamburg was rooted in a mind-
set originating in the Wilhelmine era, characterised by power consciousness, knowledge of 
the world and rich experience in dealing with the political and economic powerful of the 
world. Moreover this mind-set featured a critical distance towards the conservative elites 
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subsumed as liberal political understanding.
29
 A touch of this attitude and outlook of the 
Hamburg upper class survived the Second World War and the ensuing occupation period to 
be revived by the founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and its members. 
The articles of association  a prerequisite for registering as non-profit organisation  set 
forth that new members could be admitted by co-optation only. Potential members had to be 
invited and approved by vote of the existing members of the Atlantik-Brücke. Once admitted 
to membership, members were eligible to regularly vote for the executive board of the 
group.
30
 Thus, a careful selection process for members was ensured, maintaining the elite 
character of the Atlantik-Brücke as envisioned by the original founders; the more so as 
German business and industrial elites were traditionally acquainted with the gatekeeper 
function of older representatives. Hence cooptation into the Atlantik-Brücke was a broadly 
accepted proof of prestige of the newly founded organisation.
31
 In addition, the new official 
status of a non-profit organisation implied an additional built-in advantage. The Atlantik-
Brücke was exempt from income and business tax. This in turn meant that membership fees 
and financial donations to the organisation were tax-deductible  an incentive, no doubt, in 
attracting financially strong industry and business representatives to the cause of contributing 
to a better understanding of West Germany in the US, who in turn were expected to pay 
annual membership fees of a few thousand deutschmarks.
32
 
Selecting potential members was therefore a key issue on the agenda of the first annual 
meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke upon registration in September 1954. Inviting managers of 
top-class companies and prominent journalists and academicians served two aims. Firstly, big 
names enhanced the organisation’s appeal by offering membership in an exclusive and 
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prestigious club. Secondly, and more importantly, it was essential to attract financially strong 
members to ensure further development of the organisation’s programmes and activities. The 
attendees at this September meeting, hence, explicitly stressed the desirability of inviting a 
representative of the Norddeutsche Bank, Bremen as well as of the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft, and of the Munich reinsurance or of the insurance company Allianz. 
Besides the financial industry the members also wanted to co-opt a representative of the long-
established shipping company Hapag, the Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt 
Aktiengesellschaft, and the even older electrical engineering company Siemens.
33
 And indeed 
this strategy proved to be very successful. Only three years later, the Atlantik-Brücke had co-
opted representatives of six more companies, among them Siemens and the Norddeutsche 
Kreditbank. Siemens’ company interest in the development of stable and friendly relations 
with the United States, however, was not merely justified by its business strategies to access 
the US as export market. Rather the Siemens & Halske AG and other major German firms 
used their newly established branches in the US to prepare and negotiate deals in South 
America. According to Reinhard Neebe, American banks made available the necessary funds 
for the realisation of such projects.
34
 Membership in the Atlantik-Brücke helped opening 
doors across the Atlantic given Eric Warburg’s broad and far-reaching networks particularly 
on New York’s Wall Street.  
By 1960 total membership in the Atlantik-Brücke had increased to 39. Of those almost 80 
per cent (see table 4) were corporate members. The most striking feature of the Atlantik-
Brücke membership – the predominance of business and industrial circles – had hence fully 
developed at this point. In the course of the late 1950s, the pharmaceutical giant Schering, the 
automotive company Daimler Benz AG, and finally Hapag had joined. Hence, within less 
than a decade after its founding, the Atlantik-Brücke had managed to co-opt top-class 
                                                 
33 
Summary record of the general meeting of the Transatlantik-Brücke, Sep. 25, 1954. 
34 
See Reinhard Neebe, “German Big Business and the Return to the World Market after World War II” in 
Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century, ed. 
Volker R. Berghahn (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), 113. 
  100 
managers from basically all industrial sectors of the resurgent West German economy 
including the banking sector, chemical and oil industry, gas trading business, rubber, 
mechanical engineering, metal and food industries as well as the automotive sector.
35
 Despite 
this evident success in attracting the business elite, Eric Warburg suggested to additionally 
approach German subsidiaries of American companies, such as Ford and Opel. The majority 
of the members, however, did not only oppose this suggestion. They even seemed offended 
and hence argued that “personalities represented in the Atlantik-Brücke were determined to 
make a purely German contribution to German-American friendship”.36 This attitude appears 
quite out of place in an organisation promoting “German-American friendship”. It offers, 
however, a glimpse of the confident self-perception of West German industrial elites nurtured 
by national pride alongside a denial of accepting “total destruction of Germany’s power 
position in Europe” as well as fear of superior business competitors.37 
Table 4: Membership categories of the Atlantik-Brücke 
year Business/
industry 
% of 
total 
politics % of 
total 
media % of 
total 
academia % of 
total 
other total 
1954 13 76.5 1* 5.9 2 11.8 1 5.9 1 17 
1960 31 79.5 2* 5.1 2 5.1 6 15.4  39 
1965 41 74.5 3*+ 3 10.9 2 3.6 8 14.5 1 55 
1969 48 76.2 4*+ 4 12.7 2 3.2 8 12.7 1 63 
1974 46 70.8 3*+ 8 16.9 2 3.1 6 9.2 1 65 
*double counting: the person categorized as politician was also counted as businessman 
It is, moreover, noteworthy that by 1960, Atlantik-Brücke corporate membership featured 
companies from six different federal states plus West Berlin indicative of the elite clubs trans-
regional appeal and unique selling point nation-wide. Likewise, it is striking that companies 
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from the Ruhr featured so prominently throughout the period under consideration (see table 
5). The Ruhr district located in the federal state of North-Rhine-Westphalia had been the 
German Reich’s industrial heartland and was one of Europe’s most significant industrial 
concentrations and one of its largest coal-producing areas. The history of the district during 
the Third Reich was closely associated with the big conglomerates of Flick and Krupp.
38
 
During World War II, the Ruhr district was particularly affected by the allied bombings and 
after the war by allied de-industrialisation and de-nazification measures. Thus, anti-
Americanism was exceptionally vigorous among Ruhr industrialists.
39
  
Against this background, we can establish a twofold reason for the high number of 
industrialists especially from the Ruhr district, among the Atlantik-Brücke membership. On 
the one hand, the perspective of the founders and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke may be 
considered. Given their well-connected background and intimate knowledge of German 
industrial circles it can be assumed that Dönhoff, Warburg, Blumenfeld and Emmet were 
quite aware of the widespread and strong anti-American sentiments in German industry and 
thus deliberately sought to co-opt influential industrialists. In the long run, the overarching 
objective of integrating West Germany into the Atlantic Community could only be 
accomplished by strategically assimilating conservatives as well into transatlantic elite 
networks with certain individuals serving as multipliers in countering anti-Americanism.  
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Table 5: Regional breakdown of Atlantik-Brücke members representing business and industry 
Year/ 
federal state
40
 
1954 1960 1965 1969 1974 
Bavaria 1 2 2 3 3 
BW 0 2 6 8 8 
Berlin 0 1 0 0 1 
Bremen 0 1 1 1 1 
HH 4 4 7 8 6 
Hesse 1 5 5 6 8 
LS 0 0 0 1 1 
NRW 2 8 12 11 9 
NRW-Ruhr 6 6 6 8 8 
RP 0 0 0 1 2 
On the other hand, it is important to remember that Germany’s reputation and image had been 
substantially damaged abroad. The industrial elites felt the repercussions thereof especially 
hard. Hence, the motivation to improve German industry’s image by casting off the Nazi past 
should not be underestimated. To this end, joining the Atlantik-Brücke proved to be beneficial 
as this automatically associated members with Eric Warburg, an influential returning German 
Jew, and with former members of the resistance movement against Hitler. These two 
categories were central for Americans in order to distinguish the “good” Germans from Nazis. 
Concluding membership in the Atlantik-Brücke undergirded, at least for a number of 
corporate members, broader whitewashing strategies. Among the more tangible reasons for 
businessmen and industrialists to join the Atlantik-Brücke might as well have been the long-
term objective of seeking restitution for confiscated property in the United States.
41
 
The large share of business and industry representatives among Atlantik-Brücke members 
was starkly contrasted by the personalities chairing the organisation from the mid-1950s to 
the early 1960s. With Ernst Friedlaender and Arnold Bergstraesser, two men lent their faces 
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to the Atlantik-Brücke who were untainted by Germany’s Nazi past. Friedlaender was 
originally banker and merchant by profession. In the 1920s, he was acting director of the 
Agfa-Anilinfabrikation, a US subsidiary of IG-Farben. In the face of the political 
developments in the Weimar Republic, however, he abandoned this position in 1931 and 
returned to Europe. Friedlaender spent the Nazi-era in neutral Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
Only one year after the end of World War II, he returned to Germany and began writing for 
Die Zeit. At the same time, Friedlaender started a political career becoming, according to 
Christopher Emmet, “one of the most active German members of the European movement.” 42 
 The European Movement was founded in 1948. All the different national member 
organisation of the European Movement had the overarching common aim of rapidly unifying 
Europe. Renowned European politicians such as Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, and 
Konrad Adenauer supported this transnational undertaking by acting as Presidents of Honour 
for the movement. However, it was not a purely European project. The financial malaise of 
the European Movement was cured by US government funds, which were covertly transferred 
using the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE) as a conduit. ACUE was formed in 
the 1940s with the aim of promoting European integration as a means of solving the German 
question and was run by senior figures from the US intelligence community such as Allen 
Welsh Dulles and William J. Donovan. The European Movement and its different national 
branches were central to organising mass support among the European population at large as 
well as among political and economic elites for the Schuman Plan, the European Defence 
Community and a European Assembly.
43
 Friedlaender’s crucial position in the European 
Movement was particularly important to the Atlantik-Brücke as he rubbed shoulders with 
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world leaders and the internationalist-minded US foreign policy establishment.
44
 Moreover, 
he had gained a reputation as political columnist and vice executive editor of the German 
weekly Die Zeit. He turned to freelancing, though, when in the early 1950s, the weekly 
moved too far to the right for his taste. Yet, to Christopher Emmet, Friedlaender was “one of 
the foremost German political writers” of post-war Germany.45  
Table 6: Chairmen of the Atlantik-Brücke, 1954 -1974 
Years Name Profession/ function 
1954-1959 Ernst Friedlaender Journalist, activist European Movement 
1959-1962 Arnold Bergstraesser 
Professor of Sociology and Political Science Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg; director German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 1955-1959 
1962-1972 Gotthard von Falkenhausen 
Personally liable partner of the bank Burkhardt & Co., 
Essen; president of European Banking Federation; 
president of Association of German private banks 
1972-1978 Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein CEO Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt/ M. 
Friedlaender was succeeded by Arnold Bergstraesser, the eminent founder of political science 
in post-war West Germany. Like his predecessor, Bergstraesser was a re-migrant. He had fled 
the Nazi regime and immigrated to the United States. There he taught at Claremont Colleges, 
California and the University of Chicago. After serving guest professorships at the 
universities in Frankfurt and Erlangen, Bergstraesser was appointed chair of political and 
social science at the University of Freiburg. Just prior to his presidency over the Atlantik-
Brücke he had also been director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and 
hence established long-lasting connections to West Germany’s central foreign policy think 
tank.
46
 The history of the Atlantik-Brücke during the second half of the 1950s, thus, was 
characterised by organisational links to the evolving academic and intellectual sphere in West 
Germany via the Atlantik-Brücke’s chairmen. During the early phase of establishing the 
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Atlantik-Brücke domestically and in the US, Friedlaender and Bergstraesser had served well 
the Atlantik-Brücke and its predominant business membership in giving the organisation an 
untainted and innocuous image.  
By the early 1960s, representatives of industry and business dominated the membership of 
the Atlantik-Brücke insisting on a chairman from among their own ranks. Hence, in 1962, 
Gotthard von Falkenhausen was elected chairman serving for the coming ten years until 1972. 
The banker, who also held a doctorate in law, was indeed a heavyweight of the real and 
financial economy of the young republic. Falkenhausen held a number of prestigious and 
influential positions in the 1960s. He was personal liable partner of the private bank 
Burkhardt & Co., prior to Aryanization Hirschland bank. Furthermore, he presided over the 
German-French chamber of commerce founded in 1955 as well as the chamber of industry 
and commerce of Essen in the Ruhr district. Furthermore, Falkenhausen was chief lobbyist for 
the private banking sector, both on the national and on the European level heading the federal 
association of German private bank trade and the Banking Federation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). His local and regional standing was further enhanced by his 
political function within the municipal councillor of the city of Essen in which he represented 
the Christian Democratic Party. According to a portrayal in Die Zeit, he was clearly a man 
“with roots in the universal traditions of the haute bourgeoisie” which found expression “in 
the harmonious connection of culture and money” and international thinking linked with local 
political commitment.
47
 Altogether, the sum of these functions and characteristics 
distinguished Falkenhausen as key networker and multiplier within the industrial Ruhr district 
and beyond and thus made him so valuable for the Atlantik-Brücke. In contrast, Christopher 
Emmet  who organised a dinner for von Falkenhausen in May 1963 at the Harvard Club to 
introduce the Atlantik-Brücke chairman to the ACG’s New York network  considered him 
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“not highly intelligent” but admitted that he was “very respected, well-connected, well-
informed and level-headed”.48 
The 1960s: The politicisation of a private elite club 
The 1960s were a decade of dramatic change in the political arena of West Germany. The 
post-war period of great political stability symbolised by consecutive Christian Democratic-
led cabinets ended with Konrad Adenauer’s resignation in 1963. This marked a change of 
generations in politics. At the same time, it marked social changes with a relative descending 
of conservatism and the rise of liberalism.
49
 As the Christian Democrats lost ground, the 
Social Democrats gained and eventually entered a coalition government in 1966. Those 
developments on the national scene were foreshadowed by structural changes of the Atlantik-
Brücke which allowed for a more prominent role of active politicians in the organisation. The 
basic pattern in the composition of membership, however, did not change. On the contrary, 
the strong base of business and industry representatives was further expanded. 
In 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke members co-opted, for example, Otto A. Friedrich, at the 
time CEO of Phoenix rubber works in Hamburg-Harburg and according to Christopher 
Emmet “the most politically intelligent German business man I have ever met”.50 Emmet’s 
assessment of Friedrich corresponded well with the role Friedrich envisioned for West 
German entrepreneurs in the world as “business diplomats” – a telling example for Friedrich’s 
“state spirit”.51 In many ways Friedrich epitomised the key characteristics of the Atlantik-
Brücke membership, namely a concentration of economic and social power combined with 
privileged access to politics. Despite having joined the NSDAP in 1941, he resumed his 
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management position at the Phoenix AG immediately after the end of World War II and even 
became government advisor for commodities. From 1969 to 1973, Friedrich was, moreover, 
president of the Confederation of German Employer’s Associations (BDA). This powerful 
umbrella organisation represents the interest of the entire private sector in the West German 
economy. The fact that Friedrich’s career hardly suffered despite his entanglements with the 
Nazi regime might be explained by his professional US contacts as well as his family ties. In 
the 1920s, Friedrich had worked for the US tire company B.F. Goodrich in Akron, Ohio. His 
brother, the well-known political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich had immigrated to the US in 
the 1920s and subsequently became professor at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA.
52
 
Incidentally, Carl Joachim Friedrich joined the ACG in the early 1950s.
53
 
In the course of the 1960s, however, the Atlantik-Brücke paved the way for more overt 
access to West German politics. In 1964, the members elected three parliamentarians to serve 
on the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive board: Kurt Birrenbach, CDU; Fritz Erler, SPD; and W. 
Alexander Menne, FDP.  
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Table 7: Board Members of the Atlantik-Brücke, 1954-1974 
Years Name category 
1954-1992 Erik Blumenfeld, CDU Politics/business 
1958-1959 Helmut Kuhn Academia 
1960-1972 Gotthard von Falkenhausen Business 
1960-1965 Arnold Bergstraesser Academia 
1965-? Kurt Birrenbach, CDU Politics/business 
1965-1967 Fritz Erler, SPD Politics 
1965-? Alexander Menne, FDP Politics/business 
1965-? Walter Stahl Other 
1967-1971 Helmut Schmidt, SPD Politics 
1971-1974 Hans Apel, SPD Politics 
1971-? Friedrich Bechtle Business 
1974-? Peter Corterier, SPD Politics 
1972-1978 Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein Business 
The cooptation of active parliamentarians necessitated, however, a change of internal rules. 
Until 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke would not accept active politicians as members “to prevent 
politicization of this private organisation” as Erik Blumenfeld explained at the annual meeting 
in 1961 irrespective of the fact that he was an active politician in the Hamburg CDU.
54
 After 
the general elections in 1961, this principle was abandoned, however. A key reason was that 
Erik Blumenfeld himself was elected to the German Bundestag. Thereupon Kurt Birrenbach, 
W. Alexander Menne, and Fritz Erler were co-opted.  
When Birrenbach joined the Atlantik-Brücke, he had already served one parliamentary 
term in the Bundestag. As member of the prestigious Foreign Policy Committee, Birrenbach 
quickly advanced to become one of the leading US experts within the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group and rose to be an intimate of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. During the 
Berlin crisis (1958-1961), for example, Adenauer sent Birrenbach to Washington to have talks 
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about the US-European Multilateral Force (MLF).
55
 Birrenbach’s international network was 
not limited to the US, however. He had also important links to the influential Monnet Action 
Committee, a private transnational organisation established by the Frenchman Jean Monnet in 
support of a strong transatlantic alliance.
56
 Chapter Four of this dissertation analyses the 
strategic value of Birrenbach’s multinational connections for the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
ACG tangibly exerting influence on West German policy in the 1960s.
57
 Birrenbach’s 
professional background in import and export business of the iron-making industry would 
rather have suited a career as economic policy expert. His biography was untainted by 
Germany’s Nazi past; even more importantly Birrenbach had left Germany in 1939 to marry 
his wife, who was a “half-Jew” according to the Nazi’s Nuremberg Laws. This background 
characterised him as “good” German. Hence, in addition to his political career, Birrenbach 
was able to revive his previous line of work in the iron and steel business by acting as 
plenipotentiary for Anita Countess Zichy-Thyssen and chairman of the supervisory board of 
Thyssen Aktiengesellschaft für Beteiligungen.
58
  
The second politician on the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive board pursued a dual career as 
well. Yet, in the case of W. Alexander Menne, the concentration of power was even more 
striking than in Birrenbach’s. In the immediate post-war period, Menne contributed 
significantly to the re-organisation of Germany’s economy and society. As early as in the fall 
of 1945, Menne initiated the founding of the first association of the chemical industry, 
marking the beginning of tripartite corporatism in West Germany. Corporatism is 
characterised by a social partnership between organised interests of capital and labour 
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mediated by government. Industry associations have been a central component of this 
structure. From 1946 until 1956, Menne presided over one of the most powerful associations, 
the German federal Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI). From 1949 onwards, he was 
also vice-president of the Federation of German Industry (BDI) even more increasing his 
structural power as the BDI has been the umbrella organisation of the major industrial 
association in the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, in 1952 after the restructuring of 
IG-Farben, Menne became executive director of the Farbwerke Hoechst AG. His extra-
parliamentary activities were meanwhile not limited to his post on the Atlantik-Brücke board. 
Menne was also president of the German-American Society and Steuben-Schurz-Society, 
private organisations also fostering German-American relations.
59
  
With regard to the long-term impact of the Atlantik-Brücke, the co-optation of the Social 
Democrat Fritz Erler was most significant. As the SPD’s eminent expert on defence and 
foreign policy issues, Erler had already earned a notable reputation in West German politics 
prior to joining the Atlantik-Brücke. Even before the general elections in 1957, the German 
press already called him “Chancellor of the day after tomorrow” and eventually even “man of 
tomorrow”.60 Thus considered a respectable and suitable candidate, Erler had been invited to 
the first German-American conference in October 1959. The conference scheme was to 
become the Atlantik-Brücke’s and ACG’s central activity (see below chapter five on the 
German-American conferences). Fritz Erler  along with Herbert Wehner, Carlo Schmid, and 
Willy Brandt  spearheaded a fundamental reform of West German Social Democracy from 
the late 1950s onwards. This reform encompassed a generational change of the party 
leadership as well as a readjustment of the party’s political orientation. Most noteworthy in 
this regard was the SPD’s shift towards embracing Germany’s west integration and the 
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expressed commitment to NATO, affirming rearmament including the establishment of the 
Bundeswehr, endorsing of the social market economy, and last but not least emphasizing 
fundamental and growing distance from Communism.
61
 Erler’s receptiveness for the attitudes 
of the transatlantic bourgeoisie had contributed to this shift. When Erler first participated in 
the German-American conference in 1959, he was already familiar with formats of 
transatlantic elite meetings. Since 1955, Erler had regularly attended the Bilderberg 
conferences. The Bilderberg Group founded by Joseph Retinger, Paul van Zeeland and Prince 
Bernhard of the Nertherlands organised this transatlantic multinational conference scheme. 
Bilderberg was critical in paving the way for continental European integration by providing 
time and space for top level American and Western European representatives of government, 
business and media to have frank off-the-record debates.
62
 In 1955, Erler was not the only 
Social Democrat present. He was accompanied by Carlo Schmid and Max Brauer, the latter 
also being a member of the Atlantik-Brücke. By participating in such international elite 
conference formats Erler seized the opportunity to introduce his political concepts to an 
exclusive international western audience as well as connecting with influential US foreign 
policy figures. At the 1957 Bilderberg conference on St. Simons Island, United States, for 
example, Erler met the Rockefeller brothers Nelson and David, both belonging to the liberal 
wing of the Republican Party, and a number of intellectuals closer to the Democratic Party 
like Dean Rusk. All of them held influential positions in the Rockefeller, Ford or Carnegie 
foundations. Rusk even served as Secretary of State under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson. Erler’s involvement in such transatlantic elite networks was driven by his intention 
to convince especially American politicians of Social Democracy’s concept for German 
reunification. Another important reason was to disperse American fears of Social Democrats 
withdrawing from NATO once in government.
63
 Erler’s participation in transatlantic foreign 
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policy conference schemes and his numerous trips to the United States during 1950s must be 
seen in the larger context of German Social Democracy’s strategy of establishing an image of 
a trustworthy alternative to the governing Christian Democrats that was simultaneously 
supported by elite organisations as the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. 
Thus, admitting members of the Social and Christian Democratic parties to the executive 
board of the Atlantik-Brücke was, on the one hand, an expression of the organisation’s 
growing political significance and, on the other it was a means to increase the group’s ability 
to exert influence on US political opinion and decision making. According to Gotthard von 
Falkenhausen, Atlantik-Brücke chairman “... it has always been the Atlantik-Brücke’s aim to 
influence US decision-making – indirectly by way of publications as well as directly”.64 
Undoubtedly, Erler’s and Birrenbach’s contacts to the highest echelons of Western power 
were part of the equation. According to Erler’s biographer Hartmut Soell, Erler had become 
one of the most favoured European politicians in Washington during the Kennedy 
administration. Many referred to Erler most enthusiastically and some even wondered 
whether he would become the next German ambassador to the United States.
65
 Likewise, 
Birrenbach had impressed Christopher Emmet with “his many close friendships with 
influential people in Washington.”66 Moreover, the integration and assimilation of active 
politicians into such informal elite contexts illustrates the blurry border between the state and 
private business circles. 
Despite the growing number of active politicians among the members – by 1974 politicians 
accounted for 16.9 per cent of the membership – and politicians’ more prominent position on 
the board, business representatives remained in the preponderance since 1954 (table 4). While 
Atlantik-Brücke members sought to include all parties represented in the Bundestag  Social 
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Democrats, Christian Democrats and the liberals of the Free Democrats  the transatlantic 
elite organisation’s membership did not include a single representative of West Germany’s 
strong labour organisations until the late 1970s.
67
 Central figures of the Atlantik-Brücke like 
Gotthard von Falkenhausen, Otto A. Friedrich, and W. Alexander Menne did, however, 
function as nodes linking the financial industry, commerce, industry and the public sphere and 
thus illustrated well the organisation’s position within West German society and the state. 
The American Council on Germany 
 he American  riends o  the “good” Germans 
Establishing the ACG as a pro-German lobby and public relations organisation required two 
steps. The first was taken in November 1952 when the ACG was finally incorporated 
pursuant to the membership corporation law of the State of New York. The relevant 
certificate was signed by George N. Shuster, Eric M. Warburg, Ellen McCloy, Joseph 
Kaskell, and Christopher Emmet.
68
 The City of New York seemed the right place for such a 
committee not only because of the fact that the key personnel lived there. Like the German 
counterpart choosing Hamburg and not Bonn as location for its operation the ACG set up 
office in New York City and not in Washington, potentially as a deliberate symbol for the 
organisation’s distance to official politics and diplomacy. New York might not have been the 
seat of government of the global superpower USA. It was, however, considered world class 
after the end of World War II with all the major European cities devastated and emerged as 
the world’s preeminent city with the United Nations setting up their headquarters there. 
Moreover, New York established its reputation as the world’s centre of finance, culture, and 
communications during the post-war era with the city’s economic prominence reaching new 
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heights. New York City had the greatest population within the United States, had the most 
factories, the busiest port, and the largest markets. On top it became “headquarters city” being 
home to 136 of the nation’s top 500 industrial companies in the period between 1945 and 
1969. Historians Sven Beckert and Joanne Reitano have shown how this World City became 
both cradle of liberalism and centre of capitalism.
69
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Table 8: Subscribers of certificate of incorporation of 
American Council on Germany, Inc. Nov. 1952 
Name Function/ Profession 
Ellen McCloy Wife of former HICOG John J. McCloy 
George N. Shuster President Hunter College, NYC 
Eric M. Warburg Banker 
Christopher Emmet Publicist, activist 
Joseph Kaskell Attorney, NY 
After incorporation, however, there were still a number of legal details to be clarified; among 
them the question whether the ACG had to register with the State Department and whether it 
would be granted tax-exempt status. This status was supposed to help raising funds, the real 
hurdle of setting up a functioning “political or charitable” group. In 1953, Christopher Emmet 
regarded this as much harder than two years earlier because “every political or relief crisis 
connected with any country which has a large number of immigrants in America is already 
competing for every charitable dollar left over from taxation”. And this came only on top of 
the fact that “German-American understanding is more important to more individual German 
businessmen than vice versa”. 70 Thus, it was of utmost importance that the US Treasury 
Department decided in favour of the ACG granting tax-exempt status. To ensure this, Emmet 
tapped his contact, Geoffrey Lewis, at the German Desk of the State Department. In March 
1954, Emmet asked him to put in a word to the treasury staff for the ACG on the grounds that 
it was going to be very helpful “in promoting the overall aims of the American 
Government”.71 
Emmet’s intervention had the desired effect. A few weeks later, in April 1954, the 
Treasury Department granted tax-exempt status given the group was “organized and operated 
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exclusively for educational purposes.”72 At least officially this ruling contradicted Emmet’s 
vision for the ACG, whose “whole usefulness” he saw in the political aspects of its work, like 
“making constructive political recommendations” with the aim of promoting “closer 
understanding between the American people and Democratic elements in Germany.”73 So the 
ACG started off to continuously perform a balancing act in not jeopardizing its tax-exempt 
status. Emmet faced this challenge in that he contacted key political and diplomatic decision-
makers officially in a private capacity. He was not willing to give up on the ACG’s larger aim 
of exerting political influence. Emmet was determined to try to convince the political 
responsible of his views on issues pertaining to the western alliance and it’s strategies to 
counter Soviet Communism. And indeed officially, the certificate of incorporation stated that 
the ACG was to focus on educating and informing the American people with regard “to 
political, economic and cultural developments in Germany and her integration in the 
community of free nations”. Further, the ACG was said “to procure and transmit appropriate 
informative material to organizations in Germany” that studied the United States. In short, 
legally speaking, the ACG’s purpose was to explain Germany to the Americans and the 
United States to the Germans.
74
 The ACG and more specifically Christopher Emmet were to 
transgress these narrow limits of the group’s educational purposes from early on as chapter 
four of this dissertation illustrates in more detail. 
Despite the favourable ruling by the Treasury Department regarding the ACG’s tax-exempt 
status, the American group did not, unlike the Atlantik-Brücke, establish formal membership 
with specific rules as to the admission of new members and mandatory membership dues. 
Hence, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, as a New York-based enterprise the ACG’s 
affiliates and directors were mostly comprised of Emmet’s circle of friends and acquaintances 
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who shared an interest in US-German relations and Germany itself; many of whom Emmet 
knew from his visits to the “Council on Foreign Relations a block and a half away every 
single day”.75 To a certain extent this explains the specific composition of the ACG 
membership with academicians being in the majority and journalists playing a greater role 
than in the Hamburg-based Atlantik-Brücke until the late 1960s (see table 10). In this respect 
the membership of the ACG was a perfect supplement to its German counterpart organisation 
in Hamburg with a much stronger representation of businesspeople.  
The preponderance of intellectuals in contrast to businessmen in the ACG was also 
symbolised in choosing George N. Shuster as president of the new ACG, a position he was to 
hold for more than 20 years until 1974. Emmet considered Shuster a “big shot” and 
particularly influential due to his “access to Eisenhower” and hoped the ACG could benefit 
from Shuster’s name and reputation in exerting influence on US politics.76 Shuster had earned 
this reputation especially through his numerous appointments to public service. The most 
recent was his service as Land Commissioner for Bavaria under John J. McCloy in 1950-51. 
Transnationally he had contributed to establishing the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1945-46 and acted as US representative on the 
Executive Board of UNESCO until 1963. Shuster’s main occupation, however, was in the 
educational sphere. Since 1939 he had been president of Hunter College in New York City 
and was to move to the catholic University of Notre Dame as assistant to the president.
77
 In 
terms of collaboration between Christopher Emmet as executive vice-president of the ACG 
and George N. Shuster as president it perhaps more important that there was a “close general 
agreement on policies” between them and that, according to Emmet, Shuster had “a great deal 
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of tolerance and wisdom” granting “a certain amount of freedom” to Emmet “to function 
effectively at all”.78 
Another central exponent of academics among ACG members was Carl Joachim Friedrich. 
Emmet highly appreciated Friedrich’s opinion and sought his advice frequently. 79 He was 
particularly valuable to the ACG’s cause due to his personal and professional ties to Germany 
as well as due to his status in the US Ivy League. The famous political scientist born in 1901 
in Leipzig, Germany was the brother of the aforementioned West German manager, Otto A. 
Friedrich, member of the Atlantik-Brücke. Carl Joachim Friedrich first came to the United 
States during his student years in the 1920s. A few years later he accepted the position of 
Lecturer in the Government Department of Harvard University where he later also held the 
chair of Science of Government. In the post-war period, he became one of the most influential 
scholars of totalitarianism, law and constitutionalism. The scope of his career reached beyond 
Harvard. In the late 1940s, Friedrich served as advisor to the US Military Governor of 
Germany, Lucius D. Clay and furthermore participated in the process leading to the drafting 
of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
80
  
Eric Warburg, who like Friedrich had been born in Germany, served the ACG as treasurer 
for more than 25 years until 1976. More important than his formal involvement in the ACG 
was his role as liaison between the American organisation and its West German counterpart. 
Warburg also played a decisive role in the latter, regularly attending meetings in Hamburg 
and moreover always nurturing his friendship with Christopher Emmet as well as with Erik 
Blumenfeld and Marion Dönhoff. The business category on the ACG’s board as well as 
among the members was complemented by Joseph Kaskell, the fourth signatory of the ACG’s 
certificate of incorporation. The German born international lawyer was not only equipped 
                                                 
78 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Feb. 13, 1963, SWA. 
79 
See Carl Joachim Friedrich Papers at Harvard University Archive (HUA). 
80 
http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hua27003 (Aug. 10, 2012). Other academic members of the ACG 
in the 1950s and 1960s were Karl Brandt of Stanford, Carl Landauer of Berkeley, Felix E. Hirsch of Bard 
College, and Arnold Wolfers of Yale. 
  119 
with legal expertise but had also experience in committee work. During World War Two, he 
was active in the Council for a Democratic Germany (CDG), which had attempted to bring 
together all pro-democracy German exiles in the US. The organisation aimed at influencing 
Allied policies toward Germany as to promote or at least not to restrict the revival of post-war 
German economy.
81
 In this sense his service as the ACG’s legal counsel for more than 20 
years was a coherent continuation of his earlier commitments.
82
 
Ellen McCloy was the only women on the board. But Eric Warburg had urgently 
recommended inviting her as she could serve as liaison to her husband John J. McCloy, who, 
according to Emmet, promised to support the ACG’s cause.83 Indeed McCloy kept his 
promise and became chairman of the ACG in 1972.
84
 In the meantime, his wife followed 
Emmet’s and Warburg’s invitation and served as director until 1968 when she officially 
resigned due to overstretch with other commitments.
85
 She was tremendously valuable to the 
ACG not least due to her very recent two-year experience in public service as her husband’s 
“spokeswoman” – of German descent she was fluent in German – and “first lady” so to speak 
during John McCloy’s appointment to High Commissioner of Occupied Germany. On the US 
East Coast and especially in New York, Ellen McCloy was a well-known society woman with 
an upper-class upbringing –a standing she used in various organisations of volunteer and 
charitable nature as well as in the representative role she assumed as John J. McCloy’s wife 
throughout her life. The higher her husband climbed on the career ladder the more powerful 
people belonged to the couple’s circle of friends and acquaintances; a fact from which the 
ACG benefited  if only in the long run.86  
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In terms of the ACG’s core purpose of educating and informing the American public on 
developments in West Germany, authors and journalists among the ACG membership were of 
utmost importance. The most prolific author among ACG members was Norbert Muhlen. 
Born in Fürth, Bavaria, he studied in Munich in the late 1920s and early 1930s. There he had 
played a decisive role in organising student protest against the National Socialists. After being 
detained by the Nazis for a number of years, Muhlen then succeeded to immigrate to the US 
in 1941. In post-war Europe, Muhlen was also active in aligning anti-communist left 
intellectuals with the Western cause by co-organising the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
Furthermore he wrote for Der Monat in Germany and for American periodicals such as 
Commentary, The New Leader and National Review. Muhlen published widely on post-war 
Germany, for example, in 1953 Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries. In the early 
1960s, he co-authored the book with Dr Walter Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-
Brücke and The Vanishing Swastika: Facts and Figures on Nazism in West Germany together 
with Christopher Emmet.
87
 
With regard to Christopher Emmet’s networks in the US as well as in West Germany 
granting him access to politicians and information alike a further German born émigré played 
a key role in establishing the ACG’s influence. Klaus Dohrn, a German born journalist was a 
driving force in founding the “Deutsche Front gegen das Hitlerregime”, an alliance of German 
conservatives in exile in Austria and the Czech Republic. In 1942, Dohrn managed to leave 
Europe and immigrated to the US. After the World War II, he became advisor on European 
affairs for Henry Luce’s influential magazines Time and Life. More important than his 
journalistic work, however, was his ability to “open doors” to the politically influential in 
Europe and West Germany in particular and hence his intimate knowledge of the political as 
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well as media landscape. This is particularly well illustrated by Dohrn’s influential role as 
Emmet’s advisor in selecting delegates to the German-American conferences.88  
Access to and knowledge about politicians, however, did not pay the bills and thus, in the 
early 1960s, the ACG sought ways to attract more businesspeople. Emmet considered it, 
therefore, a great success when Lucius D. Clay agreed to become honorary chairman of the 
ACG in 1963 as he was hoped “to conjure with in the business world”.89 When Clay was 
appointed to military governor of the US zone in occupied Germany in spring of 1945, he 
“was a recognized fixture in Washington” who had earned the lasting respect of Henry 
Stimson, Robert Patterson, and John J. McCloy, the civilian leadership of the War 
Department.
90
 In 1949, he was succeeded by John J. McCloy, who became the first US High 
Commissioner while Clay returned to the United States entering the business world. For 12 
years the former general then headed the Continental Can Company with headquarters in New 
York City as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. Under Lucius D. Clay’s 
leadership, Continental Can rose to become one of America’s largest corporations. And by the 
end of the 1950s “Wall Street touted Clay as one of America’s leading industrialists”.91 
Merits earned in business, however, did not preclude him from special appointments by the 
federal government in Washington. In the late summer of 1961, following the building of the 
Berlin Wall, Clay was called and subsequently sent to Berlin by President Kennedy as his 
“personal representative with the rank of ambassador” to “re-establish Western resolve” and 
“confidence of West Berlin that it would not be forsaken”.92 Not long after this special 
assignment Clay was approached by the investment bank Lehman Brothers asking him to 
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become senior partner, which he did, though he had just reached retirement age. And thus in 
February of 1963, Lucius D. Clay started his third career as investment banker. Hence to get 
him on board of the ACG was a first step in diversifying the organisation’s membership and 
thereby its network to be utilised for fund-raising matters.  
Table 9: Membership categories of the ACG 
year Business/ 
industry 
% of 
total 
Politics % of 
total 
Media % of 
total 
Academia % of 
total 
Other % of 
total 
Total 
1954 6 26.1 1* + 2 13 5 21.7 8 34.8 2 8.7 23 
1960 10 27.0 2 5.4 10 27.0 9 24.3 6 16.2 37 
1965 11 23.9 2 4.3 8 17.4 16 34.8 8 17.4 46 
1969 13 32.5 2+1* 7.5 5 12.5 13 32.5 6 15 40 
1974 19 40.4 7*+1 17 5 10.6 12 25.5 7 14.9 47 
By the early to mid-1960s, membership growth of the ACG was comparable to the Atlantik-
Brücke. Yet in terms of specific composition of member categories both organisations 
differed significantly. Whereas Atlantik-Brücke membership was predominantly characterised 
by the preponderance of businessmen – which confirmed Emmet’s assessment that US-
German relations were so much more important to Germans than to Americans – the ACG 
suffered from a lack of business people. Yet, the membership profiles of the two organisations 
complemented each other as academics and media people figured so much higher in the 
American group (compare tables 4 and 8). The original founders thus succeeded in 
reproducing the special composition of their core group: business and industry, politics, 
academia and media. Another characteristic of members in the ACG was the so called 
“revolving door” many have gone through several times changing from military and 
government positions into the private sector, taking academic or business appointments; a 
feature typical of the US establishment.  
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The ACG struggling with a changing zeitgeist 
The early 1960s were a period of upheavals. In early 1963, Chancellor Adenauer and Charles 
de Gaulle signed the so called German-French friendship treaty, a serious challenge to close 
German-American relations, also keeping the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke busy (see 
Chapter 4). Later that same year Adenauer resigned and US president John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. Thus, a new era in German-American post-war relations began against the 
background of a growing and strengthened civil rights movement in the US and increasing 
tensions in Southeast Asia. For the ACG, however, hiring of Lucius D. Clay had the desired 
effect. In the course of 1963/4, the business front among the ACG members was strengthened.  
John Bugas, vice-president of the International Group of the Ford Motor Company and J. 
E. Trainer joined the ACG’s board of directors. The latter was vice president of Firestone & 
Tire company, which had a “big minority interest in the great German rubber company, 
Phoenix-Werke run by Friedrich”, the brother of C. J. Friedrich.93 In addition Herman Georg 
Kaiser, an oil producer from Tulsa, Oklahoma and Stephen M. Kellen joined as ordinary 
members. The former was still a very young man being born in 1942 to a Jewish family that 
had fled Germany due to Nazi persecution.
94
 A devoted businessman, Kaiser nevertheless 
took an interest in US foreign policy and in particular in relations with the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Kaiser had been directed to the ACG by Senator Mike Monroney from 
Oklahoma and thus initially participated as a delegate in the third German-American 
conference in 1962.
95
 As a result of this involvement, Kaiser became member of the ACG.
96
 
Stephen Kellen represented, besides Eric Warburg, the first strong link to the New York Wall 
Street banking scene. A native of Berlin, Kellen had immigrated to the United States via 
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London in 1936. In New York he had helped his father-in-law to re-establish his bank, the 
investment bank Arnhold & S. Bleichroeder, which had been moved from Germany with the 
rise of Nazi persecution. Though a comparatively small banking firm, it nevertheless engaged 
in international trade in the post-war period striking deals with companies like Siemens and 
Mannesmann – both members in the Atlantik-Brücke – and other leading German industrial 
firms and advising them in their expansion to US markets. Besides his membership in the 
ACG, Kellen nourished his interest in world affairs as member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR).
97
  
Finally the ACG had achieved a greater diversification of membership. Towards the end of 
the 1960s, however, criticism directed at the New York-based transatlantic elite organisation 
grew louder. Personal friends as well as government officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
worried about Emmet’s health and the future of the ACG. Hence, in January 1968 Gotthard 
von Falkenhausen and Erik Blumenfeld discussed with the members of the Atlantik- Brücke 
the need to find a younger, qualified assistant for Emmet with excellent knowledge of 
contemporary Germany.
 98
 
More significantly however, was that even Atlantik-Brücke and ACG officers, namely Eric 
Warburg, Walter Stahl and Kurt Birrenbach considered Emmet as one of the last “Cold 
Warriors” and his core political ideas –“militant anti-Communism” – as outdated by 1969. As 
long as this had been the official policy of the United States and the Federal Republic, it had 
been much easier to spark interest and gain support for the ACG’s activities. By 1969 Willy 
Brandt was the first Social Democratic foreign minister preparing the ground for his 
Ostpolitik once he became chancellor in the fall of 1969. The Cold War zeitgeist shifted 
                                                 
97 
Wolfgang Saxon, “Stephen Max Kellen, 89, Banker and Philanthropist”, New York Times, Feb. 14, 2004. The 
Berlin Journal. A Magazine from the American Academy Berlin, 8/2004, pp. 8, 10. 
98 
Summary record of the annual meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke, January 25, 1968 in Bonn, municipal court 
Berlin-Charlottenburg (VR 20196). Letter from Eric Warburg to Carl Joachim Friedrich, Jan. 6, 1969, Carl J. 
Friedrich Papers, HUGFP 17.14, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1962-1975, Box 29, HUA. Memo 
on conversation with Eric M. Warburg by Walter Stahl, Feb. 7, 1969, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I-433/112/1), 
ACDP).  
  125 
decidedly from politics of strength to careful rapprochement of East and West leading to 
superpower détente under Richard Nixon.  
In the late 1960s, the Ford Foundation was one of the most crucial voices criticising the 
ACG, at the same time being the group’s most important institutional source of funding. In 
May 1969, Ford Foundation staff consulted Shepard Stone, the former director of the 
foundation’s international programme and hence intimately familiar with the ACG and the 
Atlantik-Brücke.
99
 Stone considered the latter as competent. By contrast, he regarded the 
ACG as being in desperate need of new leadership.
 100
 Shepard Stone clearly had a deep-
seated interest in German-American post-war relations. He had studied in Berlin of the 
Weimar era and had returned to Germany after World War Two as John J. McCloy’s public 
affairs officer in the High Commission. In the 1950s, Stone joined the Ford Foundation and 
thus continuously fought for a strong transatlantic alliance by promoting a firm anti-
communist left in Europe. So it is little surprising that even after he had left the Foundation in 
1967, he maintained interest in his old projects such as the German-American conferences 
organised by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Thus Stone contacted the US embassy in 
Bonn to be informed about the embassy’s assessment of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in 
the late 1960s. Since the first secretary of the embassy, Robert Gerald Livingston himself had 
had no association with the ACG he discussed the matter with Jack McCloy and with Rudi 
von Wechmar, the former head of the Federal Republic’s Information Office in New York. 
After his conversation with von Wechmar and McCloy, Livingston suggested that the focus of 
its activities, methods, and membership “should perhaps be changed” as well as the group’s 
leadership although the primary aim of the ACG, “to foster better understanding between the 
U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany”, has remained the same since its inception in the 
                                                 
99 
Chapter 3 in this dissertation attends in greater detail to the institutional relationship between the Ford 
Foundation and the ACG as well as to Shepard Stone’s personal relations to a number of ACG and Atlantik-
Brücke officers. See also Anne Zetsche, “The Ford Foundation's Role in Promoting German-American Elite 
Networking During the Cold War”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies vol. 13, no. 1 (2015): 76-95. 
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RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0695), (ACG & 06700160), (letter from Shepard Stone to Wilfried Kohl, May 8, 
1969), (interoffice memo, May 19, 1969). 
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early 1950s. Furthermore, he thought it advisable to keep a close link to the Jewish 
community in New York and attempting to attract more “first-rank industrial executives and 
bankers whose companies have substantial interests in the Federal Republic...and all former 
U.S. Ambassadors” to West Germany.101 In comparison, the Atlantik-Brücke was considered 
to be “vigorous” and “less for us [Stone and Livingston] to think about”. However, Livingston 
reminded Stone that in the face of declining official US presence and activities in West 
Germany “we will have to rely more on private organizations such as the Atlantik-Brücke.” 
He went on proposing to make the Atlantik-Brücke “a chosen instrument” trying “to establish 
it as a leader of the several German-American friendship societies.” Russ Fessenden (deputy 
chief of mission), and Gordon Ewing of the United States Information Service agreed and 
supported Livingston’s suggestions.102 
At the end of 1969, the Ford Foundation hence hired Richard Hunt as consultant to assist 
Christopher Emmet with the preparations of the next German-American conference. Hunt, at 
the time associate dean of Harvard University, became personally committed to the ACG’s 
cause and thus joined the organisation. And indeed the ACG responded to the harsh criticism 
and description of its membership being “a rather moribund group” lacking “new blood” and 
took first steps in rejuvenating its leadership.
103
 In February 1972, Christopher Emmet 
attended the Atlantik-Brücke’s annual meeting in Bonn. There he informed the participants 
personally about the reorganisation of the ACG’s board. Most significant in his remarks was 
definitely the piece of information regarding John J. McCloy who would, accordingly, chair 
the board for one year; a decisive step in the reorganisation process of the 20 year old 
committee, one that would definitely change the course of the ACG for the coming decades. 
At the same time it demonstrated that the US foreign policy establishment considered the 
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Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library, Shepard Stone Papers (ML-99), (memorandum on 
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RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & 07000054), (interoffice memo from William B. Bader to Mr. 
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group as crucial actor in German-American relations – worth supporting. By the early 1970s, 
John J. McCloy was known as “the Chairman” epitomising the “making of the American 
establishment” in the American Century according to Henry Luce.104 By the time McCloy 
officially joined the ACG, he was probably one of the best linked men in the US and beyond, 
with contacts into the military, business – oil as well as Wall Street – philanthropy, and 
politics; a man truly filled with “state spirit”.105 Throughout the course of his career McCloy 
was a staunch advocate of internationalism, promoting an active role of the US in world 
affairs by taking a stance against totalitarianism, both fascism and Communism. In the early 
1940s, for example, he joined the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, “an 
avowedly pro-war propaganda group”.106 Later when McCloy chaired the Ford Foundation’s 
board of trustees, he could prove his state spiritedness even more pronouncedly, using the 
Foundation “as a quasi extension of the U.S. government”.107  
McCloy had started his career in the 1920s in a law firm on Wall Street. During World 
War II, he had entered US administration as Assistant Secretary of War, and afterwards 
became president of the newly established World Bank. From 1949-1952, he served as US 
High Commissioner for Occupied Germany. Upon his return to the US, McCloy chaired 
Chase Manhattan Bank as well as the CFR. In addition he was trustee of the Ford Foundation, 
and later chairman, and director of the Rockefeller Foundation. What is more, he was “one of 
the president’s most valued private advisers.”108 And he continued to be a sought-after adviser 
on foreign and security policy issues for all the presidents to come, from John F. Kennedy to 
Gerald Ford. 
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To date the most comprehensive biography is by Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the 
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105 On “state spirit”, see Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 23-24; Antonio Gramsci, Prison books, 
H. 12, §1. See also Introduction. 
106 
Bird, The Chairman, 109. 
107 
ibid., 519. 
108 
ibid., 416. 
  128 
Ever since the ACG’s inception in the early 1950s, McCloy had been in touch and had 
been informed about the group’s business; first, by his wife, Ellen McCloy and later by his 
son. John McCloy, Jr became member of the ACG in 1969 shortly after his mother had left 
the board. In addition he had always been kept updated through his friend Eric Warburg and 
Christopher Emmet. In numerous ways he had supported the cause, for example, by heading 
the American delegation to several of the German-American conferences jointly organised by 
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.  
 At the annual meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke in February 1972, Emmet furthermore 
announced that Richard Hunt would succeed the long-term ACG president, George N. 
Shuster. And while Emmet would continue to serve as executive vice-president, John 
Diebold, 48 year old businessman and engineer was named vice-president in addition to five 
“younger men, with wide knowledge of Germany [who] have been added to the Board of 
Directors”.109 
Table 10: Chairmen/presidents of the ACG, 19541974 
Years Name Profession/ function 
1954-1971 George N. Shuster 
President Hunter College; assistant to president 
University of Notre Dame 
1972-1987 Richard Hunt Lawyer, banker, presidential advisor 
Despite these efforts on the part of the ACG, Dr Joseph J. Thomas, head of the foreign 
department of the Federal Press and Information Office expressed concerns of his agency as 
well as of the Chancellor Willy Brandt in a letter and memorandum to Kurt Birrenbach. He 
was deeply worried in view of Christopher Emmet’s state of health – “the actual inspiration 
and soul of the committee” to lose their “political lobby group” in the US. Since the “ACG 
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Summary record of annual meeting of Atlantik-Brücke, Feb. 28, 1972 in Bonn, municipal court Berlin-
Charlottenburg (VR 20196). Frank Barnett, president - National Strategy Information Center; Harold van B. 
Cleveland - vice-president, First National City Bank; Joseph E. Slater, president – the Aspen Institute for 
Humanistic Studies; Frederick S. Wyle, attorney – former deputy assistant secretary of Defence for NATO; 
and William Griffith – Professor of Political Sciences, MIT; see ACG – Report of Activities 1971/1972, Oct. 
6, 1972, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I-433-166/2), ACDP. 
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had always assumed that the Federal Republic was the most important and reliable ally of the 
US in Europe”. In the face of the decreasing interest in Germany resulting from global detente 
policies of the US and increasing activities of the US in other regions of the world, the ACG 
was considered of utmost importance to West German diplomacy. Hence, West German 
authorities got actively involved in supporting the ACG’s efforts in expanding and stabilising 
the group’s membership.110 In the course of the 1970s, the West German government 
supported the ACG furthermore with considerable funds.
111
 
Table 11: Board members of the ACG, 19541974 
Years Name Category 
1954-1971 George N. Shuster Academia 
1954-1968 Ellen McCloy Other 
1954-1974 Christopher Emmet Other 
1954-1978 Eric M. Warburg Business 
1954-1977 Joseph Kaskell Business 
1969-1975 Lucius D. Clay Business 
1972-1987 John J. McCloy Business 
1972-1973 Richard Hunt Academia 
1972-? John Diebold Business 
In February 1974, Christopher Emmet died. The ACG continued to operate, however, to this 
very day. After John J. McCloy had resumed chairmanship the share of businessmen 
increased significantly with 40.4 per cent reaching the greatest share in the history of the 
ACG. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to analyse the special composition of the Atlantik-Brücke’s and ACG’s 
membership to shed light on the two organisations’ specific function in the context of West-
                                                 
110 
Memo on American Council on Germany, Inc. by Dr Joseph Thomas, head of foreign department Federal 
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German-American post-war relations and the Cold War. Were the original founders, Emmet, 
Warburg, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld successful in reproducing the functional pattern of their 
group? Did the membership in the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke resemble a “power elite” in 
line with C. Wright Mills’ definition or a foreign policy establishment, an American and a 
West German one? 
Indeed, when viewing the membership of the West German and the American group as a 
whole, it appears as a successful reproduction of the core functional pattern of the four 
original founders, bringing together the transatlantic financial sector, US liberal political 
activism fighting isolationism and world Communism and simultaneously promoting a strong 
Atlantic Alliance, the media in West Germany and in the US, as well as business and politics. 
The profile of the “good” Germans and their liberal American friends in the Atlantik-Brücke 
and the ACG indeed corresponded with C. Wright Mills’ definition of the “power elite” albeit 
transferred to a transnational level. The membership of the two groups definitely present a 
“triangle” consisting of representatives of politics, the state, diplomacy or the military for that 
matter, and the business world supplemented by a cultural component – the media and 
academia. A second feature of Mills’ “power elite”  the revolving door between the public 
and the private  is evident as well. Maybe even more importantly are the so called “go 
betweens” simultaneously active in politics and business who were numerously represented in 
the ACG as well as the Atlantik-Brücke; persuasively demonstrating the accumulation of 
power in these transatlantic elite organisations. While both membership profiles show features 
of the foreign policy establishment, the concept remains limited to the national context. Yet, 
both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were active on the domestic as well as the 
international scene. Ultimately, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke functioned as hinge groups 
between official diplomacy, politics of the state and the private sector, particularly because 
they were successful in attracting valuable multipliers connecting many subsections of both 
the American and the West German elites. Thus, they assumed a role in the large 
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transnational process of transatlantic integration of elites during the Cold War by initially 
countering anti-Americanism and promoting a new, positive image for West Germany. 
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Chapter 3: 
Mastering a tainted past: 
The funders of German-American public diplomacy efforts 
The previous chapter analysed how the “good” Germans and their American partners were 
identified and thus formed the membership for the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. The 
previous chapter illustrated as well how densely linked both groups were with state structures. 
In the West German case, the many active parliamentarians represented these links most 
obviously. In the American case, this part was played by those members who had either 
served in OMGUS or HICOG.  
This chapter investigates three dimensions of the intertwined history of the ACG and the 
Atlantik-Brücke. Firstly, the chapter sheds light on the sources of funding – public and private 
in nature – of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke over the course of roughly two decades from 
the 1950s to the mid-1970s. Secondly, the chapter offers an insight into the two organisations’ 
relationship with one another as well as into the mode of cooperation with West German 
public agencies and the Ford Foundation. And thirdly, the activities of this transatlantic elite 
project are introduced as a transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort to improve 
West Germany’s image tainted by the Nazi past. 
The funding of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke constitutes a vital component of our 
understanding of German-American elite networks during the Cold War. By investigating the 
funding sources of the two groups, we will be able to assess the extent to which they were 
supported by political and social power-brokers on both sides of the Atlantic. Examining the 
extent to which support came from higher echelons of US and West German political 
societies, will further demonstrate the network’s interconnectedness with the state and core 
strands of civil society. 
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The activities and programmes of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke, sponsored by political 
and social power-brokers presented in this chapter, concentrated on fostering mutual 
understanding and countering prejudices between West Germans and Americans and thus are 
clearly located in the realm of public diplomacy. Yet, as is documented in the course of this 
chapter, there was a significant preponderance on improving West Germany’s and the 
Germans’ image in the eyes of the American public at large and the foreign policy elite in 
particular. By investigating the Atlantik-Brücke’s and the ACG’s cooperation with the West 
German federal agencies – Press Office, Chancellery, Foreign Office – and the Ford 
Foundation, we get an intimate glimpse at the overall cooperative, yet at times conflicting 
relationships between private and public partners in a joint transatlantic public diplomacy 
effort. This is a welcome addition to possible explanatory models of the relationship between 
private entities and the state in which the state either dominates private efforts or is merely 
accommodating private interests. 
Transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort  
The term “public diplomacy” has been in use for decades, first by government agencies and 
later also by academia.
 1
 Yet, there is no one universally agreed definition available.
 
Rather, 
the term is often used interchangeably with “cultural diplomacy”, “cultural exchange” and 
even “propaganda”. It may also entail “political advocacy” and “intercultural 
communication”.2 Scholars are still searching for a commonly agreed definition of “cultural 
diplomacy
 “.3 There is, however, general agreement that public diplomacy is part of a 
country’s foreign policy. By communicating with foreign audiences, governments try to 
influence public attitudes and opinions and thus create an understanding for the nation’s 
                                                 
1 
On the history of the concept see Nicholas Cull, “‘Public Diplomacy’ before Gullion: The Evolution of A 
Phrase”, Public Diplomacy Blog, Apr. 18, 2006 
(http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase). 
2 
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, Explorations 
in Culture and International History Series (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 13; Hans N. Tuch, 
Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 8. 
3 
Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy. 
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culture and policies: “Public diplomacy is a term that describes ways and means by which 
states, associations of states, and nonstate actors understand cultures, attitudes, and 
behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance 
their interests and values.”4 
What kind of role, then, can private organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG 
play? Authors disagree when it comes to the role of private individuals and groups being 
involved. Whereas early scholars on the subject such as Hans Tuch restricted public 
diplomacy activities to the state, others like Giles Scott-Smith explicitly include private 
actors, individuals and groups alike.
5
 So does Jessica Gienow-Hecht in introducing a new 
concept for modelling, improving and selling an image of a state, nation, empire – nation 
branding. She opened the activity of branding an image for a nation deliberately to all kinds 
of actors, irrespective of their nature – public, private, individual, institution  focusing 
instead on method and achievements. The concept can thus be applied to a broad range of 
epochs in human history.
6
 For the 20
th
 century, however, Gienow-Hecht limits the range of 
actors to official ones. During the Cold War, Gienow-Hecht argues, nation branding became 
a priority of national policy with which only legitimate representatives of the state could be 
trusted.
7
 Scholarship assessing international relations in the 21
st
 century concludes, however, 
that public diplomacy “has emerged as a routine feature of international relations” being 
“conducted by states and private actors alike.”8 
                                                 
4 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field”, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 616 (2008): 276. 
5 
Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas. To the former belongs Manuela 
Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations, 1955-1968, Studies in 
Modern European History, (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State 
Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-1970. The essays 
compiled in Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, illustrate well the broad 
understanding of who can actually conduct public or cultural diplomacy.  
6 
Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Nation Branding”, in Dimensionen der internationalen Geschichte, ed. Jost Düffler 
and Wilfried Loth (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), 65-84. 
7 
ibid., 80-81. 
8 
Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge , eds. The United States and Public Diplomacy. New Directions 
in Cultural and International History (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 4. 
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This chapter argues that in the case of the young Federal Republic’s public diplomacy 
efforts, particularly during the late 1950s and 1960s, it was not a question of either/ or with 
regard to the active players. Quite to the contrary, private and public actors cooperated and 
had an interdependent relationship. The propaganda of the Third Reich had left its mark. After 
the war, official German bodies were not regarded as trustworthy abroad. The West German 
state needed groups like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG to brand a new German image. The 
ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke, on the other hand, needed access to the financial resources of 
the state. 
Moreover, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as private actors and integral part of a state-
private network cooperating across national borders represent a new dimension of public 
diplomacy or nation branding for that matter.
9
 First, theirs was a transnationally coordinated 
effort. And secondly, in addition to promoting West Germany in the United States, the 
Atlantik-Brücke also engaged in activities aimed at informing West German audiences about 
American perspectives and policies. Vice versa, the ACG was even more active in the 
promotion of West Germany within the United States. In the 1950s in particular, the ACG 
was preoccupied with proving to the US foreign policy elite and to the wider American public 
West Germany’s progress in the democratisation process and its steadfast stand against 
Communism.  
This endeavour, a large-scale campaign promoting a “new” democratic Germany, could 
only be successfully realised because of the particular composition of sources of funding 
available to the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Thus, this chapter argues that this transatlantic 
elite project entailed advantages for all parties involved – German or American, public, 
private, business or philanthropy. The chapter is organised along the three major categories of 
funding. The first section investigates corporate contributions from American and West 
German donors and thereby sheds light on the two groups’ financial relationship with one 
                                                 
9 
Gienow-Hecht, “Nation Branding”, 65-84. 
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another. Next, West German public agencies and their relationship with the Atlantik-Brücke 
are explored. The last section introduces the Ford Foundation as key grant-giving entity on 
the American side. It portrays a dense triangular relationship with the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
ACG.  
The financial backbone: corporate donors 
Inversed roles during the 1950s and 1960s: the ACG on financial life support from West 
German industrial circles 
Contrary to intuition, it was the West German group, the Atlantik-Brücke that was able to 
operate on a secure financial footing from the outset. The ACG, located in New York, the 
financial heart of the United States, struggled financially up until the early 1970s. Only then 
was the private group able to attract more corporate donations for its cause of strengthening 
German-American relations. In the meantime, the joint transatlantic endeavour of the ACG 
and the Atlantik-Brücke was kept alive through genuine transnational cooperation as is 
illustrated below. 
The Atlantik-Brücke was incorporated as a non-profit organization in September 1954. All 
financial means had to be raised from membership fees or donations. In order to have 
sufficient funds at the organization’s disposal, the question of selecting and electing new 
members was of utmost importance from the very beginning.
10
 Already in the early and mid-
1950s, the Atlantik-Brücke directors focused on “top-class” representatives of the business 
world, whom they expected to be willing and able to pay a set membership fee of annually 
DM 3,000 to 5,000 (equivalent of approx. $6,475 to $10,793).
11
 An invitation-only 
                                                 
10 
This issue is dealt with in-depth in chapter 2. 
11 
I have use the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ inflation calculator to indicate the equivalent buying power of 
today whenever I give figures of budgets and grants (http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). I 
also check the exchange rates from DM to US dollars for the given year. 
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membership policy added a sense of elitism and desirability to it.
12
 In the 1950s, the 
membership lists of the Atlantik-Brücke resembled a selection of the German industry’s 
who’s who.13 Membership grew steadily with business representatives always comprising the 
largest group. In 1952, there were ten members, by 1972, there were 65 and in 1977, 79 with 
42 and 51 paying members respectively, i.e. corporate and business representatives. Non-
paying members tended to be scholars and journalists.
14
 Such elitism proved highly 
worthwhile. Between 1958 and 1973, the organization’s annual revenues increased form DM 
76,000 to DM 217,000 (equivalent of approx. $148,000 to $331,132 today).
15
 Given this 
sound financial base, the West German group was able to establish a permanent secretariat 
and hire Dr Walter Stahl as its executive director.  
The American counterpart was not able to secure this kind of funding from business circles 
until well into the 1970s. Incorporated at the end of 1952, the ACG had only very limited 
funds at its disposal during the first years of its activities.
16
 Despite the lack of adequate 
funds, the ACG got off the ground owing first and foremost to Christopher Emmet, the 
ACG’s executive vice-president. He worked without salary and at times even donated to the 
group. In addition, he provided his apartment in the Upper East Side of New York as office 
space to this transatlantic enterprise.
17
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Leaflet “Atlantik-Brücke e.V.” (SWA “Atlantik-Brücke”). It is interesting that this leaflet suggests that 
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See Chapter 2. 
14 “Mitgliederbewegung der Atlantik-Brücke” (membership growth of the Atlantik-Brücke) (ACDP, Kurt 
Birrenbach Papers, I-433-110/1). 
15 
Financial reports of the Atlantik-Brücke 1957-1965 (SWA “Atlantik-Brücke”) and annual reports 1971, 
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certificate was signed by Ellen McCloy, George N. Shuster, Eric M. Warburg, Christopher Emmet and 
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17 According to Walter Stahl’s notes on a conversation with Christopher Emmet, Feb. 7, 1969 (ACDP, Kurt 
Birrenbach Papers, I-433-112/1) Emmet gave $1,000 in 1969 and $500 in 1972 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach 
Papers, I-433-166/2). Internal memo by Dr Thomas (BPA), Jan. 1974 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-
433-166/2). 
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In light of the ACG’s membership profile, very prominently featuring academics (see table 
9) without considerable funds at their disposal, fundraising was the measure of choice for the 
young organisation.
18
 Christopher Emmet, however, delayed “concentrated fundraising ... 
until tax deductibility could be definitely promised”.19 He considered the tax-exempt, i.e. non-
profit status as crucial prerequisite to attract potential donors who prefer tax-deductible 
donations to a legitimate body. In the spring of 1954, the US Treasury Department did grant 
the newly-formed group exemption from federal income tax on the grounds that the ACG was 
formed “exclusively for educational purposes”.20 Nevertheless, raising sufficient funds 
remained a challenge that the ACG was not to master without the assistance of the Atlantik-
Brücke in the 1950s and 1960s. Table 12 illustrates well that almost 50 percent of corporate 
donations to the ACG between 1953 and 1965 came from German companies. 
In the spring of 1953, the ACG received its first, and, for many years, only corporate 
donation. The Sprague Warner Corporation, a groceries food company based in Chicago, 
donated $2,500 (equivalent of approx. $22,183 today). The ACG, however, owed this to Erik 
Blumenfeld, the Atlantik-Brücke’s treasurer, who was able to successfully tap transatlantic 
business contacts of his own.
21
 Time and again, the ACG depended on its West German 
friends and their business connections in Germany as well as in the US. German business 
circles had much greater incentives to financially support both the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
ACG as they needed to re-establish business connections and re-enter markets in the US as 
much as elsewhere. 
                                                 
18 
For details on ACG membership development and profile see chapter 2. 
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Report on the Activities of the American Council on Germany, October 15, 1953 (HIA, Christopher Emmet 
Papers 74105, Box 4) and Report on the Activities of the American Council on Germany, January 1, 1954 
(NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1950-1954, Box 4455). 
20 
Norman A. Sugarman (Assistant Commissioner U.S. Treasury Department) to American Council on 
Germany, April 21, 1954 (FFA, Grant Number 05500109). 
21 
Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Jun. 5, 1952 (HIA, Christopher Emmet Papers 74105, Box 98, 
Correspondence with George N. Shuster) and Eric Warburg to Mr Holland (Sprague Warner Corporation), 
Apr. 15, 1953 (HIA, Christopher Emmet Papers 74105, Box 4, ACG financial records). 
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Table 12: Sources of corporate and other private contributions to the ACG, 1950s/1960s
22
 
Name  Industry Home country Year(s) of donation 
Sprague Warner Corporation Wholesale groceries US 1953 
Phoenix Gummiwerke Rubber GER 1962, 1963 
Hapag Logistics GER 1962, 1964 
George Kaiser, independent 
oil producer, Tulsa, Oklahoma 
Oil US 1962 
Daimler Benz of North 
America 
Automotive GER 1959, 1962 
New York Hanseatic 
Corporation 
Bond trading US 1959, 1962 
Mrs Alan Scaife (Sarah 
Mellon) 
Philanthropy US 1965  
At the end of the 1950s, the weak financial situation of the ACG had not changed 
fundamentally. A fundraising campaign conducted in the summer of 1960 did not help either. 
Christopher Emmet, however, considered the turnout of $2,400 a “very high” sum.23 ACG 
officers assessed the overall financial situation as seriously troubling. They discussed the 
option of raising substantial funds through German sources. Emmet argued, “[i]f it is a choice 
of accepting more than 50% of our funds from German sources, on the one hand, or being 
practically immobilized from doing any useful work, on the other, it seems then that on 
practical as well as moral grounds we would be justified in taking more than 50% from our 
German friends”.24 The lack of financial support from American business to the ACG had 
several reasons. Christopher Emmet’s was not a fundraising mission but a political one. Other 
key officers of the ACG such as the president, George N. Shuster, and the treasurer, Eric 
Warburg were not on site; the former living in Indiana acting as assistant to the president of 
the University of Notre Dame since 1961 and the latter spending more time in Hamburg than 
in New York. This constellation did not allow for closely coordinated and strategically 
focused fundraising activities within the United States. More importantly even was, however, 
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Misc. 
23 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Apr. 7, 1961 (CSHU 6/27, UNDA). 
24 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Jul. 5, 1962, SWA. 
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the fact that the American business community did not deem it necessary to contribute to one 
organisation in particular focusing on the relations with one country of so many within the 
American sphere of influence. Therefore, it was necessary for ACG officers to direct their 
fundraising at people with established or potential business links with Germany. 
Among the very few corporate donors of the ACG in the 1950s and 1960s was Daimler of 
North America. Daimler was a special case donating to the ACG in 1959 and 1962 while the 
German mother, the Daimler-Benz AG, joined the Atlantik-Brücke only in 1967.
25
 In the 
spring of 1962, it was up to Eric Warburg to implement the plan of approaching companies in 
West Germany. Despite being a gifted fundraiser, Warburg’s requests were not all answered 
in the affirmative. Helmuth Wohlthat, for example, member of the supervisory boards of two 
companies represented in the Atlantik-Brücke, Mannesmann AG and Henkel & Cie, replied in 
the negative to Warburg’s request. Wohlthat explained that the aforementioned companies did 
not intend to contribute to the same effort twice, paying membership fees to the Atlantik-
Brücke and donating to the ACG.
26
 The Hamburg-based Hapag, on the other hand, generously 
supported both the West German and the American group. On top of the annual membership 
fee of DM 3,000 (equivalent of approximately $5,900 today), Hapag donated $2,500 
(equivalent of approx. $19,612 today) to the ACG in 1962.
27
 This was, however, even 
surpassed by a contribution from Otto A. Friedrich, CEO of Phoenix Gummiwerke (rubber 
works).
28
 Friedrich made available DM 80,000 (equivalent of approx. $154,000 today) to the 
ACG over a period of two years (1962 and 1963).
29
 As generous as these donations were, they 
                                                 
25 “ACG Fundraising Prospects 6-17-64”, SWA. 
26 
Letter from Helmuth Wohlthat to Eric Warburg, Sep. 10, 1962, SWA. In the 1930s, Wohlthat first worked in 
the economics ministry of the Third Reich heading the department for currency control. Then he changed to 
the Prussian State ministry where he was directly subordinated to Herman Göring. In 1939, he negotiated 
with the US the Rublee-Wohlthat treaty regulating emigration of Jews. After the war he held numerous chairs 
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27 
Eric Warburg mentions this $2,500 gift from Hapag in a letter to Wohlthat, Sep. 19, 1962 and it is also 
mentioned in a letter from Ruth B. Muhlen to Eric Warburg, Jun. 18, 1964, both SWA. 
28 On Friedrich’s US connections see chapter 2. 
29 Er “habe es erreichen können, dass aus einem ohnedies diesen Zwecken gestifteten Fonds dem Schatzmeister 
des American Council on Germany…” Gelder “zur Verfügung gestellt worden sind.“ Otto A. Friedrich to 
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did not change the ACG’s financial situation sustainably. Most of the funds were needed to 
fund the German-American conferences.
30
 
Despite its desperate need to secure sufficient funds, the ACG rejected a tempting offer by 
the Carl Schurz Association in 1963. Hans-Werner Deeken, executive president of the Carl 
Schurz Association approached the Council suggesting a merger of the two organizations. 
The Association was originally established in 1930 in honour of Carl Schurz, a German 
emigrant who, in 1869, became the first German-born American elected to the US Senate.
 31
 
The Carl Schurz Association’s aims were rather cultural in nature, though the founders also 
wished to foster friendly relations of the United States with German-speaking countries. The 
focus, however, was on promoting and improving the teaching of the German language and 
culture in the United States.
32
 It appealed to the ACG because it was “practically the only 
German-American group, which was never directly or indirectly contaminated by Nazi 
influence or personnel during the Hitler period”. Moreover, it was a vibrant group: in the 
early 1960s, the Carl Schurz Association had some 500 members and 2,500 subscribers to its 
publication The German-American Review. An affiliation or merger would have granted the 
ACG access to a far larger group of people across the United States in addition to solving its 
financial problems.
33
 The heirs to one of the founders of the Carl Schurz Association, the 
German-American textile manufacturer Ferdinand Thun, had offered to donate $50,000 
immediately and $10,000 annually over a period of five years, conditional on a formal merger 
of the Carl Schurz Association with the ACG.
34
 ACG officers seriously considered this offer.
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Alexander Menne (CEO Farbwerke Hoechst AG), Jul. 20, 1962, and letter from Eric Warburg to Otto A. 
Friedrich, Jul. 24, 1962, both SWA. 
30 
See Chapter 5 in this dissertation. 
31 
Carl Schurz was born in Germany and later was among the Forty-Eighters revolutionaries. In the early 1850s, 
he emigrated to the United States where he became a diplomat and army general and later US senator and 
secretary of the interior. 
32 
Finding aid to National Carl Schurz Association Records at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania with the 
Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies, Philadelphia 
(http://hsp.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/findingaidmss167ncsa.pdf) 
33 
Memorandum on The Proposal For an Affiliation or Possible Merger Between The American Council on 
Germany and The Carl Schurz Association by Christopher Emmet, May 30, 1963 (SWA „ACG-Emmet). 
34 See “Ferdninand Thun & Heinrich Janssen” http://www.barmen-200-jahre.de/index.php/home/item/42-thun. 
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In the end, they turned it down, however. Christopher Emmet and ACG board members 
feared that this arrangement could only be realised at the “cost of handicapping [their] basic 
objective” of combating “ignorance and misunderstanding of Germany” that was “in the most 
exposed geographical position and therefore is the key political area in the struggle between 
Freedom and Communism.” 35 The ACG had a comparatively small membership base, this 
Emmet in particular considered as an advantage because the organisations’ scarce human 
resources were not tied up with administrative work. Instead, Emmet could focus on his 
behind the scene political work. 
For the remainder of the 1960s, the ACG was not able to change the situation considerably. 
By the summer of 1965 it was “not only broke, but in debt”. Plans for a joint appeal signed by 
John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay failed, which doubtless added to the severity of the 
situation. McCloy had been involved with the ACG’s cause from the very beginning not least 
through his wife, Ellen McCloy who had officially served on the board since 1952.
36
 
According to Emmet, John McCloy felt his hands tied to do more for the ACG particularly in 
terms of fundraising as long as he was on the Ford Foundation board, the sole US based 
source of funding for the German-American conferences.
37
 This situation even forced the 
ACG to postpone plans for another German-American conference in spring of 1966. 
Therefore, Christopher Emmet insistently urged George N. Shuster to sign a letter, which the 
ACG intended to send out to past contributors.
38
  
At this point, rescue came in form of a $10,000 contribution from a Mrs Alan Scaife (Sarah 
Mellon), scion of the Mellons – one of the richest families of philanthropists in the United 
                                                 
35 
Memorandum on The Proposal For an Affiliation or Possible Merger Between The American Council on 
Germany and The Carl Schurz Association by Christopher Emmet, May 30, 1963, SWA. See also 
Memorandum (Second Summary of a Possible Proposal to Establish a Strong Private American German 
Institution in the U.S.A.) by Hans-Werner Deeken, executive director National Carl Schurz Association, Inc. 
Mar. 20, 1963; Observations by Joseph Kaskell on Mr. Deeken’s Memorandum of Mar. 20, 1962, and letter 
from Christopher Emmet to Mr Deeken, May 31, 1963, SWA. 
36 
See chapter 2. 
37 
On the ACG’s relationship with the Ford Foundation see the last section in this chapter. 
38 
See Letter from Christopher Emmet to Adolph Schmidt, Sept. 9, 1965 (UPAS 16/05, UNDA) and letter from 
Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, June 2, 1965, SWA. 
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States.
39
 The gift from Mrs Scaife allowed the ACG to resume routine activities and pay off 
debt. Shepard Stone, director of International Affairs at the Ford Foundation, had a great part 
in bringing about this arrangement with Adolph Schmidt, who was married to one of the 
Mellon family.
40
 Moreover, Schmidt was a Council on Foreign Relations acquaintance of 
Christopher Emmet’s and knew of the work of the ACG quite well. Back in 1962, Schmidt 
had purchased huge quantities of Kurt Birrenbach’s book The Future of the Atlantic 
Community, financed by the ACG.
41
 “This present arrangement”, Emmet wrote to Shuster, 
was some kind of “substitute” for a rejected plea by the ACG to the Old Dominion 
Foundation, whose treasurer Adolph Schmidt was.
42
  
 
Coming o  age in the 1970s: “ he chairman” turns the tide 
In the early 1970s the number of donations, particularly by American companies, to the ACG 
literally mushroomed as table 13 indicates. Yet, what had caused this development? 
 
 
  
                                                 
39 
The founder of this superrich US family was Andrew Mellon, who was, along with Henry Frick, Andrew 
Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Sr, and J.P. Morgan, an industrial titan in post-Civil War United States. See 
Nathaniel Burt, "[Untitled]," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 102, no. 4 (1978): 527-
29. 
40 
See more detailed information on Shepard Stone in the section The Ford Foundation. 
41 
Birrenbach joined the Atlantik-Brücke in 1962 and was elected to its board in 1965. For more detail on 
Birrenbach see chapter 2. 
42 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Sept. 24, 1965 (UPAS 16/05, UNDA). 
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Table 13: Sources of corporate and other private contributions to the ACG, 1970s
43
 
Name  Industry Home country Year of 
donation 
Hoechst Chemical GER 1971 
BASF Chemical GER 1971 
Bayer Chemical GER 1971 
Lehman Bros. 
Banking/ 
financial services 
US 1972 
Ford Motor Company Automotive US 1972 
Mobil Oil Company Oil US 1972 
National Lead Industries Heavy industry US 1972 
Aluminium Company of America 
(Alcoa) 
Heavy industry US 1972 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Corp. Food industry US 1972 
General Telephone & 
Electrics Corp. 
Telecommunication US 1972 
The Chase Manhattan Bank 
National Association 
Banking US 1972 
Chrysler Corporation Automotive US 1972 
Continental Can International Corp. Packaging US 1972 
Corning Glass Works Glass manufacturing US 1972 
The Diebold Group Consulting/services US 1972 
General Electric Company Conglomerate US 1972 
Merrill, Lynch International Financial services US 1972 
International Telephone & 
Electronics Corp. 
Telecommunications US 1972 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation Oil and gas US 1972 
Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of N.Y. 
Banking US 1972 
Olin 
Chemicals and 
manufacturing 
(ammunition i.a.) 
US 1972 
Siemens Conglomerate GER 1972  
Initially, the pattern of transatlantic cooperation in which the Atlantik-Brücke board members 
assisted the ACG in raising funds persisted. Big West German chemical and pharmaceutical 
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  145 
companies supported the ACG.
 44
 Hoechst, BASF and Bayer agreed to contribute financially 
in preparation of the Seventh German-American conference in 1971; thus the Atlantik-Brücke 
sent $3,000 (approx. equivalent of $17,560 today) donated by Hoechst, BASF, and Bayer to 
the ACG.
45
 
In 1972, John J. McCloy finally joined the ACG board after he had left the Ford 
Foundation board of trustees.
46
 Hence, the ACG raised funds successfully by way of a 
personal fundraising letter signed by John J. McCloy. ACG staff sent these letters to more 
than one hundred corporations doing business in West Germany. In the “Report on Activities 
– 1971/72”, the results of this campaign were considered so positive “that, for the time being 
at least, our financial position is greatly improved...”.47 Twenty American corporations 
responded positively to this fundraising letter contributing between $100 and $3,000 each 
totalling $25,100 (equivalent of approx. $142,300 today). They represented the big industries 
such as finance, automotive, petroleum and oil, chemical, metal, food, and 
telecommunications.
48
 In addition to corporate contributions, the ACG received funds 
between $25 and $750 totalling $3,250 (equivalent of approx. $18,420) from 13 individuals; 
the majority of which were either members or directors of the ACG.
49
 The ACG’s financial 
situation stabilized further in the course of the 1970s, due to new board members and to the 
more widely known chairman, John J. McCloy.
50
  
                                                 
44 In the letter Stahl mentioned Messrs. from “BASF und Leverkusen”. I am assuming Leverkusen refers to 
Bayer. Letter from Walter Stahl to Eric Warburg, Apr. 9, 1969 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-
112/1). 
45 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, Jul. 28, 1971 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-166/2). 
46 
Brown, “A Proud Past and a Bright Future” – the First Fifty Years of the American Council on Germany, 
32. 
47 “American Council on Germany, Inc. Report on Activities – 1971/72”, p. 4, Oct. 6, 1972 (ACDP, Kurt 
Birrenbach Papers, I-433-166/2). This is supported by a letter from Walter Stahl to Shepard Stone in which 
he informs Stone about a conversation he had with Christopher Emmet. Hence, Emmet said he was confident 
the ACG had fairly sufficient means. Letter from Walter Stahl to Shepard Stone, Nov. 19, 1970 (Rauner 
Special Collections Library, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99). 
48 
See table 13 and “1972 Corporate Contributors to ACG”, Oct. 4, 1972 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, I-
433-166/2). 
49 “Individual Contributors – ACG-1972”, Oct. 4, 1972 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach, I-433-166/2). 
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In terms of the general financial situation, the relationship of the transatlantic partner 
organisations was an inverse reflection of the relation between Germany under occupation, 
later the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Post-war relations between the 
two were characterised by immense economic support from the latter to the former, in the 
form of the Marshall Plan.
51
 Further, it was characterised by massive military assistance and 
security guarantees. The genuine transnational cooperation between the Atlantik-Brücke and 
the ACG was only realized because the former proved to be much more successful in tapping 
solvent industrial sources. The West German business community could expect much greater 
benefits from sponsoring the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. It was the West Germans who 
sought to rebuild companies, re-enter the world market, and get confiscated property back. 
The American business community on the other hand held a hegemonic position with 
business interest all over the world not limited to one country. Hence, US business had fewer 
incentives to actively engage in a transatlantic endeavour as envisioned by the officers of the 
Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. 
Boosting the German image: Atlantik-Brücke, ACG and West German public agencies 
The Atlantik-Brücke operated on a secure financial footing. Yet for a number of activities, it 
nevertheless tapped public funds. West German public agencies contributed financially to its 
activities mainly by purchasing or funding publications of the organisation. US agencies, on 
the other hand, never funded any kind of activity of the ACG. Yet, they were not completely 
ignorant of the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s transnationally coordinated effort on behalf 
of strong West German-American post-war relations. Especially in the early years of the 
ACG, staff of the Bureau of German Affairs at the Department of State (DoS) and HICOG 
frequently corresponded with Christopher Emmet. Yet, his connections to HICOG did not 
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translate into any kind of institutionalised long-term collaboration as was evident on the 
German side of the story.  
The only tangible cooperation took place in 1954. The State Department provided copies 
of a report by HICOG on the Neo-Nazi movement in Germany, which ACG staff then mailed 
to Americans interested in German affairs, for example, congressmen, scholars, and former 
HICOG staff.
52
 In the early 1970s, the US Foreign Service internally dealt with the two 
private organisations. The Embassy of the United States of America in Bonn/ Bad Godesberg 
was concerned about the situation of the ACG – a situation clearly documented in the 
correspondence of Robert Gerald Livingston and Shepard Stone. The former was First 
Secretary of the US Embassy in Germany at the time and drafted a memorandum on the 
future of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in 1970. He consulted Stone who intimately knew 
the ACG. As director of the Ford Foundation’s international programme, Stone had closely 
cooperated with the American organisation for many years.
53
 Livingston’s memo did not 
suggest any financial support on behalf of the State Department or the Embassy, however.
54
 
American agencies whose core task was public diplomacy, the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) along with the United States Information Services (USIS) abroad did not 
cooperate with the ACG.
55
 
West German public agencies concerned with public diplomacy relied on private actors 
and thus developed close relationships with them by providing the necessary funds. From the 
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1950s onwards, the Federal Press and Information Office (Bundesinformations- und 
Presseamt – BPA), the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt) and the Federal Foreign 
Office (Auswärtige Amt) supported and funded various activities and programmes of the 
Atlantik-Brücke. 
The Federal Press Office 
Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic’s first chancellor, personally issued an instruction to 
establish a press and information office in 1949. Ever since, the office’s functions have been 
twofold: firstly, to inform the West German government and president about global 
developments; secondly to inform the domestic population as well as peoples abroad about 
the politics and policies of the German state and more generally to inform about the country, 
its society and the development thereof.
56
 In terms of the latter task, the BPA played the same 
role as the USIA. Yet unlike its American counterpart, it relied much more on external 
partners for promoting a new image of the people and the country. Germany’s Nazi past cast 
long shadows which officials of the newly founded Federal Republic had to deal with. 
Memories of the aggressive Nazi propaganda machinery constrained the scope of action for 
public agencies despite having been established for the very reason of conducting public 
diplomacy as in the case of the BPA. The Federal Republic’s Foreign Minister, Heinrich von 
Brentano, acknowledged this fact when he stated in 1956 that cultural (i.e. public) diplomacy 
was most effective when the government remained in the background.
57
 The best way to 
achieve this goal was to employ private organisations such as the Atlantik-Brücke, which 
were, at least on the surface, distanced from the state. Improving the image of Germany in the 
eyes of foreign audiences, in particular in the United States, was a central goal of public 
diplomacy efforts of the Federal Republic. Another aim of German as well as American 
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public diplomacy efforts in terms of information policy was to counter Soviet propaganda. In 
this regard, the German section of the Comité International pour la Défense de la Civilisation 
Chrétienne (CIDCC), an international anti-communist propaganda agency with sections in 
Western Europe, the US, and Latin America, maintained a close relationship with the West 
German government.
58
 During the second half of the 1950s the BPA funded the CIDCC’s 
German section with approx. DM 18,000 annually in addition to special funds frequently 
made available for lecture tours, publications, and campaigns to counter the influence of 
communist ideas in the West German public.
59
 While the CIDCC assumed the role of a 
domestic anti-communist communicator, the Atlantik-Brücke’s publications were directed at 
an US audience. The following section takes a closer look at the relationship between 
Atlantik-Brücke officers and the BPA. 
In the early years, the agency relied quite heavily on the expertise of the Atlantik-Brücke in 
producing information material about the Federal Republic of Germany for English-speaking 
countries, first and foremost the United States. For over 20 years, from the mid-1950s to the 
1970s, the BPA was the main purchaser of publications by the Atlantik-Brücke. The bulk 
orders of the federal agency allowed for the production of Atlantik-Brücke publications in 
high quantities. Furthermore, the BPA organized the distribution of 50 to 80 per cent of a 
given edition of Atlantik-Brücke publications in the English-speaking world.
60
 Thus, Walter 
Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, referred to their cooperation as an 
exceptionally successful example of public-private collaboration.
61
 In quantitative terms of 
published books and booklets produced by the Atlantik-Brücke and funded by the BPA, 
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Stahl’s assessment might be correct. But the relationship between the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
BPA was by no means free of conflict. 
The first publication purchased by the BPA was Meet Germany.
62
 This booklet, produced 
and published by the Atlantik-Brücke since 1953, served as a sort of introductory handbook to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, its political system, relations with Europe and the world, 
the economy, its people and culture. It was aimed at an English-speaking, especially US 
audience. In this regard, Meet Germany resembled the brochure Wissenswertes über die USA 
(What is important to know about the USA) produced by the USIS in Bonn.
63
  
In the late 1950s, the BPA purchased 47,000 copies of the booklet for a total of DM 
101,250 (equal to approx. $210,953 today).
64
 During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, BPA 
officials were satisfied with the quality of this publication and hence continued funding 
thereof. While the BPA purchased Meet Germany, in the United States it was the German 
Information Center (GIC) in New York which used the booklet for its political public 
relations efforts.
65
 Formally, the GIC came under the authority of the German Embassy in the 
US, yet its main task was the conduct of public diplomacy, hence informing the American 
public about German policies. 
In 1957, the Atlantik-Brücke started an illustrated paper called The Bridge for the 
American Forces stationed in West Germany with a monthly circulation varying from 60,000 
to 70,000. This paper was highly regarded by American troops “by both officer and men” as 
Colonel Carter reported to Walter Stahl in a letter in February 1959. He went on to state that 
“[The Bridge] serves many good purposes. It is used by travel clubs, by schools, by adult 
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evening class instructors, and by several other groups. ... The only complaint we have with 
The Bridge at the moment is that there is not enough of it.”66 The Atlantik-Brücke’s activities 
aimed at American troops stationed in West Germany concurred with the Federal Republic’s 
as well as American concerns about the relationship between military personnel and civilians 
in the late 1950s.
67
 Hence, throughout the 1960s, the BPA supported The Bridge with at least 
DM 324,000 (equal to approx. $609,715 today).
68
 Atlantik-Brücke officers considered every 
single US soldier as a potential multiplier of a positive and friendly attitude towards West 
Germany upon his return to the US.
69
 Moreover, the Atlantik-Brücke was an active member 
of the government task force on improving the relations between US troops stationed in 
Germany and the civilian population of which the Foreign Office was in charge.
70
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the BPA planned to cease its support for the monthly in 
favour of other publications for French and Flemish-speaking troops in Germany. For a 
number of years, BPA officials attempted to discontinue the agency’s financial support for 
The Bridge. Yet whenever, the Atlantik-Brücke was informed to this end, Atlantik-Brücke 
officers protested not shying away from verbally threatening, if implicitly, BPA staff. In 
October and November 1969, the conflict over the intended termination of support to The 
Bridge climaxed. At the end of October, Count Schweinitz informed Walter Stahl about the 
BPA’s decision to discontinue funding for the paper. In response, Stahl first stressed the 
importance of The Bridge for good relations with the American troops stationed in Germany – 
at the end of the 1960s numbering 257,000 – and for German-American relations in general.71 
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  152 
In this letter, Stahl sharpened his arguments edging on threat. He referred to the new federal 
government under Willy Brandt, which was well known in the US armed forces headquarters 
in Germany. Stahl further argued that if the publication of The Bridge had to be discontinued 
due to a lack of financial backing from the BPA, this could have serious ramifications for the 
relations of the new German government with the United States. He suggested that 
representatives of the US armed forces could interpret this as indifference towards the 
American troops stationed in West Germany. Stahl concluded by threatening to notify Helmut 
Schmidt, Federal Minister of Defence and a known Atlanticist and member of the Atlantik-
Brücke, about this issue.
72
  
When Schweinitz did not answer in the expected way, Erik Blumenfeld, MP and vice 
president as well as treasurer of the Atlantik-Brücke intervened personally. He addressed the 
head of the Federal Press and Information Office, Conrad Ahlers. In his letter, he basically 
repeated the same arguments, suggesting the compromise to at least provide partial funds for 
continued publication. Furthermore, Blumenfeld recommended talking with the Defence 
Minister, Helmut Schmidt, not without mentioning that Schmidt had been a member of the 
board of the Atlantik-Brücke for years.
73
 Yet, to no avail. In 1970, the BPA rejected all 
requests by the Atlantik-Brücke for further funding. Internal BPA documents illustrate Count 
Schweinitz’s line of argument against continued funding. The strongest and at the same time 
most telling argument was that the BPA did not have any influence on the editorial design and 
content of the publication. Therefore, the BPA rather planned its own publication for English-
speaking troops called Focus on Germany and mentioned other publications by the BPA that 
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needed funding.
74
 Schweinitz’s attitude is telling evidence for the maturation process of West 
German bureaucracy under way during the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1960s, West 
Germany’s relations to neighbouring countries as well as to the United States had improved 
significantly and a new image of the young republic had successfully been installed. Hence, 
agencies like the BPA were not willing anymore to leave public diplomacy work to 
organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke, particularly if control over these activities was not 
granted.  
Notwithstanding, in retrospect the 1960s appear as the decade of closest cooperation 
between the Atlantik-Brücke and the Federal Press and Information Office and also the 
beginning of conflict. The BPA funded a number of other publications by the Atlantik-Brücke 
in addition to The Bridge and Meet Germany. In 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke sold 10,000 copies 
of the booklet Education for Democracy in West Germany, published by Frederick A. Praeger 
of New York for DM 30,000 (approx. equivalent $59,476 today).
75
 The booklet was a 
compilation of a number of articles informing about the organisation’s efforts, difficulties and 
successes with regard to political education of youth and adults in the Federal Republic of 
Germany at schools and universities, youth associations and within the West German armed 
forces, as well. Furthermore, the authors studied the role of the mass media in educating and 
democratising the people.
76
 A few years later, the BPA purchased all 5,000 copies of a print 
run of a booklet, The Politics of Postwar Germany.
77
 In January 1964, Count Schweinitz 
noted dislike of the design of the booklet’s cover in an internal BPA memorandum. The cover 
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Postwar Germany, (New York: Praeger, 1963). 
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showed coloured maps of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation. Schweinitz criticized the fact that the former eastern territories of the German 
Reich (the provinces East Prussia, Silesia, and Eastern Pomerania, all east of the Oder-Neisse 
line)
78
 were not included. Therefore, the BPA decided that in the US the booklets were to be 
distributed without the cover.
79
 This decision was preceded by the intervention of the Foreign 
Office. In February 1963, Foreign Office staff had contacted the BPA and requested a review 
of the Atlantik-Brücke’s publication assessing the general suitability of the booklet to be 
distributed for the purpose of political public relations by German diplomatic missions 
abroad. Yet, this intervention went even further, demanding that the covers of the booklet be 
removed by the publishing house from the copies already delivered as well.
80
 The issue of the 
accurate portrayal of the German borders had concerned the BPA before. In 1959, the BPA 
invited the American geographer, Arthur L. Burt, to discuss with him the many American 
maps of Germany with incorrect borders.
81
 
These Strange German Ways, an entertaining introduction to German manners and customs 
featuring many cartoons also produced by the Atlantik-Brücke did not get approval of BPA 
staff, however. 
82
 Even Walter Stahl’s rather unconventional methods of promoting this 
publication were unsuccessful among BPA staff. In November 1963 Stahl wrote to Emil C. 
Privat, the head of the North America department of the BPA, to inform him that he had sent 
display copies to German diplomatic missions and consulates in English-speaking countries, 
notifying them that orders of the brochure should be directed to Privat’s department. In doing 
so, Stahl assumed the BPA would buy high quantities.
83
 However, additional attempts on the 
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part of Stahl at convincing colleagues of Privat yielded no positive response.
84
 The Atlantik-
Brücke still was able to produce the brochure. These Strange German Ways was first 
published in 1963. Altogether 21 editions with a total of 573,620 copies were published.
85
 
Boing and IBM purchased high quantities. From the late 1960s onward the latter was a 
member company of the Atlantik-Brücke. Furthermore, These Strange German Ways was 
distributed to American schools and universities and was sold at Stars and Stripes 
newsstands, the authorised news outlet of the US Department of Defence to inform the US 
military community.
86
 
By the early 1970s, the BPA’s interest and willingness to financially support the Atlantik-
Brücke by purchasing publications ceased. The Atlantik-Brücke had outlived its usefulness to 
the Press and Information Office. This is nicely illustrated by the correspondence between 
Walter Stahl and Martin Schött of the Federal Press and Information Office. Stahl informed 
Schött about plans for new publications inquiring whether the BPA would purchase a bulk of 
copies. Stahl interpreted the general interest uttered by Schött with regard to these projects as 
agreement to indeed place an order. Schött in turn, however, was merely in general interested 
in the matter of German-American relations. They also disagreed about whether those 
publications could be used for the Federal Republic’s political public relations efforts. Schött 
considered them not suitable for distribution abroad and thus did not approve financial 
support. Schött did not dare telling Stahl straight in the face what he really thought about the 
Atlantik-Brücke. In marginalia he essentially stated that, even though this initiative was 
generally praiseworthy, the support of it must be limited considering the BPA’s budget, 
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adding that “many representatives of this initiative are getting terribly old and therefore they 
hold opinions accordingly”.87 
Those internal memos show that staff of the Foreign Office and the BPA did not blindly 
trust the Atlantik-Brücke. They preferred to control and check the publications, particularly 
those intended to be distributed abroad. The relationship of the Atlantik-Brücke and the BPA 
illustrated above gives an indication of the maturation process of the agency. In the early 
years of its existence, the BPA was quite dependent on private organisations to reach out to 
the world and recreate a new image for Germany. Yet over the years, the agency along with 
its staff acquired expertise and standing of their own. By the mid- to late 1960s, West German 
public servants in the BPA as well as in the Foreign Office were not content anymore with 
leaving core tasks of their offices to external actors over which they had only limited control. 
The Foreign Office and the Federal Chancellery  
Support for Atlantik-Brücke activities was not limited to its publications. The BPA also 
granted partial support of the German-American conferences. These exclusive meetings were 
modelled after the English-German Königswinter conferences, and the multinational 
transatlantic Bilderberg meetings.
88
 Between 1959 and 1974, the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke 
organized eight biennial German-American conferences. These conferences provided forums 
for intensive and confidential discussions about issues of common concern in the US and 
West Germany, covering security, politics, and economy – mostly under the label “East-West 
tensions”.89 In 1961 and 1970, the BPA covered the cost for accommodation and airfare for a 
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number of participants of the conference.
90
 At the occasion of the Eighth German-American 
conference, the BPA offered to take over accommodation costs for the American delegation. 
BPA officers as well as those of the German diplomatic mission in Washington, DC were 
interested in getting certain American congressional representatives to come to Germany who 
attended the NATO parliamentarian meeting in London prior to the planned German-
American conference in Germany.
91
  
Two other German federal agencies supported German-American conferences. The 
Foreign Office funded them regularly, with DM 20,000 (equivalent of approx. $24, 000- 
40,000 today), covering the costs of the conferences to a large extent.
92
 The Federal 
Chancellery and thus a number of chancellors, contributed to those German-American 
conferences taking place in Germany by inviting a number of participants and in later years 
the entire delegation to a luncheon or dinner.
93
 
In April 1959, the executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke formally approached the 
Foreign Office on behalf of the Atlantik-Brücke’s board members to inquire about a possible 
grant of DM 20,000 (equivalent of approx. $40,000 today) for the first German-American 
conference to be held in Bonn, Bad Godesberg. The grant was supposed to cover mainly 
accommodation, board and travel expenses of the delegates. Total costs were estimated to be 
DM 30,000 (equivalent of approx. $61,000). Initially, financial means of support for the 
conference were meant to be allocated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which served as 
main sponsor of the German section of the Comité Since 1956, the ministry provided the 
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Comité with an annual budget of DM 49,000.
94
 When the Atlantik-Brücke’s request was put 
forward, however, the ministry’s ordinary budget was already exhausted; as was the case with 
the Foreign Office’s ordinary budget, which also regularly funded the Comité starting in 
1957. The Foreign Office began funding the Comité with DM 8200. Two years later, this sum 
had increased to DM 33,600 and in 1960 to DM 40,000.
95
 Hence, at first sight the Comités 
explicit anti-communist effort was worth much more than Atlantik-Brücke activities. 
Contrary to Manuela Aguilar’s finding that “there was little private involvement in German 
information efforts”, this shows that the German state even engaged different organizations 
for different addressees of information policy.
 96
 
Yet, the planned German-American meeting’s aim, rank and expected effects were 
considered so important that the requested grant was recommended for support from a special 
budget of the Foreign Office.
97
 This special budget had been set up, according to Christian 
Haase, especially for the Anglo-German Königswinter conferences as well as for Franco-
German and German-American conferences and thus “firmly established them as informal 
instruments of West German foreign policy.”98 
The Federal Chancellery also had a part in the conference scheme. In July 1959, in 
preparation of the first German-American conference, Walter Stahl met with Dr Hans Globke, 
state secretary at the Federal Chancellery. Globke and Stahl discussed the luncheon to be 
given by the chancellor at the occasion of the opening of this first conference. In addition to 
the American delegation, the Atlantik-Brücke’s chairman, Dr Bergstraesser, C.D. Eddleman, 
General, US Army Commander in Chief and Richard Tüngel, former editor at DIE ZEIT were 
to be invited by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, Adenauer received some especially 
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high-ranking members of the American delegation separately prior to the luncheon. Senator 
Javits, Christopher Emmet, Klaus Dohrn and Norbert Muhlen, James Conant, John J. McCloy 
and Robert B. Meyner, governor of New Jersey hence enjoyed privileged access to the 
chancellor.
99
 Altogether, Adenauer hosted 26 people at Palais Schaumburg. Yet, the 
organisers envisioned an even greater role for the chancellor. They invited Adenauer to attend 
the opening session of the conference, which the chancellor did, grudgingly. Adenauer was 
concerned that otherwise Christian Democratic views and party politics would not be 
represented appropriately. That is why he ordered Globke to make sure that enough Christian 
Democrats participated.
100
 
The second conference was held in Washington, DC. The chancellor was not expected to 
host an event, but his possible attendance was discussed internally. Initially, Adenauer had 
intended to combine participating in the conference and getting together with John F. 
Kennedy, the newly inaugurated American president. Yet, this plan failed and Adenauer 
merely sent a telex forwarding his best wishes and expressing his hope that the exchange of 
thought during the conference proceedings would contribute to the solution of issues 
challenging both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in their struggle for 
freedom and a lasting peace.
101
 On the occasion of the second and third conference, the 
Federal Chancellery and the Foreign Office even expanded their involvement. In cooperation 
with the Atlantik-Brücke, they organised a separate ladies’ luncheon for the wives 
accompanying their spouses on the American delegation.
102
 By the end of the 1960s, when the 
sixth German-American conference took place, this segregation of gender during social 
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events was ended with the Chancellery inviting the American delegates along with their 
spouses.
103
 
Besides corresponding and meeting with officers of agencies directly involved in the 
conference’s funding and procedure, Walter Stahl also consulted with officers of the German 
Information Center in New York.
104
 In February 1962, Stahl asked legation councillor, Dr 
Joseph J. Thomas to comment on plans to hold the third German-American conference in 
Berlin – an idea mainly expressed on the American side. On these matters, Walter Stahl was 
also in touch with officers of the Foreign Office, which also consulted with the Federal 
Chancellery on the matter.  
After a few years, it seems it was almost expected on the part of the Atlantik-Brücke that 
the chancellor would participate in the opening session of the German-American conferences. 
This expectation might have been nourished by one of the board members’ privileged access 
to the chancellor. For many years, Erik Blumenfeld, chairman of the Hamburg Christian 
Democrats and member of the Bundestag, was so close to Konrad Adenauer that he described 
their connection as a “grandfather-grandson-relation”.105 In the spring of 1962, Erik 
Blumenfeld met with Konrad Adenauer to inform the chancellor about the plans for the third 
German-American conference. During this conversation, Adenauer agreed to attend the 
opening session of the conference and to host a meal for the delegates on the next day.
106
 The 
chancellor’s decision to support the event by inviting the American delegation had not been 
made by Adenauer alone. On the contrary, the Foreign Office full-heartedly backed and 
welcomed the chancellor’s contribution.107 All successors of Adenauer  Erhard, Kiesinger, 
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Brandt, and Schmidt  continued the thus established tradition of hosting a meal and attending 
at least the opening session of those German-American conferences held in Germany.
108
 
In the Federal Republic, the Foreign Ministry was the main external source of funding for 
the conference scheme, regularly granting DM 20,000 (in 1959 the approx. equivalent today 
$38,000 in 1974 $37,000) for the fifth conference. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the 
German Embassy in Washington, DC was keen on supporting the organizers in managing the 
conference and taking care of German participants. Prior to the third conference, the embassy 
in Washington received a number of requests from German participants to arrange meetings 
with leading American personalities of the current administration and Congress, who 
apparently would not be delegates to the conference. Ambassador Knappstein cautioned the 
Federal Office in Bonn that probably not all requests could be met.
109
 Also in preparation of 
the fifth conference, Baron von Falkenhausen, chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke 1967 until 
1972, travelled to Washington to meet with potential American delegates to the upcoming 
conference. Furthermore, Falkenhausen expressed his desire to meet with the Foreign 
Minister Gerhard Schröder to inform him in detail about the plans for the conference.
110
 
During the conference ambassador Knappstein was eyes and ears for the grant-giving West 
German institution at home. He sent a detailed report to the Foreign Office in Bonn about the 
discussions and procedures of the conference. The general assessment of the fifth German-
American conference was quite positive. Knappstein described the meeting as catalyst in 
easing misunderstandings between the United States and the Federal Republic. Knappstein 
went on about the climate of trust having been established at the conference, which 
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contributed significantly to open and frank discussions and the particularly high level of the 
debates.
111
  
On the West German side, a good number of public agencies were involved with the 
Atlantik-Brücke’s activities, particularly with the German-American conferences. Yet, their 
support was not a pure benevolent giving to the cause of improving German-American 
relations. The Foreign Office, much like the BPA, wished to have a say and monitored closely 
the proceedings of the conferences. The next section focuses on the American side of the 
story. 
Boosting transatlantic elite networking: the ACG and the Ford Foundation 
As we have seen above, the Atlantik-Brücke focused much of its activities on informing 
American audiences about the “new” Germany and in this way attempting to master the 
tainted past. Another central goal of both, the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, was to further 
mutual understanding between West Germans and Americans by means of arranging personal 
meetings and talks of representatives from both countries’ business, political, academic, and 
media elites.
112
 One way to do so was the aforementioned conference format. The conference 
scheme and other activities of the West German group were funded by federal public 
agencies. The following section focuses on the main source of funding on the American side 
and the ACG’s activities in the realm of public diplomacy. In the United States, the Ford 
Foundation served as most important grant-giving entity.  
Cold War historians have long been interested in the role of US funds in supporting anti-
communist activities in Europe. Probably the best-researched subject in this regard is the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom.
113
 Within this broader research context, Volker Berghahn has 
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drawn specific attention to the Ford Foundation’s involvement in the cultural Cold War.114 
The organisation’s activities in West Germany – namely its German-American exchange 
programmes – have been examined by Oliver Schmidt, who acknowledges the Foundation’s 
role in re-establishing West German-American relations in the post-war era. He particularly 
highlights the Ford Foundation’s role in forming a democratic, Atlanticist elite in West 
Germany. Yet, although the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were key players in bringing 
together representatives of political, business, media and academic elites from the US and the 
Federal Republic with Ford money, they have not been subject to scholarly analysis.
115
 
Established in 1936, the Foundation entered the international stage in the 1950s. It quickly 
ascended to become one of the key organisations well placed to partake in a new era of 
transnational relations that emerged after 1945. During the early 1950s the Ford Foundation 
underwent a comprehensive internal reorganisation, which preceded its expansion abroad. 
The accompanying professionalization of the philanthropic organisation served to secure 
close ties between the Foundation and the likewise expanded American federal state, which 
increasingly relied on the private sector to support its activities overseas.
116
  
An institutional relationship underpinned by transatlantic friendships 
The institutional relationship between the ACG and the Ford Foundation began in 1955 with a 
grant for a survey and subsequent report on the development of democratic institutions in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
117
 The closer institutional cooperation was, however, predated 
by personal relationships between founders of the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke and key figures 
in the Foundation hierarchy. Marion Countess Dönhoff and Shepard Stone, for example, had 
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known each other since Stone’s service for the American Military Government, when he 
helped establish the press in the American zone of occupation. Ever since, they were close 
friends who frequently corresponded with one another.
118
 John J. McCloy was personally 
affiliated with the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke not least due to his friendship with Eric 
Warburg which dated back to the 1920s.
119
 Organisation insiders even circulate the story that 
the founding of the two organisations was initiated by McCloy himself. In addition, 
transatlantic commuter Eric Warburg linked both continents and organisations. The 
institutionalized relationship between the two organisations and the Ford Foundation was 
underpinned by a dense network of friendships.
120
 
John J. McCloy and Shepard Stone illustrate particularly well the intersection of different 
sectors – government, philanthropy, media, and the corporate world characteristic of US 
foreign policy circles of the time. When McCloy became Ford Foundation trustee in 1953, he 
simultaneously chaired Chase National Bank in New York. Prior to these appointments, he 
had been the highest representative of the US in the semi-autonomous Federal Republic of 
Germany, serving as US representative on HICOG from 1949 to 1952, superseding the Office 
of Military Government (OMGUS).
121
 Shepard Stone in turn had been McCloy’s public 
affairs officer during his service in Germany. Both of them had been involved with the 
American war effort – the former in the intelligence branch of the First Army and the latter in 
a leading position in the War Department. Stone had intimate knowledge of pre-war Germany 
as he had earned a doctoral degree in history at the University of Berlin before he accepted a 
position with the New York Times.
122
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By ideological background and experience, Stone was an internationalist and liberal 
Democrat, whereas McCloy was a Republican. Both men belonged to a powerful faction in 
post-war American philanthropy and diplomacy that prioritized the struggle against 
Communism and the reconstruction of Germany within a larger Western European union over 
maintaining the war alliance with the Soviet Union.
123
 Both, Stone’s and McCloy’s 
professional careers exemplify and illustrate the effects of the revolving door phenomenon. 
This phenomenon surely facilitated installing a sense of 
“state spirit” in these men, the 
personal identification with the problems of their state.
124
 
Ford Foundation money and activities of the ACG 
In the early 1950s, internal Ford Foundation discussions were concerned with the direction its 
international programme should take. The question was raised whether Europe should be 
given greater attention next to the predominant focus on issues relating to US-Soviet Union 
relations and the so-called developing world. McCloy pushed his colleagues on the board of 
trustees and the president to expand the Foundation’s effort in Europe. In 1956, the European 
programme of the Ford Foundation was formally established and two years later, Stone was 
promoted to Director of the International Affairs Division that covered the European 
programme.
125
 During the internal decision-making processes in preparation for this 
programme, Stone had provided a number of reports based on trips he had taken through 
Europe in the early 1950s.
126
 Stone opined that the world was facing a long Cold War period 
in which the US would have to act wisely and maturely in order to hold the free peoples of the 
world together. Stone’s conviction that the Ford Foundation and other private organisations 
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could make a special contribution as they were able to take action where the US government 
was not, illustrates well his ‘state spirit’. Stone’s call for a more active role of US 
philanthropy echoed what Lucius D. Clay, military governor of US occupied Germany, had 
suggested already in 1946, namely inviting American foundations to help rebuild shattered 
Germany.
127
 Although the economic recovery of Western Europe was satisfactory to 
American decision-makers, domestic politics in several European countries were not. In West 
Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer faced vocal Social Democratic opposition, 
particularly with regard to the contested and linked issues of rearmament and the Federal 
Republic’s integration into the Western defence alliance.128 Moreover, the Christian 
Democratic led government had to cope with a number of volatile right-wing splinter parties 
in the 1950s.
129
 
It is against this background that the institutional relationship between the Ford Foundation 
and the ACG has to be seen. Between 1955 and 1974, the ACG received funds from the Ford 
Foundation roughly totalling $200,000 (approx. equivalent of $ 1mill today).
130
 The projects 
funded during this period illustrate the range of activities the ACG was engaged in. 
Publications on Germany-related issues were one aspect. The first grant request the ACG 
issued in 1955 was to fund a survey and subsequent report on the development of democratic 
institutions in West Germany conducted and written by Norbert Muhlen.
131
 During the latter 
part of the 1950s, the ACG acted as fund mediating entity in a number of cases. Foundation 
policies ruled out granting funds directly to foreign grantees such as the German Council on 
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East European Studies or the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich. The latter 
organization received $23,000 (equivalent of approx. $194,000 today) through the ACG from 
the Ford Foundation for hosting a summer seminar for young scholars from the US and 
Western Europe.
132
 In 1957, the Ford Foundation made available a grant to the ACG to 
sponsor the visit of Willy Brandt, then Mayor of Berlin, to the US.
133
 Though privately 
funded and sponsored, the US Department of State considered this trip “highly desirable” and 
wished to be part of the planning process of Brandt’s visit to the US.134 Thus, the 
arrangements for Brandt’s visit were an early example for the cooperative mode of the 
relationship between the US state and private entities. Despite the fact that the ACG was 
officially responsible for the arrangements, it was Shepard Stone of the Ford Foundation who 
pulled the strings.
135
  
Sponsoring and organizing visits of German personalities, mainly politicians, was to 
become another central area of activity of the ACG. It was funded to a great extent by the 
Ford Foundation. Hence, in the years to come, the ACG would host Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, Fritz Erler, and other members of the West German Cabinet and Parliament.
136
 By 
funding tours of German leaders, the Ford Foundation emphasised “the specific importance of 
Germany and Berlin”. Furthermore, it was important to the Foundation to maintain 
“continuing and close interchange of ideas between American and German leaders” to serve 
the “objective of strengthening ties between Europe and the US”.137 In line with such 
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arguments, the Ford Foundation sponsored an impressive number of conference activities on 
both sides of the Atlantic. International conferences served to provide space for informal 
networking and off-the-record exchange of thought among “leading thinkers and public 
opinion leaders in various fields”.138 A truly transnational meeting point for political, business 
and media elites from Western Europe and the US, funded by the Ford Foundation, were the 
annual Bilderberg conferences, “one of the most important transatlantic networks of the 
West”.139 
The Ford Foundation contributed approximately $135,000 to the German-American 
version of such transatlantic elite meetings in a 15-year-period (1959–1974). This sum is 
comparable to the $200,000 (1956-1968) granted to the Bilderberg group for their 
transatlantic conferences.
140
 Ford Foundation recommendations for repeated financial support 
of the German-American conferences were based on the positive assessment of the “private 
meeting of American-German foreign policy leaders”. They were regarded as “important 
means of increasing understanding between Germany and the U.S.”, significantly contributing 
to the development of the Atlantic Community. Furthermore, Ford staff emphasised the 
importance of personal relationships and acquaintances especially between “rising young U.S. 
and German leaders”, which were fostered on the conferences.141  
Given this assessment, it is hardly surprising that Ford Foundation staff was actively 
involved in the selection of delegates to the German-American conferences. Extensive 
correspondence between executives of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke and officers of the 
Ford Foundation illustrate that the latter and Shepard Stone in particular took an active role in 
the organisation of the conferences. Stone was deeply involved, especially in terms of 
delegation composition, but also in terms of developing conference agendas. ACG executives 
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informed Ford staff about each change in the American delegation. Internal Ford Foundation 
files show that the ACG consulted “with Mr. Shepard Stone in connection with development 
of plans for the conference and selection of participants”.142 And indeed, especially the 
executive president of the ACG, Christopher Emmet, and the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive 
director, Walter Stahl informed Stone and sought his advice most frequently and thoroughly 
on all developments regarding the conferences.
143
 Stone’s involvement, however, was not 
limited to written advice. He also regularly met with ACG executives in New York and 
whenever in Germany he tried to see representatives of the Atlantik-Brücke.
144
 Furthermore, 
Shepard Stone also participated regularly in the conference steering committee meetings and 
in the conference proceedings. After the fourth German-American conference in 1964, 
Christopher Emmet thus thanked Shepard Stone not only “for helping us to obtain the grant, 
but for your help in planning the conference, getting some of the delegates, and for your 
personal contribution to the meeting’s success both during the conference sessions and 
outside them”.145  
People further up in Foundation hierarchy were involved in shaping delegations to the 
conferences as well. John J. McCloy was regularly asked for advice and support aside from 
the fact that he also repeatedly headed the American delegation.
146
 Furthermore, McCloy 
tapped his good contacts into the highest echelons of US politics to support the German-
American conferences. In February 1964, John J. McCloy, for example, met with President 
Lyndon B. Johnson. During this meeting McCloy “discussed with [him] the importance of a 
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good congressional representation at the American-German conference to be held in Germany 
in mid-April”. The pledge for support of the conferences by the President was another 
manifestation of the state-private network at work here.
 147
 
Despite the Ford Foundation’s initial strong endorsement of the German-American 
conferences and its close cooperation with the grant-receiving organisation, internal criticism 
and scepticism regarding the ongoing support thereof grew louder from the late 1960s 
onwards. Concerns were voiced regarding the composition of the delegations, both American 
and German, with special reference to age and generation. Those concerns mirrored the fact 
that from the 1960s onwards, “new generations would be entering positions of power and 
influence with no personal experience of binding issues such as World War II or the Marshall 
Plan”.148 Beyond this, transatlantically minded elites in the US as well as in Western Europe 
worried about the effects on transatlantic relations resulting from the US image abroad being 
increasingly tainted by the Vietnam War and Watergate. To complicate the matter, potential 
alternatives to the Atlantic Community such as de Gaulle’s proposal for a unified Europe 
under French leadership and the West German’s Ostpolitik were gaining recognition. The way 
out of this dilemma was to ensure that future leaders, both in Western Europe and in the US, 
would maintain the transatlantic alliance. Hence, younger generations had to be socialised in 
this manner.
149
  
 Erik Blumenfeld thus assured McGeorge Bundy, then president of the Ford Foundation, 
that he was “able to recruit the younger generation of politicians from the Bundestag.”150 
Christopher Emmet, himself member of the generation of die-hard Cold Warriors having 
experienced both world wars and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, was of the opinion that 
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“the supreme necessity for this particular Conference is the wisdom and prestige in Germany 
of some of their old friends”, namely John J. McCloy, Dean Acheson, and Lucius D. Clay. 
The Foundation was clearly in favour of carrying this German-American elite network into 
the future. This desire, however, could only be met if younger people would be 
incorporated.
151
 
Shepard Stone, who was positively inclined towards the basic idea of these transatlantic 
off-the-record meetings, left the Foundation in 1967. Subsequently he became president of the 
International Association of Cultural Freedom, the successor organisation of the Congress of 
Cultural Freedom.
152
 Stone’s departure was preceded by the arrival of a new Ford Foundation 
president. The beginning of McGeorge Bundy’s term at Ford coincided with further internal 
reorganisation and the decision to lower the rate of spending.
153
 Hence, others within the 
Foundation assumed responsibility for ACG and conference related matters. After Stone’s 
departure, unfavourable judgment of the German-American conferences increased noticeably. 
In an internal memorandum of the European International Affairs (EIA) division, criticism 
was widened beyond the issue of generation to include critique of an insufficient “range of 
interest” and “points of view” represented on the part of the proposed American delegation. 
Moreover, in the memorandum, concerns were expressed regarding “the organisation of the 
meeting, particularly the slowness in preparing an adequate agenda”. Yet, EIA was not 
content with verbalising its annoyance. The Foundation hired Professor Richard Hunt, then 
Associate Dean of Harvard University as a consultant to help the ACG “with final 
preparations for the Conference”.154 Thus, Hunt attended the 1970 German-American 
conference as an observer with the special task to assist the ACG with organisational issues. 
Afterwards he assessed the conference quite positively and recommended continuation of the 
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German-American meetings sponsored by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.
155
 In a personal 
note to the responsible programme officer, however, Richard Hunt voiced much stronger 
criticism, especially directed at the ACG. In this note, Hunt referred to the ACG as “a rather 
moribund group [which] needs youth, wider horizons, and money”. Here he recommended 
that the Foundation “exercise more control over the Council and the Delegation Chairman; ... 
assist in the prior reorganisation of the Council which is certainly needed.”156  
However, concerns voiced by government officials as well as private citizens of both 
countries indicated that this particular manifestation of public-private cooperation in the 
context of West-German-American relations had proven useful in the past. Just now, it was in 
need of an overhaul to adapt to the changing global settings now more inclined to détente. 
The ongoing calls for rejuvenation were thus indeed answered by the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke. In 1973, they introduced their own Young Leaders Program. In June of the same 
year, they jointly organised the first American-German Youth conference in Hamburg with 
partial support of the Ford Foundation.
157
 
Though the steady flow of funding from the Ford Foundation to the ACG subsided slowly 
and eventually ceased completely, efforts to strengthen German-American relations by the 
ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were not discontinued.
158
 The Ford Foundation was, however, 
superseded by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) as main benefactor to the activities of the 
ACG from the mid-1970s onwards. Through the GMF, transnational public-private 
interconnections of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were even strengthened. In 1972, it was 
the West German government that initiated the fund and endowed it with DM 252 million 
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($78 mill in 1972) as a grateful gesture to the US in remembrance to the Marshall Plan.
159
 
Maybe even more importantly, in 1975, the Federal Republic presented a $1 million grant to 
the ACG in recognition of John J. McCloy’s contributions to German-American relations in 
the second half of the 20
th
 century.
160
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate the intertwined history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke 
in three dimensions; the first being the different sources of funding to the transatlantically 
coordinated elite effort. The second dimension is that of relationships between the American 
and the West German partner organisations on the one hand and the ACG and Atlantik-
Brücke with their grant-giving entities on the other. The third one is concerned with the 
activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. In the course of this chapter we have learned 
that the transatlantic partner organisations have funded their transnationally coordinated 
public diplomacy effort with a mix of corporate and public money and grants from the 
influential Ford Foundation.  
In terms of the general financial situation, the relationship between the West German 
Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG was an inverse reflection of the relation between Germany 
under occupation, later the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Only due to 
the genuine transnational cooperation between the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in which the 
former proved to be much more successful in tapping solvent industrial sources, this 
partnership was realised. The West German business community could expect much greater 
benefits from sponsoring the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke than US businesses. 
The relationships of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke with grant-giving entities, whether 
public or philanthropic in nature, may be described as mutually beneficial, yet not free of 
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conflict. In close cooperation, the Atlantik-Brücke, the BPA, the Foreign Office, and the 
Federal Chancellery pursued a common goal – improving and strengthening the relationship 
with the United States. The first step was to create a new image for the Germans and 
Germany and hence overcoming its tainted past. By outsourcing crucial public diplomacy 
work to external actors, the BPA could achieve this goal without being directly involved. It 
took time for West German public agencies to free themselves from association with the Nazi 
regime. US occupation forces as well as HICOG knew of this beneficial arrangement, 
therefore opting for a strong role of US philanthropy in foreign policy as was shown for the 
case of the Ford Foundation’s support for the ACG. The regular flows of funding from West 
German public agencies as well as from the Ford Foundation were a most tangible 
manifestation of a transatlantic state-private network allowing for a quite successful 
transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort. This was a most important effort in the 
Cold War era of West German-American relations, as suspicion of Germany in the United 
States was the “Achilles Heel of the NATO alliance”, according to Christopher Emmet.161 
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Chapter 4: 
Off the record: the informal diplomacy of 
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke 
In the previous chapters we have learned about the motives driving the original core founders 
of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG: firstly, the conviction that there was no alternative to a 
close transatlantic cooperation; and secondly, at least on the part of Emmet and Warburg, a 
genuine attachment to Germany. With a growing membership, however, the interests 
represented in these private organisations diversified. This was manifested in the public-
private structure of the two organisations’ funding, as Chapter 3 demonstrated. While in the 
previous chapter the focus was on the organisations’ classic public diplomacy repertoire, this 
chapter examines how the specific composition of membership of the two elite organisations 
translated into their activities beyond public diplomacy, into a realm that can more precisely 
be labelled as private or informal diplomacy.
1
 In its online Diplomatic Dictionary the U.S. 
Department of States defines ‘informal diplomacy’ simply as umbrella term for public 
diplomacy.
2
 Proponents of the New Diplomatic History, however, focus on the actors 
conducting ‘informal diplomacy’ in defining their understanding thereof. The focus is on 
individuals, private citizens, and non-governmental institutions. In doing so “the very nature 
of diplomatic practice and the role of the diplomat” is transformed. In this sense diplomats 
increasingly serve as “facilitators and social entrepreneurs between domestic and foreign civil 
society groups”. The practice of informal diplomacy encompasses therefore “mobilizing and 
linking ‘networks’ of private actors to promote particular causes”.3 “Para-diplomatic bodies” 
such as think tanks, humanitarian organisations, philanthropies, and other private 
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organisations active in international or transnational relations thus expand the field of 
diplomacy.
4
 
According to this definition, the chapter shows how the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s 
efforts as “unofficial diplomats” relate to the official dimension of German-American 
relations. To put it differently, the nexus between private diplomacy of West German and 
American elites and “traditional” diplomacy is studied. 5 Main prisms for this analysis are the 
two groups’ private or informal diplomacy activities commencing in the early 1950s and 
progressing through the 1960s until the mid-1970s. More specifically, this chapter aims at 
clarifying what role the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke played in West German-American 
relations in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. The analysis starts from the assumption that 
both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke not only significantly contributed to their respective 
country’s public diplomacy efforts but moreover attempted to influence other diplomatic 
activities such as state visits and negotiations of treaties. This was accomplished mainly 
through their mission to inform the public and the foreign policy elite about West Germany 
and the United States with their various publications.
6
 Scholars studying public diplomacy 
point to the overall objective of this communication with foreign audiences as being the 
fostering of mutual understanding. Yet, in the case of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this 
should not be overly emphasised as has been done elsewhere.
7
 Interpreting these two 
organisations’ efforts as purely promoting friendship and mutual understanding between the 
United States and the Federal Republic and their peoples would trivialise what they did, 
reducing their role in German-American relations to a rather superficial one.  
Thus this chapter demonstrates that the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s activities did 
overlap with official public diplomacy efforts. Yet, at times, they went way beyond the 
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promotion of a positive image of the United States and the Federal Republic. In a number of 
instances, directors and officers of the two organisations acted as political consultants, 
lobbyists or as private diplomats without an official mandate and thus at least attempted to 
exert influence without being democratically legitimized to do so. 
The formative years during “the Golden Age” of German-American post-war relations, 
1952–1959 
The 1950s are, by some scholars, regarded as the golden age of West-German-American post-
war relations. Coining this decade in such terms has much to do with the very close personal 
relationships between the top-level diplomats of the two countries. In particular, this refers to 
the relationship of Konrad Adenauer, first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and Dean Acheson and even more so John Foster Dulles, successive US secretaries of state.
8
 
Yet despite the fact that this period is indeed characterised by an unusual degree of agreement 
in attitudes and perceptions among the political elites in West Germany and the United States, 
historians are less inclined to overemphasise the degree of harmony between the two.
9
 Rather 
they like to point to sentiments and attitudes that Americans and West Germans held on the 
respective other that were much less sympathetic. Americans were persistently pessimistic 
about the Germans ability to truly change and abdicate from nationalism, militarism, and anti-
Semitism. What is more, it was feared that driven by their nationalism and for the sake of 
unification they might seek a neutral status between the Soviet and the Western bloc in the 
Cold War.
10
 The broad mistrust against West Germany and Germans was illustrated in the 
great success of Tete Harens Teten’s book Germany Plots with the Kremlin published in 
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1953.
11
 Many Germans on the other side despised American de-nazification policies in 
particular and American culture in general.
12
 
However, a number of Cold War crises, such as the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, 
the uprisings in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and in Hungary in 1953 and 1956 
respectively, as well as the so called Sputnik shock in 1957, helped to consolidate West-
German-American alliance within the Western bloc. West Germany’s incorporation into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its gaining of semi-sovereign status in 1955, 
only 10 years after Germany’s defeat and the end of World War II, proved this quite 
persuasively. Yet, what appears, with hindsight, as a logical development of international 
relations was in truth the result of great struggles; in the United States between proponents of 
isolationism and those promoting internationalism; and in West Germany between neutralism 
on the one side and Western integration and rearmament on the other. Although private 
organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were not spared from those differences – 
Ernst Friedlaender and Walter Stahl of the West German group, for example, had been too 
soft on Communism and what is more propagated neutralist views at least according to 
Christopher Emmet – they still did play a role in these struggles functioning as mediator and 
cushion between the frontlines.
13
 Mediating and cushioning was particularly necessary after 
the end of occupation. Educational and information programmes funded by the US State 
Department ended in the mid-1950s and the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke among others filled 
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that gap.
14
 They promoted German-American cooperation in the all- encompassing conflict 
between the East and the West; at times with a real hands-on attitude clearly exceeding their 
educational mandate as confirmed in their founding documents and thus threatening the 
organisations’ tax-deductible status.15 
Adenauer’s trips to the United States 
Public diplomacy in its most narrow meaning, informing foreign audiences about domestic 
issues as well as about the country’s foreign policies, definitely ranked high among the 
ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s activities in the early 1950s. Infused with “state spirit” 
Christopher Emmet in particular travelled quite regularly to West Germany to meet with old 
acquaintances and make new ones among the political, industrial and media elites. In doing so 
Emmet laid the groundwork for the network to come of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. In 
the summer of 1952, for example, Emmet gave a talk about the upcoming presidential 
elections, the race between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson.
16
 In addition, Emmet 
met with Johnny von Herwarth, at the time with the office of Federal President Theodor 
Heuss, Theodor Kordt, at the time head of the Foreign Office department, and Alexander 
Boeker, in the office of Chancellor Adenauer. Hans Karl von Borries and Günter Henle were 
central contacts for Emmet into West Germany’s business community. The former was a 
high-ranking senior figure of the Ruhr industries before and after World War II and the latter 
was one of the most powerful West German steel magnates of the post-war era. Prominent 
media figures, whom Emmet was in touch with, were, among others, Gerd Bucerius, 
publisher of Die Zeit, and Richard Löwenthal, at the time correspondent of The Observer and 
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a Social Democrat by political conviction. Hence it is not surprising that Emmet not only met 
with politicians of the governing Christian Democrats but also sought contact with leaders of 
German Social Democracy such as Erich Ollenhauer, Fritz Heine and Willy Brandt. This is 
particularly noteworthy since at the time SPD leaders openly favoured neutralism for West 
Germany and thus vehemently opposed Germany’s West integration and joining of NATO.17  
Some of Christopher Emmet’s early activities, however, clearly deviated from clear-cut 
public diplomacy tasks. While travelling in West Germany, Emmet acted as a private 
diplomat on behalf of the US, as political consultant and lobbyist for the NATO project. He 
played these roles without an official mandate but infused with “state spirit”. In the late 
summer of 1952, for example, Emmet wrote to Max Brauer of the SPD – whom he knew 
from one of his earliest trips to West Germany in the summer of 1950.
18
 With a watchful eye 
on congressional power struggles between those who favoured isolationism and those who 
supported the United States’ NATO policy, Emmet almost begged Brauer to try to soften 
attacks against that very policy by his party colleagues. In June 1952, Kurt Schumacher, the 
Social Democratic opposition leader, for example, warned explicitly against ratifying the 
General Treaty and announced that the opposition “would make every effort to revoke the 
treaties” in case that they were indeed going to be ratified. In his attempt to convince Brauer 
of the importance that the SPD did support the NATO project, Emmet used quite threatening 
arguments. He created a scenario in which West Germany indeed was neutral and outside of 
NATO. If in this setting the Russians attacked Germany, the West would “then be compelled 
perhaps to use the atom bomb on the Ruhr itself, to prevent its vast industrial potential from 
falling into Soviet hands.”19 Yet, there was more to come from the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke then merely writing letters. 
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 In April of 1953, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was to make his first 
visit to the United States; one of the most important and highly symbolic events in post-war 
German history. Only two months earlier, the new US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, 
had extended the invitation to the German head of government. Almost immediately 
preparations commenced in West Germany and the United States alike.
20
 While Herbert 
Blankenhorn, Adenauer’s personal adviser and head of the political department within the 
Foreign Office, met with John J. McCloy presenting Adenauer’s political agenda for the trip, 
Christopher Emmet and Erik Blumenfeld were also eager to have a say in shaping the 
chancellor’s trip. During the preparatory phase of this visit, the Eisenhower administration, 
however, dismissed any attempts on the part of the German diplomats, official or unofficial, 
to get politically tangible issues on the agenda. For example, the German delegation was keen 
to talk about aid to Berlin in connection with the steadily increasing numbers of refugees from 
the German Democratic Republic. Emmet was also well-aware of this problem and sent a 
memorandum summarising “the highlights of the German Expellee problem in relation to the 
great new influx of refugees into Berlin” to McCloy knowing that the latter informally 
negotiated the political agenda for the visit. In the memorandum Emmet pointed out that 22 
percent of the German population were refugees; the “largest single group” being “the 
expellees” accounting for more than eight million people. Beyond pure education about 
numbers the central aim of Emmet’s memo was to link the issue to West Germany’s 
economic recovery and its political future. With regard to the former, Emmet argued that “the 
burden of the refugees is the key factor in determining the amount which Western Germany is 
able to pay for the occupation costs of the allied armies or for prospective German 
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rearmament”. With regard to the latter, Emmet warned of the effects the unresolved refugee 
problem would have on the upcoming elections. According to Emmet, it endangered not only 
the re-election of the Adenauer Government but “the whole policy of integrating Germany 
with the West” on top of the “rise of neo-Nazism and Nationalism in Germany”.21 The official 
US economics negotiators for the German-American talks during the Adenauer visit, 
however, refused to discuss concrete numbers for aid to Berlin at all.
22
 
Hence, even before the trip commenced, it was reduced to more or less a pure PR exercise. 
Thus, in preparing the trip the ultimate goal was to make the most of it with one eye on public 
opinion in the US and the other on the effect on German voters. In terms of West Germany’s 
self-image the mere fact that the German chancellor was received with full honours was a 
great boost. After the conclusion of talks in Washington, Adenauer and the delegation 
accompanying the chancellor toured the country – San Francisco, Chicago, New York and 
Boston – demonstrating that this was not a pure state visit focused on high-level diplomacy 
but reaching out to the American public as well as the German one.
23
 Christopher Emmet and 
Erik Blumenfeld had been involved in the making of the chancellor’s voyage since mid-
March 1953. Athough Blumenfeld, at the time a close confident of the chancellor, Emmet 
provided Adenauer with information and guidance in public relations questions  advice that 
was much appreciated by the chancellor according to Blumenfeld. One piece of advice was to 
exploit the opportunity to press the issues related to the “priceless asset Berlin” as the city and 
its current mayor, Ernst Reuter (SPD) “have become a symbol of Freedom and anti-
Communism” and are “no longer thought of as Germans”. Emmet in particular hoped that 
mentioning the German expellee problem in connection with Berlin would yield some 
concrete results in terms of American aid. Interestingly enough, Emmet had given the exact 
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same advice to Berlin’s mayor, Ernst Reuter during a meeting when the latter had visited New 
York just a few weeks prior to the chancellor’s trip to the US. More importantly even, Emmet 
as an attentive observer of the US media, feared that Adenauer would not “receive as much or 
as universally favourable publicity as Reuter”. In his assessment of the Reuter visit – “a 
spectacular success” – Emmet went as far as comparing it to Churchill’s just after the end of 
World War II in terms of press coverage: “Churchill never had so many front-page stories and 
photographs so many different days on any of his visits to America.”24  
One of the more visible and tangible results of Emmet and Blumenfeld pulling the strings 
in the background was Konrad Adenauer’s acceptance of an invitation from General William 
Joseph Donovan, chairman of the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE). This was 
even more so a success on the part of Blumenfeld and Emmet in light of the fact that ACUE 
had wanted to invite the chancellor as early as 1950 and the fact that the chancellor’s itinerary 
included only one more comparable item. The day before the meeting with the ACUE, the 
chancellor addressed an audience of approximately 150 to 200 participants at the Council on 
Foreign Relations.
25
 In arranging for the Adenauer address to the ACUE, Emmet could build 
on contacts to people in the West German diplomatic hierarchy. There was, for example, 
Johnnie von Herwarth, chief of protocol of the German Foreign Office, whom Emmet was 
acquainted with since his earliest trips to Germany after the war. Felix von Eckardt, head of 
the Press and Information Office was also helpful and vice versa as he got in touch with 
Emmet upon arrival in New York preparing Adenauer’s trip. A third German diplomat who 
on behalf of Emmet made sure that the Chancellor attended a lunch given by ACUE in honour 
of Konrad Adenauer was Heinz Krekeler, chargé d’a  aires.26  
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ACUE was an important conduit for US covert support for the European Movement, as has 
been explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. US officials and the US foreign policy 
establishment at large promoted an internationalist agenda for the United States in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Unification and integration of Western Europe ranked high on 
the internationalists’ agenda as an end in itself but even more importantly because this very 
process entailed a solution to the German problem. People working for ACUE were bestowed 
with a sense of mission viewing American federalism as a political model to be transferred to 
other parts of the world along with its values and political culture. Given ACUE’s staunch 
anti-Communist orientation and thus providing to a large extent help to the non-Communist 
left in Europe, Christopher Emmet’s affiliation with Committee is not particularly 
surprising.
27
 And Adenauer addressing these American promoters of European federalism 
emphasised the chancellor’s commitment to the European integration process. 
In the end Konrad Adenauer’s first trip to the United States was considered a great success. 
The German delegation’s expectations regarding American public reactions to Adenauer were 
exceeded as he was warmly welcomed. Contrary to Emmet’s fears, other observers of the 
American press considered media attention to the German chancellor’s visit as very strong 
and quite consistent over the course of his voyage.
28
 The New York Times alone carried 19 
news stories over the course of Adenauer’s stay in the US the headlines carrying his name and 
the Washington Post anticipated that Adenauer’s arrival in the capital was “Heralded”.29 
However, in terms of acquiring American aid for the German expellee and refugee 
problem the trip was a failure. Thus, Christopher Emmet and Erik Blumenfeld seized the 
opportunity when, approximately one and a half years later, in October 1954, Adenauer came 
to the US again to put the issue on the agenda. This time Emmet arranged for an invitation to 
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the chancellor by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The IRC was initially founded at 
the request of Albert Einstein in the endeavour to assist refugees from Nazi Germany.
30
  
To this very day, the IRC remains an international humanitarian aid organisation. Reinhold 
Niebuhr and John Dewey were two prominent figures influential in establishing the IRC in 
the 1930s. In addition, a number of scholars, senior trade union representatives and former 
communists supported its foundation. With the onset of the Cold War, the IRC’s main focus 
was on Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Its first major campaign was raising funds 
for relief of West Berlin’s population during the Berlin blockade in 1948. William J. 
Donovan, also a crucial figure in ACUE, was the leading figure in this US fund-raising 
campaign.
31
 In the 1950s, Christopher Emmet was a director of this relief organisation. 
Therefore, he was in a good position to advise Adenauer to use the stage of this distinguished 
organisation to “give a major speech about the expellees and refugees from the Communist 
areas”. Emmet argued, first of all that “this story has never been told with sufficient 
prominence in America to stick to anybody’s mind”. Secondly, Emmet considered this issue a 
good one to demonstrate to American elites and the public alike Germans’ steadfast standing 
against Communism: talking about the expellee and refugee problem provided feasible 
arguments showing “why the Germans would not turn towards a deal with Russia or even 
towards a neutral position”. Furthermore, Emmet again pointed to Berlin in this connection 
providing Blumenfeld with a long list of arguments to be forwarded to the chancellor, “the 
leaders of government, and CDU Party” why referring to the city of Berlin – “a great potential 
good-will asset for German propaganda” (emphasis added)  would be so beneficial to CDU 
politicians in particular.
32
 One argument ran along the lines that Ernst Reuter and Berlin had 
been very popular especially among groups that tend to be rather “sceptical about Western 
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Germany as a whole” – liberals, labour, Democrats and Jews. Emmet suggested that if 
Adenauer and government officials identified “themselves to the American public with 
appeals for Berlin” they could win some of “the American friends ... and the SPD as friends 
of ... the CDU”. Moreover, this could “strengthen the Chancellor’s popularity and that of the 
CDU, among these groups in Germany” as well.33 
During the summer of 1954, preceding Adenauer’s second visit to the US, Emmet 
perceived American media reports on the situation in Germany as “exaggeratedly pessimistic” 
and as voicing “suspicions about the stability of German anti-Communism”. Indeed US media 
outlets such as the New York Times, the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times featured 
prominently the so called Dr. Otto John affair. Dr. Otto John, the head of the Federal 
Domestic Intelligence Agency, allegedly defected to the East.
34
 John justified his flight to 
East Berlin on July 20, 1954 with his opposition to Adenauer’s Politik der Stärke towards the 
East as this was manifesting the division of Germany. Moreover, John protested the re-
integration of ex-Nazis into public service.
35
 This affair prompted headlines in American 
newspapers such as “New Doubts about German Reliability”, “Uproar Caused in Bonn”, 
“Defectors Play A Key Role Now: Their Secrets Are Big Prizes in ‘Cold War’ Between 
Communists and West”.36 In June 1954, Heinrich Bruening, the former Reich Chancellor 
(1930-1932) announced his return to West German politics at the Rhein-Rhur Club of the 
West German industrial magnates. He sharply criticized Chancellor Adenauer’s foreign 
policy and called for a neutral stance of Germany between East and West. Bruening’s 
announcement and his opinionated stance on West Germany’s foreign policy, did not paint 
the picture brighter in Emmet’s eyes.37 Thus, Emmet intended to make use of Adenauer’s 
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“unparalleled publicity ... in America” to counter those trends. With the same intention 
Emmet reported to officials of the State Department’s German desk upon returning from a trip 
to West Germany that very summer giving them a summary of his “excellent impression of 
the situation in Germany”. 38 Bearing these developments in mind, this was a crucial phase for 
post-war West Germany during which the Adenauer government was still negotiating the 
post-occupation status for the Federal Republic. At this point, gaining sovereignty was by no 
means certain. The more so as the prospective granting of a sovereign status was intimately 
linked to question of the European Community (EDC) and West German rearmament.  
Confiscated German property in the US 
Atlantik-Brücke representatives returned the frequent visits of Christopher Emmet and thus 
acted as West German public diplomacy agents without an official mandate. In 1955, Marion 
Dönhoff, for example, toured the United States for several weeks. One of her tasks was to 
explain West Germany’s viewpoint on central political and economic issues in the many 
meetings arranged by Ellen McCloy and Eric Warburg. She not only talked to journalists and 
scholars but also to government officials and political leaders such as Adlai Stevenson, 
Senator William F. Knowland and General Lucius D. Clay.
39
  
When a few years later in 1958, the executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, Walter Stahl 
travelled to the US, he followed up on a much more concrete and delicate issue: “The issue of 
restitution of German assets confiscated in the United States”, which according to Stahl, 
“remains the only controversial subject between the Federal Republic and the United States in 
their post-war relations.”40 During World War Two, the US Office of Alien Property 
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confiscated German property in the United States. Affected by this seizure were mostly 
owners of small assets but also big companies such as Farbwerke Höchst, Schering and 
Volkswagen. The issue of compensation or restitution of the assets had not been settled in the 
post-war period up to the late 1950s. In 1958, however, the US Congress announced that it 
would prepare a bill allowing the confiscated assets to be used to compensate damage caused 
by Germans during the war.
41
 
West German private interests had hoped that a solution could be found as accommodating 
as the one for the dismantling issue. This turned out to be a false hope; partly due to discord 
on the American side of the bargaining table and also due to the fact that, according to Hans 
Dieter Kreikamp, this matter did not rank particularly high on the West German government’s 
foreign policy agenda. The Adenauer administration was not willing to sacrifice its larger 
foreign policy goal of West integration and gaining of sovereignty for narrow interests of the 
business community.
42
 To gain greater leverage in international relations, West Germany 
needed an untainted image of a young democracy. Thus it was out of the question that the 
West German government publicly advocated the restitution of such companies. Therefore, as 
early as 1948, private interests in Germany organised and formed a pressure group. Among 
the founders of the Studiengesellschaft für privatrechtliche Auslandsinteressen e.V.
 
were 
influential bankers and industrialists like Herman Josef Abs of Deutsche Bank and Wilhelm 
Borner of Schering AG and members of the Bundestag like Paul Leverkuehn (CDU), Hans 
Wellhausen (FDP) and Fritz Baade (SPD). In the ongoing contestation it was thus, according 
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to Jähnicke, representatives of private interest who stepped into the breach in lieu of official 
bodies.
43
  
Thus, unsurprisingly, the issue of confiscated German property in the US had drawn 
Christopher Emmet’s attention. Always the attentive observer of political developments 
particularly with regard to Germany, he drafted a memorandum on this very question. In 
September 1954, he sent the memorandum to John J. McCloy. He expressed his hope that the 
latter would give him some tangible advice as to what could be done after it had been 
“hopelessly mismanaged at the last session in Congress”. What Emmet envisioned and also 
conveyed to Heinz Krekeler, West German charge d’affaires to the United States, was “a new 
bill for the return of German property which had the blessing of the administration and the 
wide support of public opinion”.44 Emmet approached McCloy with the underlying intention 
to make McCloy, the most influential figure on all matters German, to secretly pull some 
strings  yet to no avail. Until the latter part of 1958, no solution acceptable to all parties 
concerned had been found, despite the fact that question of German property had been 
brought up in Congress every year ever since 1954. A few years later, however, when 
Emmet’s West German friends proposed to discuss the issue of “Release of German 
Property” on the agenda of the German-American conferences, the New Yorkers rejected this 
downright.
45
  
Walter Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, therefore, occupied himself at 
length with the question of “whether the Atlantik-Brücke should try to help coming to a 
solution satisfyingly to both sides” on the occasion of his forthcoming voyage to the United 
States in the autumn of 1958. On behalf of the Atlantik-Brücke Stahl expressed the view that 
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the US treatment of this issue was “discriminating against the Federal Republic of 
Germany”.46 The basic reason for this discrimination was, according to Henry A. Abt, head of 
the German-American trade promotion office in New York, that American business 
encountered German competition around the world. Indeed, according to Reinhard Neebe, the 
Federal Republic was in terms of foreign trade remarkably successful during the 1950s. In 
1950 the Federal Republic’s external trade balance stated a deficit of three billion 
deutschmark. Only three years later, in 1953, however, the trade balance already yielded a 
surplus of 2.5 billion deutschmark. Bolstering Abt’s view, West German exporters named US 
and British companies as their main competitors on the different markets around the globe.
47
 
This fact also caused the “anti-German curve” to increase lately, according to Henry A. Abt. 
Together with the strong congressional opposition representing domestic business interests 
this posed a great obstacle to a solution acceptable to German owners of property confiscated 
in the US.
48
 
Therefore, given that the Atlantik-Brücke’s membership had been dominated by business 
and industry representatives since the mid-1950s the organisation had an imperative to 
become active on behalf of its most powerful constituency. By the end of 1956, German 
property confiscated in the US totalled $395 million, approximately 90 per cent of which 
were allotted to 2,500 owners, among them big companies, such as Farbwerke Hoechst, 
Schering AG, Bayer AG, and Volkswagen. These companies were either already represented 
in the Atlantik-Brücke at the end of the 1950s or joined during the 1960s and 1970s.
49
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Yet, after Stahl had “several conversations in Washington and New York with American 
and German experts ... senators, congressmen, diplomats, attorneys, business journalists, 
specialist on international law and bankers” he concluded that “at the moment it would neither 
advance the issue nor be beneficial to the Atlantik-Brücke to become more active in this 
matter”.50 Christian Haase explains the Atlantik-Brücke’s inactivity concerning this so 
tangible issue, at least for the industrialists among its membership, by pointing to the role of 
the Foreign Ministry. According to Haase, the American Desk within the ministry had 
basically used the Atlantik-Brücke for its links into the West German business community to 
“suppress another unwanted debate on the German past in the capital cities of Western 
countries...”51 Abstaining from active lobbying in the US, however, did not mean to stay 
silent on the subject altogether. As indicated above, Walter Stahl investigated the issue quite 
thoroughly during his trip to the US in November and December of 1958. Using the acquired 
information and insights, Stahl then, upon his return to Germany drafted a comprehensive 
report on German property in the USA. Though officially this report was written for the sole 
purpose of informing Atlantik-Brücke members, the underlying aim was to stir the West 
German administration’s actions into a certain direction. This direction was to be followed in 
the form of a “new approach”. Stahl’s proposed approach would not only help to solve this 
“awkward” issue but would also very tangibly satisfy German industries’ demands with 
regard to their assets in the US. More importantly a satisfying solution in this case could be 
used as precedent for handling the issue of confiscated German property in other western 
nations.
52
  
At the heart of Stahl’s proposition was the founding of a German-American mutual fund 
which would jointly implement a technical programme in underdeveloped countries. Hence in 
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the guise of a development programme, this proposal offered German owners of confiscated 
property the opportunity to acquire shares in this fund equal to their claims with the incentive 
of potential profits. To insure success of the endeavour, Stahl felt “for psychological reasons”, 
it was crucial that economics minister Ludwig Erhard personally forwarded this proposal to 
the Americans. Furthermore, Stahl counselled, it should be pointed out to the Americans “that 
the security of US foreign investments was closely linked to the security of foreign 
investments in the United States”. This was considered a plan that had the potential to create 
“good will” in the United States particularly with regard to the issue of German property. The 
main selling point was that it “served common non-material and practical goals, namely the 
betterment of the standard of living of impoverished peoples, and the containment of 
Communism”.53 Stahl’s proposed “new approach” was not altogether novel. Arguments 
linking foreign aid and the issue of foreign investment security had been brought forward 
before.
54
 Neither was the Atlantik-Brücke the first private entity to get involved in this issue. 
The Studiengesellschaft had been around for 10 years and individual corporate claimants had 
hired lawyers in the US to handle their case. The specific idea of a mutual fund for 
development aid, however, was innovative even though Stahl’s plan like so many others 
before did not yield the expected result either. Yet, it helped the Atlantik-Brücke to establish 
itself as promoter of West German business interests and of German-American relations alike. 
In particular, the former was essential for the long-term goal of the organisation to attract 
more business and industry representatives. 
The Kennan-Acheson controversy 
Towards the close of the so called “golden age” of German-American post-war relations, a 
long-standing controversy over fundamental questions regarding Cold War strategies attracted 
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broad international public attention. On the whole, foreign policy elites in the United States 
and in the Western European NATO partner countries were proponents of the containment 
policy. For the better part of the 1950s, the Cold War foreign policy consensus among the 
Western powers was to act from a position of strength, in a military sense. Yet Western 
technological and military strength was seriously challenged in October and November of 
1957 when the Soviets launched Sputnik I and II, the latter carrying the Soviet space dog 
Laika. This tremendous technological success of the Soviets sent shock waves through the 
Atlantic Alliance. “U.S. Missile Experts Shaken by Sputnik” headlined the New York Times in 
October 1957. US defence officials were not so much disturbed by the fact that the Soviet 
Union placed the first earth satellite in space. What seriously concerned them was the strength 
of the Soviet rocket engines calling Soviet rocketry superior.
55
 The launch of Sputnik also 
made, in Western eyes, the Soviet’s diplomatic offensive from earlier the same year even less 
trustworthy. During an appearance on the US broadcasting system CBS, June 2, 1957 
Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of withdrawing all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe on 
the condition that American and British troops would also be removed from the Western part 
of Europe. Western officials declined to consider Khrushchev’s offers altogether. They were 
rather inclined to agree on deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Western European 
arsenal during the Paris NATO summit in December 1957.
56
 
Against this background George F. Kennan, former US diplomat and professor, delivered 
his contribution to the BBC’s Reith lecture series in November and December 1957 which 
had the reputation of giving a forum to controversial issues. In the course of six successive 
talks on Sunday nights, Kennan’s views on the Cold War and proposals for mutual 
disengagement and a nuclear free zone in Europe were aired. Kennan had earned a reputation 
as the expert on Soviet Russia with the long telegram and the X article in Foreign Affairs in 
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1947, thus, being the father of containment so to speak.
57
 Yet, Kennan’s suggestions 
regarding military disengagement in Europe were by no means breathtakingly new. Others 
before him had brought forward arguments in favour of a pull back of British and American 
troops from Germany implying a neutralization of Germany. More prominent advocates of 
this way forward were Walter Lippmann, eminent US columnist and Denis Healey, British 
foreign affairs expert and soon to be shadow foreign secretary of the Labour Party. Thomas 
Gijswijt even suggests that Kennan had been infused with at least some of his ideas during a 
Bilderberg meeting early in 1957. This had been the venue where Denis Healey, for the first 
time, presented his proposal on disengagement in Central Europe.
58
 
Kennan’s views, however, caused some uproar in the international circles of informed 
opinion. Christopher Emmet worried most that Kennan might have “bewitched ... British and 
German intellectuals and newspapers, like a new Pied Piper of Hamelin” since they fell 
victim to the “illusion ... that Kennan is some kind of unofficial spokesman and brain truster 
for the Democratic Party”, as he expressed in a letter to Vice President Richard Nixon.59 
Emmet’s assessment of the effects of Kennan’s contribution to the Reith lecture was right and 
wrong at the same time. The British newspaper The Times indeed covered widely Kennan’s 
on-air remarks and their repercussions in British policy circles. Yet, in the many articles 
referring to Kennan’s suggestions, he was never introduced as representative of the 
Democratic Party but correctly so as professor, visiting scholar and former US ambassador to 
Moscow. However, The Times also reported on Labour MPs positively responding to 
Kennan’s ideas. For example, left-wing politician Konni Zilliacus during parliamentary 
debate called NATO a “useless anachronism” and proposed to seek a settlement as 
                                                 
57 
On George F. Kennan and his Reith lectures, see Walter L. Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); David Allan Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of 
US Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
58 Thomas Gijswijt, “The Bilderberg Group and the End of the Cold War. The Disengagement Debates of the 
1950s”, in Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-1990, ed. Frederic Bozo (New York: 
Berghahn, 2012), 31. 
59 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Richard Nixon, Jan. 8, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. 
  195 
“advocated by the Opposition and responsible American opinion, such as Mr George F. 
Kennan and Mr Walter Lippmann”.60  
In Emmet’s eyes an article by Fritz Rene Allemann in Die Zeit had caused the spread of 
the false impression regarding Kennan being an unofficial spokesman of the Democratic 
Party. In this article entitled “Kennans Kettenreaktion” (Kennan’s chain reaction), Allemann 
had criticised the Adenauer government for brushing aside Kennan’s arguments by pointing 
out his status as private citizen. Furthermore, he had elevated Kennan’s status in American 
politics by claiming that Kennan was a “foreign policy adviser – some even suggest: a future 
secretary of state – of the Democratic presidential candidate and party leader Adlai 
Stevenson”. Allemann had gone on to stress that other politicians and opinion moulders in a 
good number of other countries had taken up the lead provided by Kennan.
61
 This was, as 
Emmet told Marion Dönhoff, “misinformation ... and was key to the false build-up of 
Kennan’s political influence for German readers”.62 Besides Die Zeit, Der Spiegel also 
reported quite sympathetically on Kennan and his disengagement proposals.
63
 Yet, what 
Emmet considered most disturbing about the coverage of the 1957 Reith Lectures was the 
potential or real impact this had on political decision-makers in West Germany. Although 
advocates of some kind of disengagement were mainly to be found in the ranks of British 
Labour and West Germany’s Social Democracy, Emmet was convinced that Allemann’s 
article had significantly “contributed to the mistake the Chancellor made yesterday in Paris” 
at the NATO summit where Adenauer had favoured the delay of “the setting of IRBM missile 
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basis”, which “was psychologically disastrous”. If Allemann “and DIE ZEIT took Kennan’s 
blueprint for surrender so seriously, naturally the Chancellor... felt he must yield.”64 
This was the background to Christopher Emmet’s decision, who was a staunch proponent 
of the “position of strength” himself, to design and concert a full-fledged public relations 
campaign aiming to counter Kennan’s ideas about disengagement in particular and isolationist 
and neutralist tendencies in general. Moreover, the campaign aimed at mitigating media 
impact of the Reith lectures in the United States as well as in Germany.  
The Washington Post opined “Peril of neutralism in the new phase of the Cold War ... 
cannot lightly be dismissed” prominently featuring George Kennan, who “in his Reith 
lectures in London, and Lester Pearson, in his Nobel Peace Prize address, advocated with 
profound conviction and intelligence the need to continue negotiations with the Soviet Union 
at every level short of the showy summit conference”.65 The Wall Street Journal showcased 
Kennan’s positions headlining “Kennan on Germany: The Proposal to Withdraw All Foreign 
Troops Is tempting”.66 The New York Times titled “Solution for Europe as Kennan Sees 
Them: Troop Withdrawals, Withholding Of Nuclear Weapons Proposed”.67 
Centre-piece of the ACG’s campaign was the successful launch of a statement by Dean 
Acheson, former Democratic US Secretary of State. Though retired from public duty, 
Acheson was still an influential figure chairing the party’s Advisory Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Acheson’s statement was a harsh attack on his former subordinate George F. Kennan 
reflecting a controversy within the Democratic Party over the principles of US defence 
policy.
68
 Acheson emphatically replied to Kennan, explaining that the proposal for the 
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“withdrawal of American, British and Russian troops from Europe” was not in accordance 
with the position of the Democratic Party in the United States.
69
 
Indeed, Kennan’s radio talks were widely discussed and also reprinted in British, 
American, and European media such as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung.
70
 The latter picked up on  he  imes’ coverage of the Reith Lectures with 
a short piece entitled “Kennan’s big success” (Kennans großer Erfolg), quoting the British 
newspaper opining that Kennan had been extremely successful in shaking up people and 
starting a debate.
71
 In January 1958, Kennan’s lectures were furthermore broadcasted on CBS 
and the North German Radio. At roughly the same time, Emmet introduced Dean Acheson to 
his detailed plans for his counter campaign, which on New Year’s Day had gotten even more 
urgent. German federal president Theodor Heuss “gave Kennan a flattering reference in his 
New Year’s message, which was wrongly interpreted by much of the German press as an 
endorsement of Kennan’s proposal”.72 And so Emmet’s campaign preparations gathered 
considerable speed over the course of one week in January. And on the day before January 12 
“all the domestic and foreign news agencies” and “the New York and Washington City 
Desks” were provided with Acheson’s statement. Newspapers in Europe, among them the 
London Sunday Times and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, received advance copies. Interestingly 
enough, Emmet deliberately circumvented the Atlantik-Brücke, Marion Dönhoff and Die Zeit. 
“[T]he Atlantik Bruecke is not to be relied on politically in Germany anymore”, Emmet told 
his confident, Klaus Dohrn. Emmet decided he would spare the Atlantik-Brücke 
embarrassment by excluding it from the ACG’s counter-campaign because the latter’s current 
chairman, Ernst Friedlaender was a supporter of George Kennan.
73
 Thus it can be argued that 
the ACG’s PR campaign accompanying the Acheson statement had several intended impacts; 
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one of them to exert influence on the Atlantik-Brücke and the elites it represented. Emmet 
believed that West German businessmen needed some guidance on political issues: “They’re 
torn between respect for the Chancellor and realization of the necessity for German-American 
unity on the one hand, and the influence of the German press and intellectuals on the other.”74  
And thus, towards the end of the 1950s, a simmering internal conflict came to a head in 
which quite plainly neutralist views held by Friedlaender and Stahl, whom Emmet considered 
intellectuals, clashed with Emmet’s, which were in accordance with official US foreign 
policy.
75
 Yet, to ensure the desired impact on the political scene in Bonn, Emmet informed the 
West German ambassador to the United States, Heinz Krekeler, in great detail about the 
planned campaign not without urgently suggesting that the ambassador put the Chancellor and 
the foreign minister into the picture prior to release of the statement. The latter was clearly 
motivated by Emmet’s hope that both would make timely comments on the issue.76 
The release of Acheson’s statement on Sunday, January 12, was then accompanied by a 
speech the former Secretary of State gave at a luncheon organised by the Herald Tribune, 
chief rival to the New York Times. One week later, the campaign was topped off with the 
release of a joint statement entitled “Should Germany be neutralized? – A Reply to Kennan”, 
drafted by Christopher Emmet and signed by 16 “leading experts on Germany” headed by 
James B. Conant, former High Commissioner and first US ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Among the other under signers were the imminent Carl J. Friedrich, 
George N. Shuster and Hans Wallenberg.
77
 By wholeheartedly supporting Acheson’s position 
and agreeing to the arguments put forward therein, this joint statement constituted an 
                                                 
74 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Jan. 19, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. 
75 
See, for example, letters from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Jan. 17, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, 
Box 81, HIA; from Eric Warburg to Christopher Emmet, Feb. 8, 1958, SWA. For Stahl’s perspective see his 
letter to Christopher Emmet, Jan. 14, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. 
76 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Heinz L. Krekeler, Jan. 8, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 84, HIA. 
77 
Originally Eric Warburg had also intended to sign the statement. Yet, in the end business partners forced him 
to abstain from being linked to the effort. 
  199 
additional counter attack on George Kennan’s views.78 Indeed, in terms of press coverage, 
this campaign was an outright success considering all the big names on the global news 
market that either carried or at least reported on the Acheson statement or the ACG’s joint 
statement or both – Time, The Times, La Stampa, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, New York Times.79 
Yet, Emmet was particularly delighted about the fact that this comprehensive effort had had a 
real impact on the Chancellor. For, he considered a speech by Adenauer broadcasted on West 
German home service “a triumph... for us”.80 After Konrad Adenauer had displayed a certain 
openness to negotiations with the Soviets at the NATO Paris summit in December of the 
previous year, the Chancellor now publicly denounced any approaches by the Soviets as 
propaganda and clearly rejected any proposals for a neutral Germany. Adenauer’s attitude in 
December of 1957 Emmet had notoriously accounted to the negative influence of Kennan’s 
views on German press and intellectuals as explained above.
81
  
In the end, Emmet was tremendously pleased with his “one man operation” even though he 
had “to conceal it as much as possible in order to give the impression of a collective effort 
since that carries more weight politically...”. Yet, “a good many important people here knew I 
had a great deal to do with this”.82 He had achieved all this using the ACG as a means towards 
the ends he had envisioned all along for this private group despite the ACG’s tax-deductible 
status. At least in theory this status foreclosed any such political activism as it was granted to 
organisations with purely educational purposes.  
It is interesting to note that those proposing disengagement within transatlantic foreign 
affairs elite circle never overcame their minority status. Yet, their ideas and the potential 
power of them were taken very seriously. In this Christopher Emmet was not an exception. In 
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the spring of 1958, the organizers of the Bilderberg meetings arranged a steering committee 
meeting to which they invited for the first time NATO General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak 
and New York Times columnist Cyrus Sulzberger. Inviting the former was a sign of support 
for NATO. Inviting the latter was an indication that transatlantic foreign affairs elites wished 
to influence public debate on the issue.
83
 
Times of change: the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke facing challenges to the close 
transatlantic relationship, 1960–1967 
If the 1950s were considered the “golden age” of post-war West-German-American relations, 
then the 1960s definitely presented a much rougher period in the two countries’ relations. 
Vociferous protest movements in both countries added to the challenges that politicians faced 
during that decade. In the United States a shift of generations in the highest political office, 
from Dwight D. Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy (January 1961), took place almost three 
years earlier than in the Federal Republic of Germany, from Konrad Adenauer to Ludwig 
Erhard (October 1963). The youthful President Kennedy and Konrad Adenauer did not only 
differ considerably in terms of age but also in their outlook on the world and in political style. 
Yet, the conflicts in the international arena in general, and in West-German-American 
relations in particular, can by no means be ascribed to deteriorated relations on the personal 
level of the highest diplomats of the US and West Germany alone. West Germany’s position 
in terms of economic performance had strengthened substantially through the 1950s and 
1960s. This is illustrated, for example, by a comparison of per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the United States and the Federal Republic. From 1949 to 1968 West Germany’s 
GDP rose from $3,600 to $10,800 whereas that of the US only rose from $9,000 to $14,700. 
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The balance of trade between the US and West Germany reached parity in the late 1960s.
84
 
Thus West Germany’s economic strength translated increasingly into the country claiming a 
greater say and greater room for manoeuvre in international affairs. Furthermore, the 
advancing economic integration of Western Europe as well as security issues in the Cold War 
context led to a clash of interests within the Western Alliance. All this coupled with the 
aforementioned West German demand for a greater say that partly found expression in the 
signing of the French-German Treaty in 1963.
85
  
The signing of the Elysee Treaty or French German friendship treaty in January of 1963 by 
Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer was a great historical achievement, albeit with 
ambiguous impact. This achievement was twofold. Firstly, it helped to overcome the old 
French-German divide  within the past 70 years Germany had invaded France three times. 
Secondly, it was conducive to advancing the integration of West Europe. Yet, simultaneously 
it represented a grand challenge to America’s hegemonic position in Western Europe as well 
as to the relationship between the United States with West Germany and France alike. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that officers of both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke felt 
called to intervene on behalf of strong West-German-American relations.  
 During the 1960s, there was no lack of controversial issues and a number of conflicts 
came to a dangerous head – Diane Kunz dubbed this decade “the crucial decade” with regard 
to US foreign policy and diplomacy – and the range of ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke 
activities was considerably less broad than in the previous decade.
86
 In particular, the ACG’s 
energies and resources were bound to a great extent in organising the German-American 
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conferences, first launched in 1959.
87
 This is not to say, however, that the two sister 
organisations indulged in idleness when not preparing for the next conference. In the 1960s as 
well, the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke acted as promoters of close West-German American 
relations; on the one hand, they sought to refocus US attention on the European economic 
powerhouse and Cold War front state FRG  isolationist voices calling for at least a reduction 
of US troops in Europe had not been muted.
88
 On the other hand, the two organisations sought 
to forestall the closing of ranks between France and West Germany or at least mitigating the 
effects of such a move as will be illustrated in the next section.  
The French-German friendship treaty of 1963 
During the 1960s, US and West German diplomats alike faced a number of challenges. On 
August 13, 1961 the Soviets and the East German government unilaterally ended the Berlin 
Crisis by erecting the Berlin Wall. Thus they established a status quo on the City of Berlin. 
One year later in October 1962, the world watched anxiously the Cuban missile crisis that 
was, after all, concluded without the two superpowers starting an all-out nuclear war.
89
 The 
year 1963 began with a bombshell dropped by Charles de Gaulle. At a press conference on 
January 14, the French president announced “the Common Market blow up”, the French veto 
to the British entry to the Common Market  just a week prior to Konrad Adenauer and de 
Gaulle signing the Elysee Treaty.
90
  
Atlanticists on both sides of the ocean, in the US as well as in France and West Germany, 
were thus concerned watching de Gaulle and Adenauer growing ever closer  a development 
that came to a climatic conclusion on January 22 when the German Chancellor and the French 
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president solemnly signed the French-German treaty of friendship. Proponents of a strong 
Atlantic Alliance under the leadership of the United States perceived the Elysee Treaty as a 
threat in two respects; firstly, in regard to the timing of the signing and secondly, with regard 
to its content. With the proximity in time of the French veto to the British Common Market 
entry and the closing of ranks with the West Germans de Gaulle demonstrated impressively 
that he was not accepting the American lead anymore. Instead, he sought to take over the 
reins. The French-German treaty, in addition, provided for close cooperation and frequent 
consultation between the Federal Republic and France in political, economic and most 
importantly security matters. To Washington decision makers this was a precursor to a critical 
modification to political configurations in Western Europe. Far-fetching ramifications of this 
new strong French-German partnership were discussed with regard to West Germany’s 
relation to the Soviet Union that could lead to a neutralization of the former. Not least, US 
decision-makers and West German Atlanticists worried that NATO could seriously be 
damaged or even crumble.
91
  
Scholars writing about the Elysee treaty point to its preamble which softened the anti-
American thrust of the treaty.
92
 Yet, the origin of the preamble has so far rarely been subject 
to inquiry. Authors refer to “pro-American figures in Adenauer’s administration” or “more 
Atlanticist-oriented German leaders” when explaining who was responsible for inserting a 
clause making clear that West Germany would not withdraw from any multilateral 
commitments.
93
 Matthias Schulz in turn has ascribed responsibility to Kurt Birrenbach’s 
friendship with Jean Monnet and his membership in the Monnet Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe (ACUSE) portraying the former as decisive force among German 
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Atlanticists. Thus Schulz has acknowledged a crucial role played by transnational, state-
private channels in international relations.
94
 However, Schulz neglects the transatlantic, 
German-American dimension in this story, namely Birrenbach’s close friendship with 
Christopher Emmet and the former’s membership in the Atlantik-Brücke. Only when 
considering those facts as well it is possible to present to full extent the influence of private 
forces linked with state structures. What unfolded within the months following the French 
veto and the signing of the French-German alliance was a concerted action of American, 
French and German individuals and organisations transcending not only national borders but 
also the divide between public and private. 
At the end of January 1963, Emmet and Birrenbach almost concurrently became active in 
the attempt to calm tensions. In a letter to McCloy, Emmet provided the former with his 
viewpoint on the situation hoping it would be helpful “in anything you do or say in 
Washington or elsewhere”. The “important thing now” according to Emmet was “to gain time 
and restore perspective”. Furthermore, he advised that it was not enough on the part of the 
German chancellor to “reassure him [Kennedy] privately” in a “confidential letter to the 
President”. Rather, Emmet suggested, Adenauer make a public statement “in a way which 
shows his complete disagreement with de Gaulle on NATO and U.S. links to Europe”. This, 
Emmet also impressed on Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg  member of the Atlantik-Brücke as 
well as a parliamentary group colleague of the Chancellor  to intervene with Adenauer 
respectively.
95
  
Yet, ever attentive to the mood swings of the public, the media’s responsibility for the 
former and the effect on the Cold War power structure, Emmet worried most about the press 
playing “up controversies between the allies”.96 Partly following Emmet’s request for more 
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reassuring action on the part of the Germans, Kurt Birrenbach wrote to Dean Acheson and 
John McCloy explaining the West German dilemma: “...we cannot afford to choose between 
your country and France. We are practically condemned to be on the best possible terms with 
both countries.”97  
In the course of February, pro-Atlantic forces in France, West Germany and the United 
States put their heads together to develop a plan for real action propping up the Atlantic 
Alliance and strengthening the German-American partnership. Monnet and Birrenbach had 
several telephone conversations and a face-to-face meeting in Bonn. Their talks ended with a 
twofold conclusion. Firstly, fears and reservations on the part of the Americans and British 
would have to be allayed. Secondly, the Federal Republic needed to be pinned down on its 
hitherto followed transatlantically oriented foreign policy line.
98
 In the meantime the Atlantik-
Brücke in consultation with the ACG had also come up with a publicity effective plan to 
reassure the US public as well as US political elites of their loyalty to the transatlantic 
alliance.
99
  
While Birrenbach and Monnet jointly worked on a parliamentary declaration to be made 
on the occasion of the ratification of the Elysee Treaty in the West German Bundestag, the 
Atlantik-Brücke drafted a statement for publication in US media signed by West German 
“public figures”. The Atlantik-Brücke could progress much faster with its plan particularly 
because for its implementation no parliamentary hurdles needed to be overcome. This is not 
to imply that West German public authorities were not privy to the two private elite 
organisations’ scheme for a public declaration. In a letter to Kurt Birrenbach, Christopher 
Emmet reflected on the issue. He informed Birrenbach about his conversation with staff of the 
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German Information Center (GIC) in New York regarding the question whose signatures were 
desirable: “... Joe Thomas and Manfred Bauer had received the same inquiry from the Foreign 
Office also asking them to get in touch with me about it.”100 In the end, all the public figures 
mentioned in Emmet’s meeting with Thomas and Bauer actually signed the Atlantik-Brücke’s 
statement “affirming solidarity with America and Britain”.101 Theodor Heuss, the former 
Federal President of West Germany, signed as intellectual leader. Furthermore, they discussed 
political figures who should preferably sign: Heinrich von Brentano, Erich Mende and Mayor 
Willy Brandt. These three were considered the best because they “would give the balance 
between the three parties” and Heuss’ signature “would strengthen it.”102  
Although Emmet welcomed and supported Atlantik-Brücke efforts in this regard, he did 
not consider it as “terribly important” as he confided to Birrenbach. Emmet regarded proof of 
loyalty in deeds as much more important.
103
 What was needed on the part of the West 
Germans was to “show that the Franco-German alliance is a two-way street by which they 
influence de Gaulle as well as vice versa, and if they can demonstrate that the temporary 
rejection of Britain involves no danger of a trade war, confidence will be restored and the 
worst part of the crisis resolved”.104 
Yet despite Emmet’s reservations, the ACG’s honorary president General Lucius D. Clay 
presented the declaration of its West German sister organisation signed by 18 public figures to 
the American press on March 19. On the same day, the Washington Post carried an 
accompanying letter to the editor by Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, chairman of the 
Atlantik-Brücke, entitled “Germany and the Alliance”.105 The Christian Science Monitor 
carried it as well and Associated Press (AP) distributed it across the country. Furthermore, 
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Emmet sent the statement to some British correspondents, distributed it via the ACG’s 
mailing list to senators and congressmen. Even Eric Warburg was involved trying to get the 
statement placed in the New York Times.
106
  
In addition to the aforementioned politicians, the president of the Federation of German 
Industry (Fritz Berg), senior figures of the German Federation of Labour, businessmen (Peter 
von Siemens, Siemens-Schuckert Works AG and Egon Overbeck of Mannesmann AG) and 
bankers (Herman Joseph Abs of Deutsche Bank AG and Alwin Muenchmeyer) as well as 
scholars and intellectuals (Arnold Bergstraesser and Freiherr F.C. von Weizsäcker) signed the 
declaration. Seven of the 18 leading public figures were members of the Atlantik-Brücke. 
Three out of the seven signatories belonged to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the 
Bundestag, including Kurt Birrenbach who was the liaison of this transatlantic effort to 
reassure the Americans. In their public statement, these West German public figures praised 
the “France-German pact” for burying “forever the feud which brought so much tragedy to 
our two countries for so many hundreds of years.” They also recognized that the coincidence 
of the signing of the pact with the “French refusal to admit Britain to the Common Market 
now has aroused misgivings.” Thus they pledged in the last paragraph of the statement that 
“the alliance with America has ... become an axiom in the post-war political philosophy of 
Germany”. Furthermore, they claimed to speak for all German politicians adding “Nobody, 
and certainly no responsible German politician would dare to weaken this cornerstone of our 
safety.”107 
In May 1963, the Bundestag approved the Franco-German treaty along with a preamble. 
Five sessions of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German parliament and additional ones 
in the Defence Committee had been necessary to organise the necessary votes.
108
 Yet, the 
overall intention of the preamble had the same thrust as the Atlantik-Brücke’s public 
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statement: mitigating the exclusivity of the Franco-German pact and taking away the anti-
American edge.
109
  
This public relations campaign coupled with transnational efforts spearheaded by Atlantik-
Brücke board member Birrenbach to add a preamble to the treaty remained the last of its kind 
at least until the mid-seventies. Albeit, there was no shortage of issues the ACG and the 
Atlantik-Brücke were concerned with during that time. The Mansfield Resolution brought up 
over and over again in the Senate, for example, did trigger some action on the part of the 
ACG yet by far not with such public impact. The Mansfield Resolution was introduced by 
Senator of the Democratic Party Mike Mansfield in December 1969. It called for a substantial 
reduction of US troops in Europe on the grounds that European partners in the Atlantic 
Alliance had continuously failed to contribute adequately to the burden-sharing of stationing 
US troops in Western Europe, first and foremost in Western Germany.
110
 Emmet, the ever 
prolific writer, drafted a memorandum warning of the dangerous implications of the 
“neoisolationist” call for troop reduction in Europe that the Mansfield Resolution demanded. 
Senator Mansfield’s suggestion for cuts in military spending particularly with an eye on 
Western Europe had been up for vote in the Senate every year in the late 1960s. Each time 
more senators voted for “substantial reductions of American forces in Europe.”111 Yet, 
ultimately the Mansfield Resolution never found the necessary majority and thus was never 
adopted. 
In West Germany, the downfall of Christian Democratic Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, in 
November 1966 set in motion major shifts on the political scene. The cards were being 
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reshuffled. The reshuffling ended with the forming of the first Grand Coalition of Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats under a new Christian Democratic Chancellor, Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger. Yet the choice of Kiesinger was met with some considerable headwinds. This was 
reason enough for Germanophile Christopher Emmet to take sides with Kiesinger, a known 
fellow traveller of the Nazis.
112
 In a memorandum he summarised why this was a critical 
moment in post-war West Germany and why it was Kiesinger who deserved support.
113
 
Détente and the end of the era of the Cold Warrior Christopher Emmet, 1968–1974 
Towards the end of “the crucial decade” West Germany and the United States had both 
undergone profound changes. Not only had the era of Germany’s first post-war chancellor, 
Konrad Adenauer, come to an end in 1963. West German Social Democracy had entered 
government in 1966 when the first Grand Coalition was formed with Kurt Kiesinger as third 
chancellor of the Federal Republic. The Spiegel affair in 1963 had shaken the young 
democracy by putting to the test freedom of the press protected by the Basic Law. At the same 
time it had accelerated the downfall of Adenauer.  
The United States had mourned the death of the hopeful young president John F. Kennedy 
who had been killed by bullets shot by a sniper in November 1963. Furthermore the country 
was shaken by ongoing race riots and a growing protest movement carried by students, civil 
rights and anti-war activists.
114
 With regard to US foreign policy, a shift away from Europe 
toward Southeast Asia and Vietnam, in particular, became apparent. This shift was manifested 
through the escalation of war under Lyndon B. Johnson’s leadership and with the approval of 
Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964.
115
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The growing US commitment to the war in Vietnam and concurrently maintaining a 
relatively high level of troops in Western Europe not only strained the US budget but was also 
cause for severe disagreements between the American administration and the West German 
government.
116
 From the West German perspective, the US modification of priorities in terms 
of its foreign policy nurtured West German fears to face unprotected or at least insufficiently 
protected an attack from the Warsaw Pact. The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the 
United States and the Soviet Union was another case in point. Both the United States and the 
Federal Republic, from the late 1960s on, sought ways of coming to terms with the Soviet 
Union and the so called Eastern bloc countries. Concurrently West Germans and Americans 
alike watched each move of the other quite suspiciously.
117
 In Frank Ninkovich’s words, to 
restore “German-American harmony” and to “further progress on the German question ... 
double containment” needed to be “replaced by a system of double détente”.118  
Christopher Emmet for his part, however, remained to the very end a staunch opponent of 
any rapprochement seemingly unable to keep up with the changing zeitgeist. This inflexibility 
proved to be a challenge to the very existence of the ACG endangering its achievements of 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus it is argued that the first decisive phase of the Atlantik-
Brücke and the ACG drew to a close between the late sixties and the mid-seventies. This 
period was marked by internal struggles  struggles for control, a search for future directions 
and a fight against the threat of becoming superfluous and irrelevant in the international 
diplomatic arena and particularly in the field of German-American relations. The challenge 
was to adjust to new political realities and an overall change in the superpower relations: 
détente and Ostpolitik.  
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The Non-Proliferation Treaty  
Energies and personnel were to a large extent bound by the big events, most importantly the 
biannual German-American conferences. The relative inactivity of both the ACG and the 
Atlantik-Brücke in the latter part of the sixties and early seventies at least in terms of public 
diplomacy campaigns reflected this. However, the ACG did continue hosting West German 
public figures such as Ludwig Erhard in the spring of 1968.
119
 Nor was this to say that the 
Atlantik-Brücke neglected its routine work such as circulating its Newsletter or having a 
watchful eye on the media coverage regarding the Federal Republic’s image in the world and 
in the US in particular.
120
 
Thus, Emmet seized the occasion of Congressional hearings on the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) to by-pass the ACG’s purely educational purpose as a non-profit organisation 
and contacted senators and congressmen to inform them about “some of the German 
misgivings about the Treaty”.121 Indeed Emmet had intimate knowledge about the German’s 
position regarding the NPT because his friend Kurt Birrenbach had provided him with a very 
detailed statement on the issue in February of 1968.
122
 Moreover, later in the year Christopher 
Emmet even prepared a testimony and presented it to the Democratic Platform Committee in 
Chicago. In his statement, Emmet asked the Democrats to be more accommodating towards 
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West Germans’ needs and requests pointing to “German feelings of isolation and insecurity” 
which “have also influenced their attitude toward the non-proliferation treaty”.123  
Negotiators representing the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the draft 
text of the treaty in 1967. For the two superpowers the treaty was a great leap forward in 
achieving some stability in reducing the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons. 
The NPT was thus a first step on the long way to a broader détente between the US and the 
USSR.
124
 Yet, the West Germans for their part had a number of misgivings particularly with 
regard to procedural issues. In the course of a few months, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, had mainly through secret negotiations, come to an agreement that would basically 
divide the globe in two camps, the nuclear haves and the have-nots, with the NPT seeing to it 
that the camps remained stable in the foreseeable future. The Federal Republic was a member 
of the nuclear have-nots camp, a fact that nobody seriously challenged. Yet, West German 
apprehensions and suspicions were nurtured by two things. Firstly, the Americans had only in 
part and quite belatedly informed its partner about the negotiations and the treaty’s 
implications for the West Germans. Nevertheless, the US expected the Federal Republic to 
sign it. Secondly, the West German government and large parts of the political elite feared 
that in the end the United States would prioritize her common interest with the other 
superpower over the needs of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence representatives of the West 
German government did not shy away from uttering their scruples frequently and 
emphatically in Washington and elsewhere. The most blatant statement came from former 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who spoke of a “remake of the Morgenthau plan”.125 In view of 
the extent to which the NPT burdened and strained German-American relations towards the 
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end of the sixties it is telling that neither ACG nor Atlantik-Brücke were able to pull off a 
comprehensive campaign comparable to the one in 1959 countering Kennan’s Reith Lectures. 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the  irst Young Leaders’ Con erence 
In addition to Christopher Emmet’s advanced age and noticeably failing health, the new 
political configurations in the Federal Republic of Germany might have contributed to this 
failure on the part of Atlantik-Brücke and ACG in acting jointly. Since December 1966 the 
Grand Coalition consisting of Christian and Social Democrats had been in power in West 
Germany. With a vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister actively promoting rapprochement 
between West Germany and the Eastern bloc countries, frontlines in the Cold War were 
anything but clear. Although the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke significantly contributed to 
the German Social Democracy’s development as a politically acceptable force on the 
international stage as well as to Social Democracy’s acceptance of Germany’s western 
integration in the late 1950s and 1960s, Christopher Emmet for his part was vehemently 
opposed to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.  
In February 1970, meanwhile Willy Brandt had ascended from vice-chancellor to first 
Social Democratic chancellor leading a social-liberal coalition, Emmet warned of the negative 
impact on NATO “through over-emphasis on the Ost-Politik”. Moreover, he feared the 
successful wooing of German industrialists by the Soviets with lucrative deals. Such a move, 
he dreaded, would persuade “enough German industrialists to a) switch their support from the 
CDU to the FDP; or b) to pressure the CDU politicians not to make a basic and sustained 
opposition to the Ost-Politik or risk losing some of their financial support”. To Emmet’s mind 
it was not only likely that Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr were aware of the Soviets’ tactics but 
also hoped to gain from it politically. To effectively counter these developments, Emmet 
tentatively suggested to Walther Leisler Kiep, Christian Democratic member of the 
Bundestag, to organise a conference “between a few leading CDU politicians and a few 
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leading German industrialists to alert them to the potential dangers in this new Soviet 
tactic”.126 With this opposition Emmet was by no means isolated. To the contrary, according 
to Gottfried Niedhart, particularly the American right wing including wise men Dean 
Acheson, John J. McCloy, and Lucius D. Clay as well as the AFL-CIO vehemently defied 
West German style of détente. Furthermore, Niedhart points to the West German Christian 
Democratic opposition parties using their long-established contacts into the American capital 
to agitate against Ostpolitik. Unofficial contacts to private organisations and politically active 
individuals like Christopher Emmet are, however, neglected by Niedhart.
127
 
 Emmet’s proposition concerning a conference of CDU politicians and business 
representatives was only one facet of a larger strategy to counter the German social 
democratic style détente. His overall aim was to strengthen the CDU’s position, now in 
opposition. In the attempt of doing so, Emmet used all kinds of channels into the Christian 
Democratic Party. Corresponding with Leisler Kiep was definitely part of the endeavour of 
manifesting new channels. Kiep had entered the Bundestag only in the mid-1960s and was 
soon to become member of the Atlantik-Brücke. At the time of Emmet’s and Kiep’s ensuing 
correspondence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kiep was still to ascend to federal treasurer 
of the CDU (1971) and chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke (1984). What Emmet did not know, 
when he took Kiep into confidence with regard to Ostpolitik, was that Kiep would vote in 
favour of the Eastern treaties in the Bundestag in 1972. Emmet even extended his well-
intentioned advice to veteran politician and civil servant, Hans Globke, former state secretary 
in the Federal Chancellery, who had retired after Adenauer’s resignation in 1963.128 This, 
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however, did not discourage Emmet from impressing on him the need of establishing “a 
research and ghost-writing organisation... for party propaganda” which was “more necessary 
now than two years ago because the CDU is in opposition and because of the Ost-Politik.”129 
However, Emmet’s opposition to Ostpolitik was not merely motivated by mistrust vis-a-vis 
the United States’ toward Federal Republic. Rather Emmet’s stance toward the German 
version of détente derived from his understanding of tough power politics as they were 
custom at the height of Cold War tensions in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Faithful to this 
understanding and his conviction that the Soviet Union was as evil as the National Socialist 
Germany, Emmet opposed any relaxation of restrictions regarding trade with the Soviet 
Union on the part of the United States as vehemently as Brandt’s policy towards the East.130  
For years, Emmet had campaigned against all kinds of deals with the Soviet Union by the 
West Germans as well as the British. Yet, in the early 1970s, when the US foreign policy 
establishment and the Nixon administration became increasingly receptive to the advantages 
of trading with the USSR, Emmet was more or less fighting lost battles.
131
 He had asked John 
McCloy to see him to discuss with him the dangers of East-West trade. During their talk in 
February 1970, McCloy at the time served as chief negotiator on disarmament, Emmet 
learned that McCloy accredited some weight to arguments circulating in the foreign policy 
establishment. Dean Rusk, for example, his fellow committee member on the President’s 
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, did not know “what’s 
wrong with increased East-West trade and with the U.S. getting in on it... it would help the 
U.S. dollar deficit.” Furthermore the Europeans “were trading increasingly with the East, so 
why shouldn’t American firms do it too?” This might be a “good way to relax tensions....” 
Rusk’s arguments were basically in line with what McCloy had reported about Khrushchev’s 
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point of view. Towards the end of his report of his talk with McCloy, Emmet sounded much 
gloomier. His fighting spirit seemingly wearing down, Emmet closed his report by saying 
“unlikely they [the administration] will do anything to stop the bad drift which already taking 
place in Europe.... The only thing we can do is to fight hard to hold the line Germany.... and 
hope for something to turn up which will heat up American feelings against Khrushchev.”132 
Yet despite Emmet’s heartfelt opposition to rapprochement with the Communist world and 
his drumming up of support for the opposition party in West Germany and encouraging CDU 
politicians to use his arguments in criticising Ostpolitik, Emmet’s main allegiance was to 
German-American relations within a strong Atlantic Alliance. Therefore it was important to 
him not to be officially connected to criticism of the Brandt government fearing negative 
impact on the ACG, whose main task was to foster trustful relations between the US and West 
Germany. This, he proved when proudly telling Hans Karl von Borries, one of his oldest 
acquaintances in West Germany, of his invitation to an off-the record dinner for Helmut 
Schmidt, Federal Minister of Defence at the time, in New York. He also had the “rare honor... 
to attend a State dinner at the White House for Chancellor Brandt”.133 Emmet further proved 
his prioritising for good German-American relations over forging die-hard Cold Warrior 
alliances. In February 1972, Atlantik-Brücke members had elected a new president, Casimir 
Prince Wittgenstein. A few months later, Wittgenstein travelled to the US to officially be 
introduced to the foreign policy establishment. In a meeting with Emmet they discussed the 
Eastern treaties. During their conversation, Wittgenstein “clearly implied that he thought 
Brandt was probably a Soviet agent”. Christopher Emmet, however, “felt I had to differ with 
him, because such views would have shocked McCloy and Clay, not to speak of the Atlantik-
Brücke.” Though Wittgenstein did not “repeat the extreme attitudes and expressions” during a 
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dinner for him given by Lucius D. Clay, honorary president of the ACG. Yet, “he did say that 
there would soon be a revelation of sensational secret agreements between Gromyko and 
Bahr...”.134 
Interestingly enough, Emmet’s attitude towards Brandt’s Ostpolitik larely paralleled the 
Nixon administration’s stance in this respect. Like Nixon and Kissinger, who despite 
unofficially favouring a Christian Democratic led government in the Federal Republic and 
despite being tremendously suspicious of Brandt’s rapprochement to the East, officially 
fostered a good working relationship with the social-liberal coalition in West Germany.
135
 
And thus, Emmet continued his political agitation work in raising awareness of the dangers of 
Ostpolitik by, for example, drafting memoranda and reports on current political issues and 
further disseminating his arguments in his correspondence.
136
 
In the meantime, Atlantik-Brücke members and officers reflected on the organisation’s 
original mission. Fostering mutual understanding between the US and West Germany was 
still the group’s main task. Thus, in the early 1970s during an annual membership meeting 
they concluded to do something to counter the anti-American sentiments; spreading in public 
and publicised opinion. Hence, Walter Stahl informed Kurt Birrenbach in his position as 
member of the board about the members concerns. They feared that Americans could get the 
wrong impression that a majority of the Germans would harbour anti-American opinions. 
Walter Stahl set forth to Birrenbach that, “according to experts the most effective way of 
countering incorrectly presented facts and biased commentaries was to present real facts 
alongside a sufficient explanation thereof.”137 The basic idea was to oppose articles in 
newspapers and TV programmes that according to transatlantically minded people 
                                                 
134 
Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Aug. 25, 1972, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. For the Atlantik-
Brücke’s official position on the subject of Ostpolitik see the Atlantik-Brücke’s Newsletter of Feb. 1972, 
Marion Dönhoff Papers (F 1413). 
135 Schaefer, “The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik, 1969-1973”, 47. 
136 
For example, letter to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 15, 1972. For the Atlantik-Brücke’s official position on the 
subject of Ostpolitik, see the Atlantik-Brücke’s Newsletter of Feb. 1972, Marion Dönhoff Papers (F 1413). 
137 
Letter from Walter Stahl to Kurt Birrenbach, Aug. 13, 1970, Birrenbach Papers, I-433-112/1, ACDP. 
  218 
represented in the Atlantik-Brücke did not present “reality” by publishing a reply. The 
intention was to mitigate the impact of “articles that in an objectionable manner generalise 
and present facts spitefully and unobjective.” Furthermore all members were asked to use 
their contacts in the newsrooms of media outlets across Germany to exert influence when 
deemed necessary.
138
 
However, in the early 1970s, officers of the two private organisations grew increasingly 
concerned over the durability of their transatlantic networks. They wondered, for how much 
longer they could reach into media, politics, academia and business on the other side of the 
Atlantic as they faced a continuing shift of generations 30 years into the post-war era. 
Contacts into these areas were considered crucial to foster and direct German-American 
relations. This question did not only matter to Emmet, Warburg, and Birrenbach. Rather, it 
was a common concern among Western elites.
139
 In the endeavour of rejuvenating their 
transatlantic elite network, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke with financial support by the 
Ford Foundation organised the first German-American Young Leaders’s Conference in 1973. 
This was the first substantial change to the two groups’ programmes and a first step into a 
new era. On February 11 1974, this era came to a close when Christopher Emmet after 
prolonged illness died. 
Conclusion  
This chapter on the activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and its American counterpart 
organisation ACG set out to clarify how the two groups’ specific membership composition 
translated into their actions in the realm of German-American relations in the period from the 
early 1950s to the mid-1970s. With regard to the West German organisation’s main 
constituency, the business and industry community, it can be stated that particular interests 
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only once came explicitly to the fore  namely when Walter Stahl investigated the issue of 
confiscated property in the United States and tried to sound out a mutually agreeable solution 
to the issue. Beyond this, their interests were best served when a relationship with the US was 
maintained that based on partnership and ensured the Federal Republic’s security and thus to 
do business unhampered. Hence, the ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s most important function 
in German-American relations was that of mediators and cushion in times of 
misunderstanding and doubts. This role was best exemplified in the transatlantically concerted 
campaign to mitigate the negative impact on German-American relations caused by the 
signing of the Franco-German pact in 1963.  
The defining feature of the ACG’s membership in this period was the strong representation 
of academics and intellectuals spearheaded by the organisation’s executive vice-president 
Christopher Emmet. This characteristic translated into activities in that Emmet could not be 
surpassed in voicing his thoughts on Cold War international relations and continuingly 
refining his arguments in his correspondence with innumerable friends and partners in the US 
and West Germany and beyond. He clearly had the aspiration of being the brain of this 
transatlantic elite network always striving to persuade the others of his point of view. 
Moreover Emmet’s and other ACG members’ long-standing ties to Germany contributed to a 
generally pro-German stance and belief in West Germany’s extraordinary importance within 
the Western alliance. Those convictions in turn translated into the ACG’s often played role of 
a mediator. 
Furthermore the chapter looked at how the two elite groups’ efforts related to official 
dimension of German-American relations. It became quite clear that the ACG’s and the 
Atlantik-Brücke’s efforts were none of some backbencher organisation. On the contrary, 
where and whenever they became active they were involved in dealings at the highest 
echelons of power and concerned with issues of utmost importance to the Atlantic Alliance 
and German-American relations; like persuading the SPD leadership of the necessity of 
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anchoring the Federal Republic in the West by agreeing to enter NATO and shaping Konrad 
Adenauer’s trips to the US in the 1950s. 
The most important finding of this chapter, however, is that the ACG’s and the Atlantik-
Brücke’ activities went far beyond public diplomacy. In the course of the chapter, it has been 
demonstrated that the groups’ officers engaged in transatlantic political consulting, lobbying, 
public relations and political activism, clearly intending to influence not only public opinion 
but political decision-makers as well. Having demonstrated the broad spectrum of activities in 
the course of these 20-odd years, it becomes clear that this does not match the image of purely 
private organisations independent and distanced from state structures. On the contrary, both 
groups made extensive use of their networks, particularly of their contacts into political 
decision-making and diplomatic circles at least trying to implement their ideas and arguments.  
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Chapter 5: 
Promoting transatlantic identity formation: 
The German-American Conferences, 1959-1974 – a public-private project 
The Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG sought to have a say in West German-American relations, 
as has been demonstrated in previous chapters. The chosen means to accomplish this were 
selected from the public diplomacy tool box, for instance the publication of books and 
engagement in public relations work. Yet, ACG and Atlantik-Brücke officers and directors 
focused much of their resources on arranging personal meetings and talks between 
representatives of both countries’ business, political, academic, and media elites as well as 
engaging in informal diplomacy.
1
 In the late 1950s the officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
ACG sought ways to institutionalize personal encounters between key Americans and their 
West German counterparts. The conference format was a consequent and logic continuation 
of their previous efforts.  
“Suspicion of Germany is the Achilles Heel of the NATO alliance; and as long as the 
Soviets keep their ambition to dominate the world, they will never rest in their efforts to 
poison the relations between Germany and her allies.”2 This is how Christopher Emmet 
perceived the state of international affairs at the beginning of the 1960s. At the same time the 
quote entails a hint at the motivation and thinking of the initiators of the German-American 
conferences. These became the key activity visibly catapulting both, the ACG and Atlantik-
Brücke on the stage of international informal diplomacy. From 1959 to 1974, eight German-
American conferences took place alternating between venues in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States. Over the stretch of 25 years, 384 West Germans and 
Americans attended, representing the foreign policy elite of both countries, consisting of 
politicians, academics, journalists, and influential business people. Thus, a genuinely 
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transatlantic state-private network took shape. The public-private cooperation was reflected in 
the different sources of funding for those informal elite meetings. The most important external 
grant-givers were the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ford 
Foundation. Their funds were supplemented by the Atlantik-Brücke’s budget.3 The public-
private network concept conceives of the numerous “interconnections and consensus-building 
activities” between representatives of the modern state and civil society as blurring the border 
between the state and civil society. Actors of both  the public and the private sector  
interact in a cooperative and “state-spirited” mode in the best interest of the nation.4 The 
network term emphasises the fact that those connections are neither limited in quantitative 
terms nor are they confined to national boundaries. On the contrary, networks are highly 
volatile structures that easily transcend national borders and allow for multidirectional 
transfer and exchange of ideas and values as is demonstrated in this chapter.
5
 
Forerunners and role models 
 “Transnational structures” characterized the Cold War. Frontlines did not necessarily run 
along national borders. Only a few years after the end of the Second World War, western 
liberals, therefore, sought transnational means to counter Soviet and communist propaganda 
in Western Europe.
6
 The instrument of choice was the organisation of elite meetings –
transatlantic, multi- and bi-national in character. Thus, the biennial German-American 
conferences had manifold predecessors. The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was the 
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earliest of such attempts of Western anti-communist liberals to counter Soviet propaganda by 
encouraging a transnational closing of ranks among intellectuals, writers and artists. This was 
to be achieved by frank discussions and free exchange of thought during regular conferences.
7
 
In 1950, the first German-English talk at Königswinter took place, which developed into a 
crucial institution of exchange for bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Other such regular conferences followed; among them the 
Franco-German talks, the Bilderberg conferences, the NATO parliamentarians’ conference, 
and the Wehrkunde Konferenz, nowadays known as the Munich Security Conference. All 
these conferences differed in the composition of the participants and surely in particularities 
of the debates. However, they all contributed to establishing a transatlantic consensus 
liberalism with strong anti-communist underpinnings.
 8
 
The German-English talks at Königswinter and the German-French talks were main points 
of reference for the organisers of the German-American format were. The Königswinter talks 
brought together English and West German elites and were organised by the German-English 
Society (later German-British Society).
9
 The Franco-German conferences were organised by 
the European Movement, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on the West 
German side, and by the Centre d’ Étude de Politique Étrangère under the significant lead of 
Ernst Friedlaender.
10
  
However, unlike many of the forerunners of the German-American format, the latter has 
hitherto been neglected by scholars of the Cold War period. By studying the conferences’ 
culture, constituency and context in this chapter, a first step towards closing this gap can be 
taken. The recurring meetings between American and West German elites helped to create a 
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more visible transatlantic state-private network as more media outlets on both sides of the 
Atlantic reported about the conferences.  
This chapter aims at demonstrating how this conference scheme contributed to the 
socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community under US-
American leadership over the period of approximately 25 years. To achieve this, a number of 
favourable conditions had to be created; firstly, a framework and a certain atmosphere, 
secondly, the “right” people had to be brought together11, and thirdly, an environment for 
open and frank discussions of issues of common interest. The analysis of this chapter is 
organised on these three levels. 
The first section of this chapter looks at cultural aspects such as the setting and the 
surrounding programme of the conferences with a particular focus on the city of Berlin as 
event location. Secondly, the conference series is approached from a sociological perspective. 
The constituency and specific composition of the evolving transatlantic elite network is 
analysed by applying instruments of Social Network Analysis (SNA). Yet, before this 
network is characterised in more depth, the selection process and the parties involved therein 
are studied. An analysis of the developing network then demonstrates that the German-
American project of the ACG and its West German counterpart organisation was by no means 
an isolated one. On the contrary, it is carved out to what extent this specific bi-national effort 
overlapped in terms of participants with others of similar kind. The chapter shows that this 
particular network constituted merely one piece within the larger picture of a re-formation 
process of a West European-US American power elite.
12
 
Last but not least important are the debates at the conferences. What issues were discussed 
and did they indeed constitute the contentious issues of West-German-American relations? 
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This section sets out to identify and carve out what function debates at these “semi-official 
conferences” had against the background of the east-west conflict. Ultimately, the question 
whether the conferences served to form a new, a common identity among the participants 
from West Germany and the United States is answered.  
In an era of international crisis –the first German-American conference 
Before diving deeper into these three levels, the international situation is explored that led 
ACG and Atlantik-Brücke staff to prepare for the first German-American Conference in 1959. 
The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in October 1957 was a great success for the USSR 
with far-reaching implications for its adversary, the US in the Cold War. The Soviets pre-
empted the US by four months in orbiting a satellite and moreover astonished the world with 
the sophistication of its rocketry. In fact, the Democratic-led US Senate acted swiftly by 
establishing an investigating committee to seek out those responsible for the perceived missile 
gap between the US and the USSR.
13
 The West German press thereupon implied that the US 
had lost leadership abroad and at home.
14
 The Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev did not help 
to defuse the strained international situation by confronting the Western powers with his 
Berlin Ultimatum in November 1958. Hence, the ACG concluded that “American prestige 
suffered throughout the world and with it confidence in the NATO nuclear shield in 
Germany.” This was manifested in “sincere differences of opinion ... over the problem of 
atomic arms in Germany”. Furthermore, George Kennan’s Reith Lectures, broadcasted widely 
at the end of 1957, had “sparked a movement in Germany and Britain for steps toward 
Disengagement and German neutralization.”15 Marion Countess Dönhoff reflected on crucial 
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differences between the two major parties in West Germany, the SPD and CDU, with regard 
to the question of equipping the young West German armed forces with tactical nuclear 
weapons. Clearly siding with Social Democrats opposing such weapons, Dönhoff questioned 
a statement by Chancellor Adenauer about the irresponsibility of those not willing to supply 
the armed forces with “the necessary weapons”, that is nuclear weapons.16 In the long run, the 
Adenauer government aimed at being included in the NATO policy of “nuclear sharing”. The 
underlying reasoning for this policy was offered by the Eisenhower administration who 
intended to deploy more densely nuclear weapons along the European front line in the larger 
context of a strategic shift from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s.
17
  
In the fall of 1959, officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG felt an “increasing 
pressure of events” leading them to arrange for an informal high-level meeting of West 
Germans and Americans. They felt this need although, in January 1958, the US and the Soviet 
Union had signed the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement, a cultural exchange agreement, which 
seemed to have eased tensions between the two superpowers at least partially. They felt this 
need notwithstanding the close relationship of US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles and 
Chancellor Adenauer.
 18
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The culture of transatlantic elite networking 
During the spring and summer of 1958, officers and directors of the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke intensely corresponded with one another. They were about the crisis-ridden state of 
world affairs and in the face of domestic conflicts in the FRG. Hence, the idea of the first 
German-American conference took shape. It was proposed that over the stretch of one 
weekend a group of 50 to 60 “distinguished American and German leaders” should get 
together to discuss political and economic issues pertaining to West German-American 
relations as well as world politics and the world economy. Organisers on both sides of the 
Atlantic considered it key to secure in advance broad endorsement from public agencies, West 
German and American alike, proving the inherent public-private character of this transatlantic 
enterprise.  
In doing so, they benefitted from the positive image of the Anglo-German conferences, 
which were supported by the West German Foreign Office and the chancellor. The latter used 
the Königswinter conferences, according to Christian Haase, to promote his foreign policy. 
The former appreciated this conference format as opportunity to boost West Germany’s image 
as a rehabilitated democratic republic with a number of former members of the German 
resistance participating regularly. In the late 1950s, thus certain of the positive effects of such 
conference schemes, the Foreign Office set up a special budget to provide funds to the 
Königswinter conferences as well as the Franco-German, and the German-American talks.
19
 
In the course of preparations for the first German-American conference, the organisers, 
moreover, gained approval from the US Embassy in Mehlem, the USIA, the West German 
Embassy in Washington, DC, and the BPA.
20
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Atlantik-Brücke and ACG officers profited from the Königswinter model in other ways, 
too. Key members of the former regularly attended the informal Anglo-German talks. Ernst 
Friedlaender, the Atlantik-Brücke’s first chairman (1954-1959), for example, not only 
attended the Königswinter conferences frequently. He also acted as chairman of the Hamburg 
branch of the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, and was a leading figure in the German 
Council of the European Movement.
21
 Due to the many overlaps, Lilo Milchsack, one of the 
West German organisers of the Königswinter talks, volunteered advice on conference matters 
to Walter Stahl, the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive director.22  
The first German-American conference eventually took place under the banner “East-West 
Tensions: present status and future developments” in Bad Godesberg, a suburb of Bonn, in 
October 1959. Afterwards, the ACG confidentially concluded that the event “surpassed 
similar previous efforts [i.e. British-German and Franco-German meetings; addition by 
author] both in eminence of the delegations and in the fruitfulness of the discussions”.23 
Therefore, the organisers stated that if funding could be secured, “the conference should be 
repeated every other year and possibly even on an annual basis.”24  
Setting and social events surrounding the transatlantic elite meetings 
The intended frequency of the German-American conferences was fulfilled only partly 
between 1959 and 1974. An annual event proved impossible. Transatlantic travel at the time 
proved too expensive  a problem that the organisers of the Bilderberg conferences apparently 
did not encounter. The Bilderberg meeting took place at least every year if not twice a year 
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despite the fact that some delegates had to cross the Atlantic to attend.
25
 West German and 
British delegates to the Königswinter conferences met exactly once a year.
26
 In addition to the 
challenges of transatlantic travel arrangements, according to Christopher Emmet  
... the personnel, program and arrangements for our conferences had to be reasonably 
satisfactory not only to ourselves, but to the Atlantik-Brücke, the Ford Foundation, and, less 
directly, to both the American and German government without whose friendly cooperation the 
meetings could hardly be held. In addition, the delegations and arrangements had to be 
acceptable to the German opposition parties as well as to the C.D.U. leaders –which is not 
always easy.
27
 
Thus, in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, at times almost three years lapsed before another 
German-American conference would take place. Yet, the German-American organising team 
invested undiminished energies in putting together a programme that would meet the aim of 
furthering understanding between US and West German elites. In this endeavour they put 
special emphasis on informal and private encounters between delegate members and 
government officials from both countries. In particular, meetings with officials had to be 
arranged outside the panel discussions because government officials and diplomats were 
officially barred from participating in the off-the-record panel discussions of the 
conferences.
28
 ACG and Ford Foundation officers indeed seized the opportunities the 
conferences offered to get access to the West German administration. In 1964, for example, 
Shepard Stone, John J. McCloy and Christopher Emmet privately met with Chancellor 
Ludwig Erhard to discuss international affairs such as the postponement of MLF and long-
term credits to the Soviet Union.
29
 McCloy’s taking part in this meeting was probably the 
least surprising. Since his service as high commissioner, he frequently acted as informal 
adviser and special emissary to US presidents. Christopher Emmet and Shepard Stone, 
however, met with the chancellor as representatives of organisations of the private sector, the 
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ACG and the Ford Foundation. Such proceedings circumvented the aforementioned 
conference rule excluding politicians in leading positions from participating in the off-the-
record sessions of the German-American meetings. 
Therefore, each conference had a lavish programme, sprinkled with high-level 
personalities surrounding the panel discussions. Again Königswinter served as a model. The 
British-German conferences also differentiated between delegates and guests. Yet among the 
latter were a notably high number of government and administration officials. They, however, 
were not expected to contribute to the study groups. Therefore organisers ensured that there 
were enough occasions to get in touch irrespective of status, such as coffee breaks and dinner 
parties.
30
 The Bilderberg group approached this issue differently. All participants of 
Bilderberg conferences took part in a private capacity, no matter whether they were 
government officials or businessmen thus circumventing the somewhat artificial distinction 
between delegation, guests and observers.
31
 
 At the first German-American meeting in 1959, the West German chancellor and other 
high-ranking officials addressed the public opening session of the conference, a practice that 
was continued over the years. In addition, the chancellor would invite the delegates to some 
social function, either to a luncheon, dinner or reception. Those were then reciprocated by an 
invitation by the acting US ambassador to the Federal Republic whenever the conference took 
place in West Germany. This reflects the relative lesser degree of importance West Germany 
enjoyed on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. The US President was never 
approached by the organisers and thus never attended or hosted a social function. The highest 
ranking member of a US administration ever attending any of the social events surrounding 
the conferences was Vice President Hubert Humphrey. In May 1967, during the fifth German-
American conference, Humphrey “attended a cocktail party given by [the] Council at the 
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Hotel Mayflower and spent over an hour in animated private discussion with members of the 
German delegation.”32 Yet, at the occasions when the West German and US foreign policy 
elite met in Washington, DC, in February 1961, May 1967, and November 1971, delegates 
had to settle for receptions by the acting secretaries of state; at the first two instances this was 
Dean Rusk and at the third William P. Rogers.
33
  
On the German side, the importance of the German-American conferences to the federal 
government grew over the years. The sixth German-American conference, originally 
scheduled for October 1969, was postponed to January 1970 on the request of the Foreign 
Office. It argued that the new chancellor, Willy Brandt, favoured the delay as he wished to 
“entertain the American delegates” once he had fully settled into government business.34 
Brandt, who knew the ACG since 1957 from a visit to the United States sponsored by the 
private organisation, was well aware of the benefits such informal gatherings could bring; not 
least because he had entertained American delgations to the German-American conference in 
the past when he was still governing mayor of West-Berlin.
35
 In 1970, Brandt, the first Social 
Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic, profited from his familiarity with casual 
American- style socialising. Indeed, Willy Brandt “quite impressed” an American delegate 
“with the cordiality with which [he, the Chancellor], Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, and 
Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt received the members of the U.S. delegation”. Richard 
Hunt, author of the Report on the sixth German-American conference, particularly 
highlighted the fact that Chancellor Brandt stayed “two hours late in the evening in the bar of 
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the Hotel am Tulpenfeld just to talk informally with the Americans”.36 In fact none of 
Brandt’s predecessors had ever done so although all of them did attend the opening sessions 
and hosted at least a reception to the delegations.  
As a matter of fact, according to Joseph Kaskell, ACG counsel, “political, academic and 
business leaders from both countries” were “much more interested in the character of 
members from the other country ... than in the final results of the panel discussions; 
congeniality of the atmosphere seemed to them more important than the meeting of minds on 
particular points.”37 Hence, Kaskell concluded that “the fruitfulness of our conferences is to 
be found in the continuance of relationships between various members of the respective 
groups carried on by mutual visits and correspondence.”38  
Thus it is little surprising that Emmet and Stahl paid much careful attention to the 
organisation of smaller dinner parties at private homes and to the choice of hotels that could 
facilitate those much appreciated “tête à tête conversations, corridor contacts, and night-cap 
talks in the bar”.39 In this respect, participants of the German-American conferences and the 
Bilderberg conferences had much in common. Shepard Stone, for example, who was a 
frequent participant of such conference formats opined that the informal discussions over 
dinner or a drink were as important as the formal panel debates, if not more important.
40
 
Hence, it was only consistent of Stone to vehemently advocate rather small-scale conference 
formats. In his memoirs, Otto Wolff von Amerongen, member of the Atlantik-Brücke since 
1961, summarised the value of frequent participation in such informal conferences as follows: 
“Bilderberg was of the utmost importance to me. If the New York banker David Rockefeller, 
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for example, claimed he had made 70 percent of his most valuable contacts at Bilderberg 
conferences, so it was almost 100 percent for me”.41 
Tribute to the frontline city: visiting tours to Berlin 
To make a difference and indeed influence governmental decision-making, it was essential to 
the organisers to be spatially close to officials in West Germany as well as in the United 
States. Similar thinking motivated the organisers of the Königswinter conferences.
42
 
Locations for the Bilderberg conferences, however, were chosen based on the special 
remoteness of the place. Unlike the organisers for Königswinter and the German-American 
talks, the Bilderberg group prioritized the fact that “the participants were forced to remain at 
the hotel for three full days”.43 Following the Königswinter model, the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke organised most conferences between 1959 and 1974 in the capital cities Bonn and 
Washington, DC. Sole exception to this rule was the conference in 1964. The fourth German-
American conference took place in West-Berlin. Two years prior, organisers had decided to 
split the locale of the conference. Thus, the third conference in 1962 was held in Bonn and in 
Berlin. Yet, this was not the only occasion for American delegates to visit Berlin. The 
programme of all conferences taking place in West Germany included a trip to West Berlin.  
The high regard for the city of Berlin on the part of ACG and Atlantik-Brücke officers was 
a reflection of the great importance the city had gained in the course of the Second World War 
and particularly with the onset of the Cold War. The organisers were certainly very pleased 
when, on the occasion of the first conference in October 1959, the New York Times carried an 
article entitled “Javits Reassures Bonn over Berlin”.44 Senator Jacob K. Javits’ visit to Bonn 
attending the informal high level meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG was, according 
to Arthur Olsen, author of the article, “another effort to abate West German concern that the 
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United States attitude on the Berlin question was softening.” Further, Javits assured the 
chancellor that United States troops would remain in West Berlin “as long as they are 
needed”. 
 In the eyes of the Americans, Berlin had become a “Bastion of Freedom” and “a City upon 
the Hill” in the unfolding Cold War.45 Andreas Daum captured this special meaning in the 
term “America’s Berlin”.46 John F. Kennedy’s visit of West Berlin in June 1963 was 
definitely the climax of this process of symbolic charging of the divided city in the context of 
the Cold War. Yet, it was the Berlin blockade and ensuing allied airlift of 1948/49 that 
represented a turning point in US-German relations and US attitudes toward the former 
enemy in the post-war period. These events aroused feelings of sympathy and empathy for the 
situation of Berliners. Following the Berlin blockade and airlift broad sections of American 
society felt connected and aligned against a common enemy – Soviet-style Communism. US 
policies pertaining to Berlin became part of American domestic politics. The city on the front 
line had become an urban symbol for US American society’s commitment in this global 
confrontation between “freedom and Communism”. Berlin was, moreover, a very tangible 
place for thousands of Americans who were based there either as member of the US military 
or civil personnel. After World War II and with the onset of the Cold War, the United States 
had become the main guarantor for the security of the Western part of the island at first in the 
Soviet sector and later in the GDR. The former capital of Nazi Germany had become a highly 
contested object of international politics, particularly between the Western Allies and the 
Soviet Union. 
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Portrait of Shepard 
Stone* 
Yet “the special relationship” between Berlin and Americans had its origins in the 19th 
century. Even then, the city carried characteristics of an “American city”. These features 
included rapid demographic, industrial and commercial development. Furthermore, the 
dynamic expansion of Berlin, the increasing ethnic diversification, the eminence of 
scholarship, cultural institutions and concentration of avant-garde art as well as modern 
entertainment allowed for analogies with New York and other American cities.
47
 
 
Image 6: Shepard Stone 
Key organisers of the conferences were personally 
strongly attached to Berlin. Shepard Stone and Erik 
Blumenfeld, for example, had studied at University of Berlin 
in the early 1930s. Christopher Emmet felt attached to 
Berlin, having spent much of his childhood and young 
adulthood in Germany prior to the Nazis ascendance to 
power. Furthermore, for years Emmet had his personal 
informant based in Berlin who hence was able to report to 
him first-hand observations.
48
 Other Americans, some of whom have played a vital role in 
post-war Germany, including John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay, Leo Cherne and Eleanore 
L. Dulles, to just name a few, even formed a “Berlin-Lobby”.49 Since a good number of 
Berlin ‘lobbyists’ were directly or indirectly connected to either one of the organising parties 
of the German-American conferences, it is little surprising that Berlin figured so high on the 
conference series programme. 
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Image 7: John J. McCloy  
Shepard Stone, for example, proved his loyalty to the 
city and the cause of strong German-American relations 
well into the post-Ford Foundation part of his career. In 
1974, he hosted a briefing for the American delegation at 
the Aspen Berlin.
50
 Christopher Emmet, who in 1953 
advised the West German Chancellor Adenauer to 
exploit “the priceless asset Berlin”, being fully aware of 
Berlin’s valuable symbolism of freedom and anti-
Communism.
51
 Given this background it appears as a logical consequence that Emmet and his 
co-organisers made sure Berlin had always a slot on the conference agenda.  
The city’s currency  its symbolic value as a frontier city – definitely increased after the 
erection of the wall. Hence, the report to the third German-American conference in 1962 
stated that “a number of social events contributed to the success of the conference.” In 
addition to the luncheon given by Mayor Brandt at “the picturesque Rathaus Schoeneberg”, 
the report highlighted the “tour along the Wall led by the mayor”. Furthermore, the “entire 
American delegation was invited to stay on in Berlin ... as guests of the city”.52 Willy Brandt, 
who spearheaded the pro-Western and pro-American wing of West German Social 
Democracy, also seized the opportunity the German-American conferences offered to 
encourage more Americans, especially those belonging to the foreign policy elite, to commit 
to the cause of Berlin.  
The fourth German-American conference in 1964 was completely held in Berlin with the 
Kongresshalle serving as actual conference venue. This building in itself was symbol of US 
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American commitment to West Berlin. Eleanor Lansing Dulles  for many years responsible 
for Berlin affairs within the State Department hierarchy  had taken the lead in furthering this 
project. She had helped raising the necessary funds and installing the Benjamin-Franklin 
Foundation as official promoting institution. According to Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, realising 
this building project assembled the politics of Cold War, modern architecture, the myth of 
freedom, and the integration of West Berlin into modern urban planning.
53
 
By 1970 Berlin had not lost its appeal to American participants of the German-American 
conferences. The visit to Berlin as part of the sixth conference in January 1970 included as 
“high point”  at least to the author of the report to this conference  a tour through East 
Berlin, which entailed “a rather exciting time getting through Check Point ‘Charlie’”.54 In 
preparation for this trip, the US Mission Berlin “had sent a special petition to the Soviet 
authorities requesting that they ask the East German authorities to permit the U.S. delegation 
to pass through Check Point ‘Charlie’” without further ado. And indeed when the delegation’s 
bus arrived at the check point the People’s Police merely requested to see the passports 
through the windows of the bus “and then waved us through”.55 This deviated considerably 
from the usual procedure Sara Ann Fagin, Emmet’s secretary remembered: “everybody had to 
have their passports and we all had to file out of the bus while they goose-stepped around our 
bus before they let us into East Berlin.“56 In the mid-1970s, the special standing Berlin 
enjoyed in the ranks of ACG board members found expression in the appointment of David 
Klein, former US minister in Berlin to executive director of the ACG.
57
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The organisers of the German-American conferences used the symbolic weight of the 
divided city on the frontline wisely. By bringing a selection of the US American foreign 
policy elite to Berlin on a regular basis, they certainly allowed to experience the Cold War 
from a new perspective. In that way the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke and the German-American 
conferences significantly contributed to the development of sympathy if not identification on 
the part of the visiting Americans with the fate of West Germans in general and West 
Berliners in particular. 
A German-American elite network evolves – featuring the members of a “common 
Western parliament”? 
The selection process  
As crucial as the right setting and atmosphere might have been, yet another central 
prerequisite had to be created to achieve the grand aim of fostering mutual understanding 
between Americans and West Germans. “All the right people” needed to be brought 
together.
58
 This section focuses on their selection. 
The transnational elite network developed through a deliberate selection process. Main 
parties involved in this process were the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke, and the Ford Foundation. 
Other agencies, particularly on the German side, such as the Foreign Office, the German 
Embassy and the Federal Chancellery were also kept informed. However, there is no evidence 
that they actively intervened in the selection process.
59
 Coordination between these 
organisations and agencies was preceded by internal decision making on the part of the main 
organising groups. The Atlantik-Brücke’s executive director, Walter Stahl, for example, did 
not only consult with the members of the board but at times even sought agreement with the 
ordinary members of the Atlantik-Brücke. Christopher Emmet likewise sought advice from 
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friends and acquaintances. Carl Joachim Friedrich, Norbert Muhlen, Klaus Dohrn, and John 
Kaskell were among them. When in doubt he would in addition “consult with the Board 
members … before the invitation” went out.60 Yet, Emmet’s task of coordinating different 
preferences and demands was complicated by the fact that Shepard Stone and John J. McCloy 
of the grant-giving Ford Foundation also sought to have a saying.
61
 Regardless of an 
agreement to a division of labour in selecting delegates between the ACG and the Atlantik-
Brücke, by which the former was to choose American participants and the latter the West 
German ones, more often than not both sides tried to interfere with the counterpart’s compiled 
lists of potential invitees. The result was a rather complex and at times opaque procedure. 
Some of the conflicts the aforementioned parties encountered are highlighted in the following 
section. 
Irrespective of the many voices having a say along the way, Christopher Emmet claimed 
that an automatic process was set in motion  
because of the purposes for which the Bruecke and the Council were founded. On the German 
side, the original nucleus of the Atlantik-Bruecke, which I selected with the help of Eric 
Warburg, was basically anti-Nazi as well as pro-American and anti-Communist. That in itself 
confined membership to the best German survivors, for there were many anti-Nazis who were 
neither pro-American nor anti-Communist. And on the American side also, it has taken people 
with moral sensitivity and imagination to maintain their enthusiasm for American-German 
understanding despite their special awareness of the horrors of the Nazi era, as liberals in the 
good old-fashioned sense.
62
 
It is questionable how far being anti-communist and pro-American were genuine selection 
criteria. Indeed, the opposite might have been true; taking a US-critical stance and being too 
sympathetic towards Communism and the Soviet Union functioning as disqualifiers. Thus, 
being pro-American and anti-Communist at the same time was merely the smallest common 
denominator clearly marking an outer boundary for everyone to join this transatlantic elite 
network.  
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The overarching aim was to bring together elites from both countries with a genuine 
interest in German-American relations: “people of sufficient prominence ... sufficiently 
divided into the required categories – politicians, businessmen, publishers, and other leaders 
of public opinion of both parties – and with the desirable knowledge and variety in point of 
view to contribute something intellectually.”63 Moreover, each national delegation was to be 
representative of its country, ideally presenting a positive image. The organisers of the 
German-American conferences, however, did not go as far as the Bilderberg group in basing 
the success of the meetings on bringing together a “cross-section of society – trade unionists 
and businessmen, socialists and conservatives alike”.64 The British-German conferences also 
included trade unionists and the first 14 meetings were held at the Adam-Stegerwald-Haus, a 
trade union discussion centre in Königswinter.
65
 The German-American conferences invited 
the first trade union representative in 1971. Three years later two West German trade union 
secretaries attended the eighth conference, but no Americans. 
Despite the fact that organisers of the German-American conference scheme deliberately 
excluded representatives of labour until the early 1970s, it was nevertheless their aim to 
compose representative delegations. In the German case this meant to assemble people 
mirroring public and political debates featuring different opinions but at the same time 
convincingly demonstrating how democratically mature the West Germans had already 
become. In the American case this meant first and foremost that the delegation’s needed to 
have the format to ably reassure West German elites and public of continuing American 
interest and support in uncertain times and of standing together in the face of the challenges 
the Cold War entailed. This was an ambitious aim. The question of how this could be 
accomplished gave rise to constant quarrelling among the parties involved. Hence many 
letters were exchanged, compromises sought and found. 
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The most prevalent issues causing recurrent disagreement were, firstly, the question of 
whether the selected group was really representative. Secondly, people in charge would argue 
over the absolute size of delegations and another interrelated third issue pertained to 
businessmen’s share of the total delegation. And finally, there was frequent disagreement as 
to the issue of old hands versus new faces. During the run-up to the first conference in 1958, 
for example, Emmet discussed the German selection with Klaus Dohrn, probably Emmet’s 
best informed and best connected adviser in all things German. Dohrn fumed at the sight of 
the “Stahl list” for the first German-American conference calling it “even worse than ... 
expected”. “The Press part” seemed “completely unacceptable”. Dohrn accused the Atlantik-
Brücke directors of “shamelessly” inviting only “anti-government journalists” in addition to 
being “in favor of Northern Germany” with “4 people from Hamburg alone ...and two from 
one paper (Die Welt)”.66 Therefore, Dohrn advised Emmet to “[e]nter into the details and try 
to get our friends in Hamburg to make some changes”. This Emmet did indeed and quite 
successfully in fact. For the final West German delegation included only one journalist from 
Hamburg, Marion Dönhoff, and none from Die Welt. Instead, it assembled a rather 
conservative pro-Adenauer selection of journalists.
67
  
Another issue was finding a political balance in the makeup of the delegation. More 
specifically, it was important to assemble an adequate representation of moderate foreign 
policy views on the part of the American delegation. Therefore Emmet once more sought 
advice by Dohrn when choosing US foreign policy experts for the first conference. The latter 
emphasised that it was “very important to get people like Kissinger and Teller to attend, 
perhaps ... also Alsop”. However, the organizers should avoid ending up “with only die-hards 
in regard to China...”. According to Dohrn, this was crucial, otherwise it could trigger the 
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short-circuit that all Americans were “crazy or war-mongers”.68 Edward Teller was a 
controversial figure indeed and definitely too contentious to be actually invited. For, the so 
called “father of the H-bomb” was a fierce advocate of the notion of strength through nuclear 
weapons, easily lending the “mad scientist” stereotype a face. Joseph Alsop, syndicated 
Washington columnist, was far less controversial than Teller. He was known as a proponent 
of the United States containment policy and was a convinced adherent to the view that a 
dangerous missile gap had opened between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 
1950s.
69
 However, Henry Kissinger, at the time director of the Harvard Defense Studies 
Program as well as of the Harvard International Seminar, was the only of the three men 
suggested by Dohrn who did attend the first German-American conference in 1959. Until 
1967 Kissinger was party to the American delegation four more times. 
Although religious affiliation was generally not considered a criterion and balancing of 
different denominations thus was not necessary, it became an issue on one occasion. In May 
1962, prior to the third German-American conference, the ACG’s directors of the board 
discussed the tentative American delegation in controversial terms. Eric M. Warburg regarded 
the list of potential delegates as “unrepresentative of America”, specifying that there were 
“too many Jews” on the list. Louis Lochner and Joseph Kaskell, also members of the board, 
joined Warburg in expressing “special doubts” about the invitation issued to “Rabbi Prinz, 
President of the American Jewish Congress”. Warburg’s main argument opposing Prinz’s 
invitation was that the latter was a theologian and if a Jewish one were included, Protestant 
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and Catholic clergymen would also have to be invited.
70
 Warburg’s objection is difficult to 
comprehend, particularly when considering the special relevance of the American Jewish 
community for “furthering American-German understanding”, as Christopher Emmet pointed 
out in his response. Moreover, Emmet reminded his colleagues on the board that all the 
important American Jewish organisations “have adopted a generous and helpful attitude 
towards West Germany... However, the rank and file of these groups are less well-informed 
and therefore naturally less friendly than their leaders.”71 In the end Emmet’s decision, firmly 
backed by Shepard Stone, outweighed the arguments ACG directors put forward. Rabbi Prinz 
attended the third German-American conference. In addition to the three Jewish businessmen 
“Messrs. Warburg, Blaustein and Kaiser” attended Irvin M. Engel, former president of the 
American Jewish Committee and Saul E. Joftes, secretary of B’nai B’rith, the oldest Jewish 
service organization; not counting Shepard Stone who was born into a Jewish family but did 
not practice his faith. Interestingly enough, the issue of including representatives of the 
Jewish community in the German delegations was never brought up. Only once, in 1962, the 
secretary general of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, Dr Henrik George van Dam 
attended a German-American elite meeting.
72
 
Since both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were dedicated to promoting bipartisanship, 
this was also a criterion for selecting participants. Bipartisanship figured highly among 
considerations of the organising team because it was seen as the most crucial prerequisite for 
a strong and persuasive foreign policy, for which the United States functioned as role model. 
Attention was paid not only to parity between the different political parties represented in the 
West German Bundestag. It was also considered helpful to have a balance between opinions 
of the government and the opposition. With regard to the selection of members of the 
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Bundestag, it is interesting to note that Atlantik-Brücke directors left the decision about which 
parliamentarians to invite to those of their members who represented the three main parties of 
the West German parliament, CSU/CDU, SPD and FDP: “... [T]hey were to agree with their 
party colleagues, which ladies and gentlemen should be invited as delegates to the 
conference.”73 This again demonstrates strikingly how tightly interwoven this conference 
series was with state structures of the Federal Republic of Germany whilst organised by actors 
of the “private sector”.74 Until the latter part of the 1960s, organisers on both sides of the 
Atlantic picked representatives from mainstream politics exclusively from parliamentarians, 
members of the Bundestag in West Germany and members of congress in the United States. 
Hitherto members of either government had been excluded. Yet on the occasion of the fifth 
German-American conference in Washington, DC in May 1967, the organising team broke 
with that rule. They broke with this tradition despite it having served “to increase the freedom 
of debate and promot[ing] the unofficial, or at least the merely semi-official, nature of the 
meetings”.75 Government officials had always been part of the conference proceedings. Thus 
far, their participation had been restricted to the opening or closing sessions, however. In May 
1967 then, this rule was modified in that government officials were allowed to “informally” 
[emphasis added] address “the actual panel sessions”.76 Hence by the time of the fifth 
conference, private and public agendas had merged to such an extent that the conferences 
could not be described as a purely private elite affair.  
As mentioned before, the question of how many business representatives were to 
participate in the conferences caused some disagreement. Dohrn, whom Emmet frequently 
took into confidence, for example, accused Stahl and Friedlaender of intending to merely 
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stage a “big show” for their financial backers, the businessmen among the Atlantik-Brücke 
members.
 77
 Such accusations were not unfounded. Stahl sincerely advocated inviting all 
members of the Atlantik-Brücke, admitting that most of them were businesspeople. Yet, Stahl 
argued “every one of them has the caliber to attend the conference”.78 Klaus Dohrn and 
Shepard Stone, however, were eager to keep the delegations and hence the conference as 
small as possible. To them the most important function of those meetings was to allow for 
“real person-to-person contacts”.79 The idea of having especially “all those business men sit 
around and either say nothing or indulge in commonplace” was rather appalling to Dohrn.80 
Atlantik-Brücke representatives, however, insisted on strong representation of the business 
side on the German delegation. They furthermore demanded that their American counterpart-
organisation actually match their “top ranking German businessmen” by assuring “a good 
attendance of first-class American businessmen”.81 This illustrates well that many of the 
Atlantik-Brücke directors’ decisions were actually driven by the organisation’s internal logic. 
This group could only implement its agenda with enough financial resources at hand.
82
 Since 
representatives of the business world accounted for the majority of membership and hence 
covered most of the group’s expenses, they felt entitled to demand a reward. Meeting 
potential business partners from across the Atlantic was considered an adequate measure. Yet, 
the drive for prestige on part of businessmen should not be underestimated. Getting together 
with their successful counterparts from the US on top of dining with politicians and officials 
from the US and the Federal Republic definitely fulfilled their desire for recognition.  
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The ACG, on the other hand, realised only later that inviting businessmen to their high-
level conferences could be to the group’s benefit. This was the case if those businessmen 
could then be attracted to become paying members. The first example of following this 
strategy successfully was Herman George Kaiser, an oil producer from Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Kaiser first attended the German-American conference in 1962 and subsequently become a 
paying ACG member.
83
  
The fourth issue of contention, old hands versus new faces, was mostly fought over by 
Emmet and Stone. Shepard Stone was an early proponent of the “successor generation” 
concept advocating the infusion of “fresh blood”. Emmet clearly preferred strengthening the 
relationships between the old hands of German-American relations.
84
 The Atlantik-Brücke, 
responsible for assembling the German delegation, on the other hand, strategically invited 
newly elects to the Bundestag. In doing so the Atlantik-Brücke contributed to the continuation 
of the transnational elite network beyond the lifespan of the founders of German-American 
post-war relations and thus proved to be farsighted.
85
  
The ACG, for that matter, could only report successful refreshing of the American 
delegation on the occasion of the eighth conference. The ACG’s report on this conference 
proudly remarked that a “significant effort was made to include new faces, and in fact among 
the 52 non-Congressional delegates, almost one-half (28) had never before attended an 
American-German conference in this series” .86 Stone’s attitude on this issue was consequent 
indeed. As frequent participant of the transatlantic elite meetings organised by the Bilderberg 
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group he knew first hand of the advantages of the invitation procedure to those conferences. 
The Bilderberg steering committee invited many participants only once or twice to allow for a 
constant influx of new members and thus fostering the continuous growth of the elite 
network.
87
  
The transatlantic elite network  
This section focuses on the actual network resulting from the selection process studied before. 
A sociological approach has been chosen. More specifically, selected instruments of Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) are applied. SNA analyses social actors with special attention to the 
relationships those actors form and maintain amongst themselves. Social actors may be 
institutions as well as people that are linked through the exchange of information or material 
resources. They have some kind of relationship. In the case of the American and West 
German representatives of different elites, the relationship is first and foremost constituted 
through the recurring meetings at the German-American conferences. The network under 
consideration here can be understood as a social infrastructure visualising the relationships 
among the participants of the conferences as nodes and edges. Some actors (participants) 
might have quantitatively and substantially better links (relationships) within the network than 
others – in the case of the German-American conferences – depending on how often they 
attended a conference. From this might result quite different positions of influence and power 
within the network.
88
 Which individuals of the German-American elite network analysed here 
can be considered to be in an advantageous, hence central and influential position belonging 
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to an inner circle within the network are looked at in a second step.
89
 In a first step, the entire 
network and its specific characteristics are examined carefully. The total network is visualised 
in graph 1. 
 
Graph 1: visualization of total network of 384 people (blue nodes = US participant; ochre nodes = Ger 
participant) attending 8 conferences (yellow= 1959, red=1961, green=1962, light blue=1964, brown=1967, 
grey=1970, pink=1971; purple= 1974 nodes ). 
Graph 1: visualization of tota l networ k of 384 people  
                                                 
89 
See section on Inner Circle in this subchapter. 
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The transatlantic elite network that evolved through eight German-American conferences 
during the course of 25 years consisted of 384 people, representing the political sphere, the 
business community, scholars and the media from both the United States and the Federal 
Republic. The German-American elite network under consideration here was considerably 
smaller than the multinational Bilderberg network that comprised 576 participants, who 
gathered, however, in a shorter period of time, from 1954 to 1966, in which, however, 15 
conferences took place. The British-German network growing through the annual 
Königswinter conferences during the same time period was also considerably bigger.
90
 
This total network includes not only the members of the two national delegations to all 
eight conferences but also guests and observers attending the meetings. Social network 
analysis emphasises social relations between actors in the particular case of the German-
American conferences. The focus is therefore on potential real face-to-face contact between 
the people attending the transatlantic elite conferences irrespective of their official status in 
which they attend. In this respect, it is of lesser importance that guests were officially 
completely excluded from attending panel discussions and observers were excluded from 
actively participating in the discussions while being allowed to attend panel sessions. Only 
when taking into focus all individuals involved in those transatlantic elite meetings it is 
possible to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the composition of the network.  
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Table 14: Categories of participants and share of total 
Category / 
year Politics 
% of 
total Business 
% of 
total Media 
% of 
total 
Civil 
society 
% of 
total Total 
1959 22 40.7 12 22.2 9 16.6 11 20.37 54 
1961 30 36.6 10 12.2 13 16 27 32.9 82 
1962 27 33.3 18 22.2 9 11 27 33 81 
1964 23 40.3 11 19.3 5 8.7 18 31.6 57 
1967 42 54.5 12 15.6 6 7.8 17 22 77 
1970 35 34.7 25 24.8 9 9 32 31.7 101 
1971 38 38.8 27 27.5 13 13.3 19 19.4 98 
1974 39 27 41 27.8 19 13.2 44 30.5 144 
Politics: parliamentarians, government officials, federal and state level; diplomats 
Business: managers, bankers, lawyers, consultants, entrepreneurs 
Media: journalists, editors, publisher, authors 
Civil Society: educational and research institutions, think tanks, philanthropic foundations, NGOs/ not-for-profit 
organisations
91
 
In the following, some of the most striking features of the network are presented. The first 
remarkable point is the particular composition of different societal segments represented 
within the network. They are essentially the same as within the membership of the Atlantik-
Brücke, the West German organisation sponsoring the conference scheme: politics, business, 
media, and civil society. Yet, especially with regard to the conference network, it should be 
pointed out that there was considerable overlap between the four categories of participants. 
Especially Americans often switched from public positions to private business and back. 
Irrespective of this overlap, both the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
transatlantic network of the German-American conferences showed the same feature of 
linking the public and the private with the latter comprising business, media, and civil society. 
Whilst Atlantik-Brücke membership featured a preponderance of businessmen, politicians and 
diplomats clearly dominated the conference network.
 92
 Thus, one of the most striking aspects 
of this transatlantic elite network is the reinforced interweaving of the political sphere with 
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the business world. This finding is underlined by the organisers’ special emphasis on having 
parliamentarians, government officials, and diplomats from the US and the Federal Republic 
as well as strong representation of both countries’ business community.93 
 Yet with regard to the strong representation of parliamentarians, again the German-
American conference series followed the model of the British-German Königswinter 
conferences.
94
 According to Christian Haase, Königswinter participation was characterised by 
such “parliamentarian dominance” that The Times even called them a “bilateral parliament”.95 
With regard to the constant, and especially on the German side strong, participation of 
members of the West German Bundestag and members of Congress, these meetings can also 
be seen as functioning as an early precursor to the West German parliamentary group USA, 
established in 1981 and linked to it the regular exchange between congressmen and MPs in 
the context of the “Congress-Bundestag-Seminar”, which began two years later in 1983. 
Table 15: Parliamentary participation FRG and USA and by political party
96
 
 Federal Republic of Germany USA 
Political party/ 
Year 
SPD CDU FDP R D 
1959 3 7 1 2 2 
1961 4 7 2 3 5 
1962 4 9 1 3 4 
1964 3 6 2 3 4 
1967 5 8 0 5 7 
1970 10 11 2 3 2 
1971 6 7 1 6 7 
1974 5 7 3 5 11 
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When comparing the German-American network with the multinational Bilderberg network a 
number of commonalities as well as differences become apparent. First of all, 40 of the 
participants of the German-American conferences were also frequent participants of the 
Bilderberg conferences, among them George Ball and Shepard Stone on the American side 
and Kurt Birrenbach and Fritz Erler on the West German one. Furthermore, while basically 
the same segments of society were represented in the German-American network and the 
Bilderberg network – politics, business, media, academia – in the latter businessmen, bankers 
and lawyers constituted the biggest group in the former where politicians were in the 
majority.
97
  
A notable and significant difference between the German-American network and the 
Bilderberg network is the fact that for the organisers of the Bilderberg conferences including 
labour had been an issue – at least rhetorically. People in charge of selecting the delegations 
to the German-American conferences, however, were never seriously concerned with this 
matter. This negligence was illustratively captured when Christopher Emmet wrote to Walter 
Stahl: “...delegations to conference [are] being too large already, we must definitely decide 
not to invite labor representatives aside from the difficulty of getting one man from each side 
who would be representative of German labor and of American labor.”98 Yet the outcome was 
quite similar in both, the German-American and the multinational case. Labour was definitely 
underrepresented in both instances. Until 1971, not a single labour representative from West 
Germany or the United States for that matter participated in one of the German-American 
conferences. In 1971, a West German labour representative was member to the delegation for 
the first time; Dr Heinz Markmann, director of the DGB’s (Federation of German Trade 
Unions) economics and social science research institute. Three years later, two staff members 
of the DGB’s international department attended; yet still none from the United States. The 
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picture of the Bilderberg conferences in terms of labour representation was not less bleak. In 
the years 1954 until 1969 not more than five trade unionists attended Bilderberg conferences 
and none of them more than once.
99
  
Another underrepresented group in those transatlantic elite networks were women. Only 17 
of the total of 384 participants of the German-American conferences were women, which 
equals meagre 4.4 percent. Moreover, besides Marion Dönhoff and Ellen Lauterbach, MP, 
none of them attended more than one conference. Yet, while Dönhoff was part of the inner 
circle, Lauterbach attended merely two conferences between 1959 and 1974. More of these 
women were US citizens than West Germans (10 compared to 7). Interestingly, the share of 
women in US Congress was comparable to participation in the German-American 
conferences for this period of time. In the West German Bundestag, however, the share was a 
bit higher even though it also stayed under 10 percent.
100
 In this respect the Bilderberg group 
fared even worse not including a single woman in the 1950s and 1960s. The German-
American elite network was therefore a predominantly male and all white transatlantic get-
together and thus in no way inferior to the Bilderberg conferences. 
The elite character of this binational transatlantic network can be substantiated by a closer 
look at each category of its participants: politics, business, media and civil society. 
Considering the representatives of politics from both the US and West Germany, it is 
noticeable that the majority were federal level MPs and members of Congress. To a much 
smaller degree they were state governors or mayors of big cities in the West German case. 
The business category was dominated by presidents, senior managing directors and partners 
in multinational corporations, joint stock companies and Wall Street law firms and 
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consultancies. Journalists representing leading media from both countries attended all 
conferences working for among others Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, TimeLife, 
New York Herald Tribune, Der Spiegel, ZDF (West German public television broadcasting 
system). Finally, the civil society category was dominated by research and higher education 
institutions. Most scholars within the network were affiliated with Ivy League universities in 
the US and comprehensive universities in West Germany. Furthermore, the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Ford Foundation deserve mentioning as symbols of the US foreign 
policy establishment. After describing and characterising the elite network at large in a next 
step the analysis is refined by examining the so-called inner circle of the network. 
The inner circle of the conference network 
The majority of the 384 participants in the German-American conferences took part in fewer 
than three meetings. Hence, people who attended more frequently may be assumed as having 
benefited most from participating. The argument underlining this assumption is twofold. 
Attending more frequently increased the opportunity of developing stronger and more 
resilient relationships with those attending the same conferences; at the same time those 
belonging to the inner circle profited from the general high turnover in participants granting 
them broad access to various people and information. SNA termed this beneficial 
arrangement the “strength of weak ties”.101 The argument that Marc Granovetter made in his 
seminal paper of the same name refers to the advantage of having acquaintances, people 
whom we are only weakly tied to. It assumes that these people will move in circles different 
from our own and thus grant us access to information different from that we receive from 
friends, people we are strongly tied to.
102
  
The inner circle, consisting of 42 people, is at the centre of attention in the following 
section (see graph 2, p. 257). These 42 people attended four or more of the eight conferences 
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under consideration. Condensing the total network to a group which has fairly often attended 
the German-American talks makes sense for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it can 
be assumed that those people attending quite frequently shaped the network as such more 
substantially and furthermore had greater influence on the debates, bringing to the fore their 
very own and their clientele’s perspectives. When it comes to those people who not only 
belonged to the inner circle but also assumed certain functions in the conference proceedings, 
such as panel chair and rapporteur, this becomes even more evident.
103
 
Table 16: The inner circle of the conference network 
Name Nationality Category Conferences  
Erik Blumenfeld GER pol, bus 8 
Gotthard v. Falkenhausen GER finance bus 8 
Norbert Muhlen US jou 8 
Kurt Birrenbach GER pol, bus 7 
Marion Gräfin Dönhoff GER jou 7 
Christopher Emmet US civil 7 
Alexander Menne GER pol, bus 7 
Henry S. Reuss US pol 7 
Shepard Stone US civil 7 
Eric Warburg US/GER finance, bus 7 
William Diebold US aca 6 
Karl Theodor Frhr. zu 
Guttenberg GER pol 6 
Walter Stahl GER civil 6 
Henry Kissinger US aca, pol 6 
Hellmut Becker GER aca 6 
Joseph Kaskell US bus 6 
Hans Karl v. Borries GER bus 5 
Zbigniew Brzezinski US aca, pol 5 
Harry D. Gideonse US aca 5 
Johann Baptist Gradl GER pol 5 
Ernst Majonica GER pol 5 
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Name Nationality Category Conferences  
John J. McCloy US pol, bus 5 
Henry Wallich US pol, bus 5 
Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz GER civil 5 
George Ball US pol, finance bus 4 
Francis M. Bator  US aca, pol 4 
Kurt Becker GER jou 4 
Robert Bowie US aca, pol 4 
Leo Cherne US aca 4 
Irving M. Engel US bus 4 
Fritz Erler GER pol 4 
Jacob Javits US pol 4 
Hellmut Jaesrich GER jou 4 
Herman George Kaiser US bus 4 
Walther Leisler Kiep GER pol 4 
Herman Kopf GER pol 4 
Kurt Mattick GER pol 4 
Klaus Mehnert GER aca 4 
Klaus Ritter GER aca 4 
Klaus H. Scheufelen GER bus 4 
Curt E. Schwab GER bus 4 
Richard v. Weizsäcker GER bus, pol 4 
42 people comprising the inner circle of the German-American conference network were extracted 
from the total network according to number of attended conferences in the period under consideration 
(at least four out of eight). 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the four individuals whose centrality for the elite 
project has been discussed in Chapter 1 remained central within the larger conference 
network.
104
 As they were at the centre of the network, they proved worthy network brokers, 
continually pulling the strings, for instance introducing a good number of Atlantik-Brücke 
and ACG members to a broader transatlantic elite context.
105
 For, almost half of the people 
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belonging to the inner circle were either members of the Atlantik-Brücke or the ACG. 
Narrowing the total network down to the inner circle brings, at the same time, to the fore 
people representing other elite circles, institutions, and organizations. Organizers of the 
German-American elite gatherings were therefore quite successful in enlarging and 
broadening their transatlantic connections and hence the network.  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that key figures of the inner circle were at the same time 
connected to other transnational conference formats such as Bilderberg and the Königswinter 
conferences.
106
 Particularly among the Americans in the inner circle, it is furthermore worth 
pointing to the large number of CFR members.
107
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Graph 2: Visualisation of inner circle using gephi showing 42 people (the Germans in yellow, the Americans in 
blue) in relation to conferences attended. The more central a node the more conferences attended. 
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The above findings can be further illustrated by taking a closer look at a number of people 
belonging to the inner circle; beginning with representatives of the American part of the 
network. Among the frequent participants on the American side were a number of prestigious 
figures such as Shepard Stone, William Diebold, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 
John J. McCloy. Shepard Stone represented the Ford Foundation in his capacity as director of 
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the international department until 1967.
108
 Later, Stone participated in the conferences as 
president of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (the successor of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom) and then as director of Aspen Institute Berlin.
109
 William Diebold 
deserves mentioning as long-time director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ economic 
studies.
110
 Henry Kissinger is a telling example of strategically incorporating people into the 
elite foreign policy context before a person actually ascends to a powerful position. Most of 
the six German-American conferences Kissinger attended as faculty member of Harvard 
University’s Department of Government and its Center for International Affairs. Only later 
was he to become the probably best known and most influential presidential advisor and 
secretary of state of the second half of the 20
th
 century.
111
 The same applies to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who initially attended the conferences as director of the research institute for 
Communist Affairs of Columbia University before later joining the policy planning council of 
the State Department and co-founding the North American branch of the Trilateral 
Commission.
112
 Last but not least important, John J. McCloy needs to be mentioned as former 
US high commissioner to Germany and constant companion and proponent of the German-
American cause. Over the course of the 25 years in which the German-American conferences 
under consideration took place, McCloy had quite an impressive career. He was chairman of 
Chase National Bank in New York, trustee of the Ford Foundation, and chairman of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, not to speak of his service to numerous US presidents as 
advisor.
113
 This post gave McCloy privileged access to President Eisenhower in late 
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September 1959, right after the latter had met with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at Camp 
David, Maryland to discuss the state of international affairs in general and relations between 
the two leaders’ countries in particular. A few days later, McCloy was “fully briefed by the 
President, Secretary Herter ... on the impressions of the Camp David meeting”. The fact that 
McCloy as head of the American delegation to the first German-American conference in 
October 1959 was able to share some of the newly acquired information elevated this meeting 
to a quasi-official level and thus placed it awkwardly between the public and the private.
114
 
On the German side there were also a few personalities worth mentioning, for example, 
Richard von Weizsäcker, Klaus Ritter, Fritz Erler, and Kurt Birrenbach.
115
 Weizsäcker, later 
governing mayor of West Berlin and adjoining sixth president of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, participated in four conferences. In the 1960s he was member of the management 
board of Boehringer Ingelheim, a chemical and pharmaceutical company that provided Dow 
Chemical with a central component of Agent Orange.
116
 Klaus Ritter represented the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a think tank advising the West German government as well 
as the Bundestag on foreign and security policy. Fritz Erler, leader of the opposition against 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, has been introduced in Chapter 2 of this thesis. He was the most 
prominent Social Democrat among the inner circle. There was only one more representative 
of the SPD in this circle.
117
 The rest of the altogether 10 members of Bundestag were 
members of the Christian Democrats. Concluding, it can be stated that bringing together “all 
the right people” did mean first and foremost bringing together influential multipliers in key 
positions: parliamentarians, representatives of powerful foundations, journalists of leading 
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media outlets, business representatives and not to forget about those holding influential 
positions at institutions of higher education training the elite of tomorrow. 
Table 17: People in inner circle with panel function: chair or rapporteur 
Name Function: panel chair, rapporteur; Number of 
conferences 
attended 
Erik Blumenfeld 
chairman economic panel 1959; 1961; 1967; 1970, 
1971, 1974 
8 
Norbert Muhlen rapporteur educational panel 1961 8 
Kurt Birrenbach rapporteur economic panel 1962 7 
William Diebold rapporteur economic panel 1961, 1964, 1970, 1971 6 
Hellmut Becker rapporteur education panel 1962 6 
John J. McCloy chairman of political panel 1964 5 
Henry Wallich rapporteur economic panel 1967, 1970 5 
George Ball panel chairman 1970, 1971 4 
Francis M. Bator  co-rapporteur panel A 1974 4 
Kurt Becker rapporteur political panel 1967 4 
Leo Cherne rapporteur economic panel 1959 4 
Fritz Erler chairman of political panel 1962 4 
Walther Leisler Kiep co-rapporteur panel A 1974 4 
Klaus Mehnert rapporteur 1959, political panel 1964, 1961 4 
The Debates amongst the German-American elite: Touching upon contentious issues? 
Following the Chatham House rule, the panel sessions of the conferences were held off-the-
record to allow for open and frank conversations. Hence, there exist no minutes or protocols 
of those debates. ACG and Atlantik-Brücke did, however, publish official conference reports 
entitled “East-West tensions” in the earlier period and later “East-West issues”, signalling the 
beginning of détente, but always maintaining a special focus on US-West German relations. 
Those conference reports also include the pre-determined agendas for the debates in the 
different panels. To Klaus Mehnert, a frequent participant of the conferences, the debates 
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 serve as a substitute for the common Western parliament which we still do not have. These 
conferences provide an opportunity, in the intensive and concentrated discussions within and 
outside of the regular sessions, to bring opinions to a vote and, to a certain degree, to coordinate 
decisions not only between Germans and Americans but between Germans themselves.
118
  
Yet, the official conference reports tell a different story when looked at more closely. They 
portray the cordial atmosphere at the conference and in particular stress agreement among the 
discussants and downplay any real disagreement. During the preparatory phase of the first 
conference, however, West German and American organisers discussed the title of the 
conference in quite controversial terms. The leading members of the Atlantik-Brücke 
(Friedlaender, Kuhn, Blumenfeld, Dönhoff, Bergstraesser, and von Falkenhausen) rejected the 
original title “Freedom and Security: the Responsibility and Opportunity of the West”. Instead 
they suggested “Solidarity and Independence in the American-German Partnership”, 
reflecting upon the wish to meet Americans as their equals. Three years after regaining the 
rights of an almost sovereign state, Friedlaender, Dönhoff, Blumenfeld and others thought the 
time was right to grant the Federal Republic “independence of judgement, independence of 
opinion”. They expressed the desire of the FRG “to be consulted by her American friends on 
all questions” directly bearing upon West Germany’s “national interests as well as on 
questions of world politics” with “an indirect bearing on our country”. Moreover, they wished 
to “influence our American friends with regard to the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy.” To defuse worries on the part of their American sister-organisation that the West 
Germans’ aspiration for independence would go too far, they hastened to assure Christopher 
Emmet that this did not imply “independence of action”. By no means was the Federal 
Republic seeking as much independence as was needed, for example, “to make a separate deal 
with Russia...”.119 In the end, however, they settled for “East-West Tensions: Current Status – 
Future Developments”. 
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Themes on the agendas can be grouped in seven topical blocks, arranged according to their 
relevance or better in relation to which extent issues falling under a topical block were 
discussed: In terms of prominence and frequency, issues pertaining to NATO and the Western 
bloc were discussed; this was followed by the Eastern bloc, and matters concerning West 
Germany. Less frequently and less extensively, issues pertaining to European integration, 
transatlantic economic relations, and monetary politics were attended to. Questions of foreign 
aid and North-South relations were almost marginal.
120
 
Disengagement 
Within those clusters, a number of perennial subjects can be identified that particularly 
concerned participants in the conferences and more generally German-American relations 
recurrently over the years. At the first conference in 1959, for example, the Kennan-Acheson 
controversy reverberated as was mirrored in the agenda in which “disengagement”, 
“isolationism”, and “neutralisation of Germany” ranked highly.121 Yet most continuously 
recurring on the agendas over the years was Berlin and unification of Germany.
122
  
Hence it was only consistent that the ACG’s report on the first conference to the Ford 
Foundation returned to the issue of disengagement in particular by emphasising the positive 
effects of the debates in this regard. According to this report, the debates had thus fostered 
“deeper understanding of American attitudes” and the softening of “some of the political 
divisions on NATO and on Disengagement between the German parties”.123 This had been 
made evident in a foreign policy debate in the West German Bundestag during which 
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“repeated reference” had been made to the “Bad Godesberg conference”.124 To prove this 
claim, the ACG sent the Ford Foundation along with the report an excerpt of the transcript of 
the aforementioned “Foreign Policy Debate in the Bundestag, November 1959”.125 
Interestingly enough, the excerpt the report referred to rather proved the opposite of what was 
claimed therein. For, the views of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats were still quite 
conflicting with regard to disengagement. 
Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, who had not attended the conference, indeed 
referred to the German-American conference with the intention of underlining the CDU’s 
opposition to any kind of disengagement pointing out that “[t]o our American alliance 
partner” such plans were “unacceptable”. SPD politicians Karl Mommer and Fritz Erler, who 
for their part had attended the conference in question, however, voiced harsh criticism of 
Brentano’s presentation. For, to their mind, the American delegation to the conference had 
only represented one opinion, namely opposition to any kind of disengagement. Erler pointed 
out that there were US politicians with differing viewpoints indeed most prominently 
mentioning Senator Hubert Humphrey.
126
 
In disregard of these major differences, the ACG’s report stated confidentially that “it had 
surpassed similar previous efforts both in eminence of the delegations and in the fruitfulness 
of the discussions” not least because of a “... feeling of pride, happiness and optimism which 
prevailed at Bad Godesberg.”127 
Germany’s Nazi past 
 Remarkable was, furthermore, how comparatively little attention organisers and participants 
paid to matters, which, not only with hindsight, appear hard to miss. The first of those subject 
matters pertains to Germany’s Nazi past. For, at merely two conferences, in 1961 and 1962, 
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this issue was part of the agenda. In 1964, however, Fabian von Schlabrendorff gave a brief 
report on the status of the war crime trials in West Germany before the political panel of this 
year’s German-American conference. From an American perspective, von Schlabrendorff 
definitely had the status to speak on such a delicate subject. At the time, von Schlabrendorff 
worked as a lawyer but was to become constitutional judge in 1967. Moreover, according to 
Emmet, von Schlabrendorff belonged to the “best German survivors” being anti-Nazi, anti-
Communist and pro-American at the same time. In 1943, as a member of the so called 
German resistance, von Schlabrendorff had unsuccessfully attempted to kill Adolf Hitler. At 
the German-American conference, von Schlabrendorff reported in a neutral, objective manner 
on the issue, covering it in just seven subsections filling three and a half pages. Yet 
Schlabrendorff did not shy away from expressing quite controversial standpoints, at least 
from a contemporary point of view. On the one hand, he stated with regard to the term of 
limitation for murder – under German law being 20 years – that “the continuity of the legal 
basis is more important than the possibility of some of the war criminals slipping through the 
net of the limitation regulations.”128 On the other hand, he pointed to the at times rather 
obstructive role American officials have played in the prosecution of German war criminals 
as in the case of SS-Group Commander Karl Wolff.
129
 Yet these contentious issues were not 
further discussed. Rather the impression prevails that participants considered those matters 
not a priority and Americans voiced the opinion that “…neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism were 
problems for the Germans to solve…. The American delegates agreed that it was not 
America’s task to tell their German friends and colleagues what to do about these 
problems”.130 Another American justified this point of view by stating that the United States 
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“has also had experiences and problems with regard to questions of discrimination and 
integration, and that Americans rightfully insist on solving those problems by 
themselves…the Germans had the same right”.131 As those domestic questions did not touch 
upon more pressing subjects of international dimension the transatlantic elite gathered at the 
German-American conference handled them adhering to the motto “live and let live”. 
The Vietnam War 
To much the same extent, one of the most pressing issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the war in Vietnam, was neglected. Vietnam and United States military involvement in the 
region was never officially included on the conference agenda. Attention paid to Vietnam by 
the organisers of the German-American conferences was disproportionate to the real influence 
the issue had on German-American relations in the 1960s. 
Some scholars consider the war in Vietnam as prime influencing factor of German-
American relations from 1964 until early 1968 and beyond, not least because of the 
transnational character of broad anti-Vietnam War protest movements.
132
 In 1964-65, the 
West German government faced a dilemma according to Arenth. On the one hand, 
government and diplomacy had elevated the domino theory and containment to a dogma of 
foreign policy and therefore had demanded US support during the second Berlin crisis, 1958-
1961. On the other hand US intervention in Southeast Asia was perceived ambiguously. It 
was understood as honouring commitments as protecting power and at the same time as 
neglecting Europe and in particular West Germany.
133
  
Moreover, US military involvement entailed some more tangible implications for West 
Germany. Firstly, the Johnson administration demanded support from the West Germans, 
which they were willing to grant in political terms as well as in economic terms in the form of 
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development aid. Yet, when it came to the issue of deploying personnel to Southeast Asia, 
this was a different story. For, West German public opinion was shored up against any kind of 
deployment of German personnel as captured in the “No, Sir” campaign of Bild, West 
Germany’s highest circulation newspaper.134 However, irrespective of the public mood, the 
West German government deployed a hospital ship, the Helgoland. Yet personnel on board 
were not to wear uniform.
135
 Secondly, as military demands for the Vietnamese theatre 
increased, the US withdrew troops from the Federal Republic in April 1966.
136
 And finally, 
the fall of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s second chancellor, has been interpreted against 
the background of ever growing burdens, financial and otherwise on the part of the United 
States which they tried at least partly to pass on to their allies.
137
 The greatest conflict 
between Erhard and the Johnson administration in this regard was the fact that the former in 
1966 did not see the Federal Republic fit to meet commitments made in off-set agreements.
138
 
Against this background, it is striking that except for the conference in 1967 the issue was 
at most mentioned in passing by a few speakers. In 1967, however, William Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, unofficially addressed one panel session and “spoke on 
Vietnam”.139 Yet, during this session the subject was not so much one “of discussion as a 
subject of information”.140 
Until 1967, however, Vietnam was not alluded to at all, not even at the fourth conference 
in 1964, which took place in November a mere three months after the Gulf of Tonkin 
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Resolution was passed by US Congress.
 141
 The basic nature of those few statements made in 
reference to the conflict in Vietnam was twofold. American speakers, on the one hand, 
emphasised US concern for European and West German security demands as being 
undiminished. West German speakers, on the other hand, hastened to praise US military 
involvement as “defending freedom” in a country divided just like Germany. Minister Georg 
Leber, federal minister of transportation, went on in his address during the opening session of 
the fifth German-American conference to warn his fellow country people that “[w]hoever in 
Germany criticizes the American engagement in Viet Nam and at the same time points to 
American pacifists and isolationists to justify his own stand should know that by so doing he 
supports those forces in the United States which tomorrow might turn against an American 
engagement in Germany or in Europe.”142 
East-West trade 
A major and continuous cause for disagreement and conflict between the Federal Republic 
and the United States was the issue of trade with the communist bloc, another topic that never 
became part of the conference agendas.
143
 This tension had to do, first and foremost, with 
fundamentally differing understandings of the strategic importance of trading with the Eastern 
bloc and the Soviet Union. Whereas the United States were eager to expand the Cold War to 
the economic sphere and hence fighting an economic war as well, Western European 
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countries including the Federal Republic had very tangible interests in engaging in trade with 
Eastern European countries as they had done in the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 
century.
144
 Those traditional trade relations were harshly disrupted by the two world wars. 
After the end of the Second World War, any hopes of business groups for a renewed 
expansion of markets were dearly disappointed. For, the onset of the ensuing Cold War with 
the communist USSR entailed the establishment of the foreign policy “containment” 
paradigm which was to include the economic sphere. Already in 1949, the Coordinating 
Committee on East-West Trade Policy (COCOM) was created. According to Jaqueline 
McGlade, COCOM imposed an impenetrable network of controls on members of the Western 
Alliance gripping the Cold War business world by the 1960s. Furthermore she maintains that 
various business communities in the West as well as Western governments were highly 
suspicious of the increased “intrusion of state regulation into world trade and economic 
affairs.” 145 
Thus, it is little surprising that German-American relations were not spared disruptions in 
the 1960s due to differing viewpoints on the question of trading with the East in particular 
with the Soviet Union. In agreement with the domestic oil industry, the US government 
attempted to restrict oil exports from the Soviet Union. Western European countries, first and 
foremost, the Federal Republic, exported huge quantities of steel pipes to the USSR between 
1959 and 1962. In the fall of 1962, just over a year after construction of the Berlin Wall, West 
German and Soviet Russian companies entered a new major contract on steel pipes. Thus, the 
West German steel industry contributed to a large part to the development of the Soviet’s oil 
pipeline infrastructure. Against the background of the recent Berlin crisis and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis being in full swing in the fall of 1962, it is quite understandable that the 
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Kennedy administration viewed any strategic strengthening of the Soviet Union as a threat. 
Therefore, it attempted to stop the pipe export using bilateral and multilateral channels. 
However, they failed to reregister steel tubes on the COCOM list. Next the US appealed to the 
NATO council arguing that Soviet pipelines would also serve to supply Soviet armed forces 
and thus the issue of steel pipe exports was a question of military strategic importance. In 
November of 1962, the NATO council indeed passed a resolution prompting member states to 
stop the delivery of large tubes and to pre-empt new contracts with the Soviet Union.
146
  
According to George Ball, the US administration exerted considerable pressure coercing 
the Bonn government to cancel existing contracts with the Soviet Union.
147
 The Adenauer 
government did this against substantial opposition not only on the part of the West German 
steel industry – to some steel companies export to the Soviet Union equalled capacity 
utilisation rates of up to two thirds – but also against parliamentary opposition from amongst 
the governing coalition of FDP and CDU/CSU.
148
 
Rapporteurs of the panel discussions at the conferences of 1962 and 1964 more or less 
neglected the enforced steel pipe embargo. Although, the embargo significantly interfered 
with West German business interests and caused onsiderable domestic conflicts. This is the 
more significant given the fact that influential figures of the West German steel industry 
directly affected by the embargo were members of the Atlantik-Brücke; among them 
managers of the Mannesmann AG and maybe even more importantly Kurt Birrenbach.
149
 
Instead speakers who did address the issue of East-West trade pointed out that there was a 
general agreement among participants of the discussions that the subject had to be treated not 
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as an exclusively economic problem but rather as a political one. This was another point of 
broad agreement on the issue of increased cooperation and coordination among Western 
countries with regard to trade with the Soviet Union, China and the so-called satellite 
countries. Only once an American speaker, Republican Senator Kenneth B. Keating, 
addressed the business community directly when he pointed out that NATO member states 
were often ineffective in their economic dealings with the Soviet Union. The reason therefor 
was, in Keating’s mind, that “sales of pipe-line, factories, techniques of production” offered 
“tempting short term profits to some manufacturers”. Furthermore, he urged the audience at 
the closing session of the third German-American conference to seize “the economic weapon” 
as it is “one of the strongest in the Western arsenal.” Further he blamed “individual 
businessmen in each NATO nation” for being responsible at least to some extent... “but the 
responsibility for leadership and guidance in this field lies with NATO governments.”150  
 Thereafter, participants of the German-American conferences concerned themselves only 
once more with questions pertaining to East-West trade at the fourth conference in 1964. As a 
result of the embargo the West German steel pipe export came to a complete standstill and 
iron and steel exports experienced great slumps.
 151
  
Conclusion  
This chapter set out to show how this German-American conference scheme has contributed 
to the socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community under US-
American leadership over the stretch of approximately 25 years. Ultimately, this chapter 
sought to answer the question whether the conferences serve to form a common identity 
among the participants. According to Aleida Assmann, social identity evolves through the 
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process of internalising certain values. Furthermore creating or developing a collective 
identity necessitates a common base, such as ethnicity, nation or culture.
152
 
Participants of the German-American conferences only in part shared a nationality. 
Ethnicity, however, is already a different matter, as they were exclusively white and the large 
majority was Christian. And indeed already at the closing session of the second conference in 
1961, one participant claimed: “‘We’ in the discussion did not mean ‘we Americans’ or ‘we 
Germans’ and it did not mean only ‘we Germans and Americans’ but it did mean ‘we, the 
members of the free world, the members of the Western alliance’.”153 
Indeed, the organisers of the conference scheme were eager to create conducive conditions 
to achieve this. Firstly, they paid careful attention to the cultural settings of each conference, 
namely the location and the social programme framing the actual conference proceedings. 
Berlin played a special role in this regard. The organisers skilfully exploited the appeal of the 
city and its symbolic weight as frontline city of the Cold War.
154
 Secondly, a quite complex 
selection process preceding each conference resulted in the formation of a transatlantic elite 
network representing politics, business, media and academia of both countries. Members of 
this network functioned as multipliers. Thus, the specific composition thereof speaks of the 
organisers’ understanding and conviction that a genuine foreign policy consensus – the 
foreign policy paradigm of a strong German-American partnership in the Cold War – needed 
to be forged not merely in the political realm. It must also reach into all segments of society in 
West Germany as well as in the United States.
155
 Thirdly, with regard to the function of the 
debates at the conferences, the conclusion is twofold. The off-the-record panels helped to 
build a consensus and have served mediating conflicts among the parties present and beyond, 
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through frank and controversial discussions. However, the way in which the conferences and 
debates were presented to the public was a complete different matter. For, the official 
conference reports rather served to gloss over conflicts. The authors of the reports emphasised 
agreement among the participants and stressed the cordial atmosphere on the expense of a 
realistic account of discussion including differing opinions. The aim of the published 
conference reports was to portray to the public and officials in both countries how close and 
friendly German-American relations were even in times of upheaval. Overall the conferences 
proved to be a mutually beneficial undertaking for all parties involved. As illustrated, the US 
and West-German public and private sectors were densely interconnected and cooperated 
successfully in the common aim of furthering mutual understanding through the German-
American conferences. These recurring transnational elite meetings neatly complemented 
purely official channels in bilateral relations. Those channels were not intended to be used to 
contradict official diplomacy, but to create lasting and reliable relationships between 
individuals and institutions irrespective of party political affiliations and nationality. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has traced the intertwined history of two private elite organisations – the West 
German Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany – over the course of a 
quarter century. It started out by introducing the founders, four unlikely friends at the time: a 
German Jewish banker with an American passport, an independent scholar from New York, 
an East Prussian countess, and a Hamburg-born merchant. Only a few years after the end of 
World War II, Eric Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld 
came together making plans for two private groups cooperating across the Atlantic to further 
West German-American understanding and to foster friendship between Germans and 
Americans. 
However, as this study has demonstrated, West German-American post-war friendship was 
not self-propelling. Scepticism as to whether to trust the Germans on the part of Americans 
was strong: “Did they really renounce Nazism and nationalism for good?” “Were they to be 
trusted not to turn to the Soviets?” And indeed, proponents of neutralism were not only in the 
ranks of West Germany’s Social Democrats but included some Atlantik-Brücke officers and 
members. In the US, proponents of isolationism and disengagement respectively were a force 
to be reckoned with. The analysis, hence, demonstrated that the two groups’ activities were 
not limited to organising friendly coffee parties. Both the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG 
proved to be successful in assembling a transatlantically oriented “power elite”. The special 
characteristic of this elite – bridging the public-private divide – allowed for the two groups to 
assume diverse roles and functions in West German-American relations from the early 1950s 
to the mid-1970s. They acted as public diplomacy agents seeking to explain US and West 
German politics and policy to the respective other public and foreign policy elites in 
particular; mastering a tainted past, and ultimately contributing to improving their country’s 
image. They engaged in informal diplomacy, mediating and managing conflict, and rendered 
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services as policy and public relations consultants. In resuming such roles, the ACG and the 
Atlantik-Brücke could draw on a mix of public and private funds provided by the Federal 
Press Office, the Federal Foreign Office, the Ford Foundation, and fees of the organisations’ 
members. 
This study of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke illuminated three sustainable achievements 
resulting from their activities. First, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke contributed to forging a 
reliable and lasting bipartisan foreign policy consensus at whose core was a strong West-
German-American relationship. Key in achieving this was the redirection of West German 
Social Democracy away from anti-militarism, neutralism, and socialism in which transatlantic 
elite networks had no small part. This is underpinned by recently published findings 
pertaining to US government funds supporting Willy Brandt’s Berlin SPD.1 Second, the thesis 
establishes the ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s function of coordinating elites across the 
Atlantic. In doing so, the organisers helped to secure the transatlantic partnership consensus 
by conveying it into business, trade and industry circles in the US as well as in West 
Germany. Finally, by utilising their manifold links to media and academia, they assisted in 
manifesting this consensus in public discourse. These efforts turned out to be highly 
successful to forge a reliable alliance between the two countries, which would even outlast the 
Cold War to be carried on into the multipolar world of the 21
st
 century. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the “new diplomatic history” of West German-
American post-war relations in a number of ways. By transferring the state-private network 
concept to the transnational level hitherto neglected private actors  individuals and 
organisations  came into view who conducted informal diplomacy without being 
democratically legitimized. Private elites  recruited from among business and media 
communities, and academia  featured prominently in this study, shedding light on the fact 
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that the electorate have less influence on who conducts politics on the international stage. 
Thus, the research on the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG also contributes to elite studies. 
Especially with regard to the German section of the transatlantic elite network, the thesis 
proves the longevity of transnational links of representatives of the German elite. At the same 
time, it disproves the “zero hour” concept indicating a total collapse of German society 
including the elites. Instead, certain elites and their transatlantic networks endured severe 
disruptive periods during the first half of the 20
th
 century. The biographical sketches of the 
four founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke are telling examples. Their networks 
survived the Nazi regime, the Second World War, followed by occupation and division of the 
country. Moreover, these networks served as base to develop new, broader transnational elite 
networks. With regard to the activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this thesis 
contributes to the study of public diplomacy by illustrating that the nation state is not the only 
point of reference. Rather, the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s efforts show that promoting 
a country’s image can be a transnationally organised undertaking for the sake of a greater 
international project such as the formation of the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War. 
The endeavour of closing a research gap  in this thesis with regard to the intertwined 
history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke  opens new doors making visible further gaps in 
historiography. In this sense, the study indeed offers new vistas on West-German-American 
post-war relations but it also raises many new questions and outlines possible new research 
efforts. At many points of the history of these transatlantic elite organisations, historians 
could probe deeper. For example, the motivation and advantages of corporate members in the 
Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG deserve more detailed scrutiny. Furthermore, an integrated 
historical social network analysis of different transnational elite networks  the Bilderberg, 
German-English, German-French, liberal, neoliberal, and conservative networks  could 
possible shed more light on how dense and congruent the transatlantic-Western European 
foreign policy elite was during the Cold War. Last but not least, research on the transatlantic 
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project started by Christopher Emmet, Eric Warburg, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld 
could be extended by exploring how it faced the challenges of the 1970s, the shift of 
generations, the end of the Cold War, and globalisation?
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